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RUN OF THE MINE: MINERS, FARMERS, AND THE NON-UNION SPIRIT 
OF THE GILDED AGE, 1886-1896 
 
“Run of the Mine” examines why workers refused to join unions in the late 
nineteenth century. Through a focus on the men and women involved in the southern 
Midwest coal industry who quit or did not join unions, this dissertation analyzes the 
economic, geographic, and racial factors that contributed to workers’ attitudes toward 
national unions like the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). It argues that the 
fluidity between rural industries that allowed residents to work in multiple occupations 
throughout the year dramatically shaped worker expectations for their unions. This 
occupational fluidity that allowed miners to farm and farmers to mine coincided with 
farmer and worker stockholding, futures market speculations, cooperative endeavors, and 
strikebreaking efforts that complicated workplace relationships and muddled local union 
goals. Taken together, these factors caused workers to craft their own concepts of 
unionism that did not always fit with national union agendas. Workers’ disinterest in 
formal unions, then, did not come from an apathy toward unionism, but from a belief that 
unions did not offer the surest means to attain their economic, political, and social needs. 
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“Organization is simply a means to an end and not the end itself….” 
 
--“Old Residenter,” Indiana coal miner    
           United Mine Worker’s Journal, May 26, 1892 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Shadows of Canaan 
 
 Over three hundred and fifty thousand guests roamed the lavish Columbian 
Exposition buildings in a city that stood in the middle of wilderness. Not twenty years 
after its infamous fire, Chicago rose from the ashes become a bustling metropolis, “the 
City of Aladdin’s palaces,” a beacon of modernity in the heart of a “primeval” muddy 
prairie. It seemed illogical that untamed countryside could sustain a city of such stylish 
vibrancy, but this was part of the “magic” Chicago offered, and in 1893, it enchanted the 
entire world.1 
 Jack was one of the thousands captivated by the 1893 World’s Fair.2 For the first 
time in Fair history, planners dedicated an entire building to the source of the “White 
City’s”—and the world’s—rapid industrial growth. The building itself was a symbol of 
modernity, “mark[ing] an era in roof construction,” with its steel cantilever trusses 
holding a glass ceiling over the building’s central hall exhibits. Intricate relief carvings of 
men with picks and drills adorned the building’s outer walls that dwarfed Jack as he 
approached. Craning his neck to take in the enormity of the mammoth building, he saw 
two female figures carved out of the rock above the ninety-foot tall central archway. Each 
woman held out mine lanterns as if to illuminate the single word etched in stone between 
them: “MINING.”3  
                                               
1 Trumbull White and William Igleheart, The World’s Columbian Exposition, Chicago, 1893 (Philadelphia: 
International Publishing Company, 1893), 13. 
2 “Jack,” letter to the editor, “A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893. 
3Frederick Skiff, “Mines,” in White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 240. 
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 The building celebrated all facets of the wealth nature offered the modern world. 
Gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, salt, metals, and ores, all prized for their monetary value, 
pulled in thousands of patrons excited to see the precious materials literally piled in 
displays that took up  
 
Figure 1.1 “World's Columbian Exposition: Mining Building, Chicago, United 
States, 1893,” S03i2231l01, Goodyear Collection, Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn, New 
York. 
 
 
two floors and a basement level. Jack, however, came to see the other material 
prominently displayed in the mines building not for its high monetary value, but for its 
abundance that made it exceptionally cheap. To Jack’s delight, in order to see the Statue 
of Liberty carved out of salt guests also viewed an eleven-ton pillar of Great Britain coal. 
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A thirty-foot tall, twenty-three-foot-wide archway of coal served as the entrance to 
Kentucky’s Mammoth Cave replica while Cape Colony presented samples of its coal 
deposits with the 40,000 diamonds its attendants cut and polished as patrons watched. 
Amid the statues of silver and pyramids of gold stood dozens of coal columns, samples, 
and seams shipped from all over the world. Everywhere the guests looked to see the 
splendor of the new age they saw coal as well.4 
Dusty, dirty, and remarkably brittle compared to the other items displayed in the 
Mines Building, coal nevertheless was the crucial material needed to fuel the Gilded Age. 
Chicago could not become the nation’s “Second City” without the coal-powered railroads 
that connected its factories and companies to the rural periphery and the eastern urban 
centers. It fueled the engines that carried both exhibits and patrons across oceans and 
prairies to the Exposition’s fairgrounds. Perhaps most importantly, it made the coke used 
in the steel mills to forge the metal that undergirded nearly every aspect of the modern 
age. Cheap coal made cheap steel that allowed the railroads to stretch farther and more 
affordably than it had on iron rails. It made steel-infused farm equipment cheaper, 
allowing farmers who could afford the investment an opportunity to cultivate and harvest 
larger crop yields. It connected local markets to larger, more competitive ones via 
railways and steamship lines that stretched across the nation and world.5  
                                               
4 White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 239-262; R.A.F. Penrose, Jr., “Notes on the State 
Exhibits in the Mines and Mining Building at the World’s Exposition, Chicago,” The Journal of Geology, 
1:5 (Jul.-Aug., 1893) 457-470;  “Montana’s Silver Statue,” NYT, May 31,1893; “Infanta at the Fair,” EC, 
June 8, 1893; “The Spell Broken,” DISJ, August 25, 1893;.Benjamin Cummings Turman, History of the 
World’s Fair: Being a Complete Description of the World’s Columbian Exposition from its Inception 
(Chicago: Mammoth Publishing Company 1893) p. 345-347; John J. Flinn, Official Guide to the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, May 1 to October 26, 1893 by Authority of 
the United States of America (Chicago: The Columbian Guide Company, 1893) 117, 256;  Tim O’Malley, 
letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893. 
5 On the importance of coal in the late nineteenth century see Sean P. Adams, “Promotion, Competition, 
Captivity: The Political Economy of Coal,” Journal of Policy History, 18:1 (2006): p. 74:95.  
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Such developments rapidly changed how materials were produced and consumed. 
By 1893, many expected that it would not be long before all farm equipment would be 
made of steel and mining could be done with efficient “labor saving machinery.” Indeed, 
although machine miners only comprised fourteen percent of the Illinois mining force, 
they produced twenty-five percent of the state’s total coal output. Still, farms, mines, and 
railroads often lagged in the mechanization of the era compared to other industries, with 
nothing replacing the usefulness of a hickory plow on the Kansas plains or the skilled 
blow of a human hand hammering a damp and jagged rock face. The labor did not 
change, but the scale and availability of it did. Established coal operations expanded or 
opened new mines in developing regions. Meanwhile, formerly secluded mines became 
connected through railway lines so that by 1893, mines from Pennsylvania to Illinois 
competed to sell their coal in Chicago. The days of isolated local markets were fading 
and in its wake arose a new age of limitless capabilities that came from mining cheaper 
coal at a faster rate. 6 
Like much of Gilded Age society, the Fair celebrated this surplus of goods and 
how easily they were accessed. It created a world of wealth concentrated in centers that 
displayed their opulence prominently for all to see, not just at the Columbian Exposition, 
but in cities throughout the world. Ornamental coal, like hundreds of other raw materials 
                                               
6 The amount of production in machine mines compared to the non-machine mines was not wholly due to 
the speed of mining technology. Rather, machine mines were only profitable in mines where coal extraction 
required the least amount of effort, causing even hand mines in machine mining districts to produce more 
coal than mines with harder rock or thinner coal veins. The Brown Coal Mining Machine,” EMJ, 
September 17, 1892; “A New Invention,” NLT, July 20, 1878; Andrew Roy, “Ohio Institute of Mining 
Engineers,” CTJ, June 17, 1891; “Steel Head Frame at Collieries,” CTJ, December 16, 1891; Illinois BLS, 
Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1893: Twelfth Annual Report, A Supplemental Report of the State Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Containing the Tenth Annual Reports of the State Inspectors of Mines (Springfield, IL: 
H.W. Rokker,1894), XXI-XXX1, 155-6; Frederick Skiff in Trumbull and Igleheart, 261; Keith Dix, What’s 
a Coal Miner to Do?: The Mechanization of Coal Mining (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 
6. 
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arranged and presented as art at the Fair and elsewhere became a way to demonstrate 
wealth and modernity, to boast of abundance so great it could be displayed rather than 
consumed. “Sioux City [Iowa] will have a corn palace at the World’s fair; Yankton, Dak., 
a cement palace; Hutchinson [Kansas] a salt palace, and Newton [Kansas] when she gets 
her four sorghum mills to running will doubtless  
 
Figure 1.2 The Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace. “Opened by ‘Our Carter,’” CDT, 
September 15, 1891. 
 
build one of molasses candy,” the Topeka State Journal quipped, prompting newspapers 
throughout eastern Kansas to joke that their cities would build a palace of coal.7   
Such a claim was only partially in jest. Amid much fanfare, President Benjamin 
Harrison attended the first opening of a two-story coal palace in Ottumwa, Iowa. The 325 
by 215-foot wooden building was gilded with polished Iowa coal with the inside full of 
                                               
7 “The Only Corn Palace,” Sioux Valley [Correctionville, IA] News, September 4, 1890; “Sioux City,” TSJ, 
April 1, 1890 (quote); “Leavenworth a Coal Palace,” The Leavenworth [Kansas] Times, April 3, 1890; 
“Osage City a Coal Palace,” OFCP, April 10, 1890; “A Coal Palace,” reprinted from the Pittsburg 
[Kansas] Smelter in The Leavenworth [Kansas]Times, April 18, 1890; “The Flax Palace,” The Des Moines 
Register, September 1, 1891. 
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displays exhibiting the region’s farm surplus and manufactured products. Streator, 
Illinois, East St. Louis, and Brazil, Indiana, erected their own palaces celebrating the 
abundant “black diamonds” that came from their soil.8  
These displays of opulence highlighted two very different worlds centered on the 
wealth generated by surplus. One world, witnessed by Jack in Chicago, gained its wealth 
by not only being proximate to raw materials, but also by the means to use them for 
profit. The other world was also witnessed by Jack, in the Illinois mines he where worked 
just outside the city. There, rural “producers,” or those who provided the materials 
consumed elsewhere, lived and labored in a world surrounded by the surplus and wealth 
urban centers prized. In the southern Midwest coalfields of western Kentucky, 
southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern Missouri, and eastern Kansas, this 
surplus created a veritable “Canaan,” full not only of the “cheap coal” the Fair celebrated, 
but seas of inexpensive grain.  
But Canaan’s prosperity did not extend to all who lived within its borders. To 
those who produced this abundant wealth, “cheap coal” and “cheap grain” had an entirely 
different meaning. As organizers planned the Mining Building’s marvelous displays of 
coal that would not be burned, a miner three hundred miles from the fairgrounds worked 
to loosen a five-ton block of coal from the southeastern Kansas soil to be placed on 
exhibit. Due to his mine’s conditions and the size of the piece, no machine could be used 
                                               
8 Although Harrison and other guests toured it in 1890, the Ottumwa Palace was not officially completed 
until September 1891. “The President’s Trip,” The Humboldt [Iowa] Republican, October 9, 1890; “A Coal 
Palace,” OCFP, January 2, 1890; “Ottumwa’s Coal Palace,” The [Hawarden, IA] Independent, February 6, 
1890; “We see it announced,” The [Humeston, IA] New Era, February 12, 1890; “Iowa’s Coal Palace,” 
Davenport [Iowa] Daily Republican, September 17, 1890; “Ottumwa Coal Palace,” Logansport Pharos-
Tribune, August 11, 1891; “Ottumwa’s Pride To Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 1891; 
“Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “A Coal Palace,” UMWJ, June 23, 1892; “Willing Hands,” letter to 
the editor, “Welcome,” UMWJ, June 30, 1892; “No Coal Palace for Them,” Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] 
Dispatch, June 17, 1890. 
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to mine the coal so the miner extracted it by hand. Such a technique had remained 
unchanged for decades, but the wages the miner received had declined. The miner had 
agreed to extract the block in exchange for eleven dollars, which he would split with his 
assistant, and a keg of beer to be given to the extra men needed to hoist the massive block 
to the surface intact. But after the miner spent days carefully extracting the piece,  
 
Figure 1.1 Southern Midwest Coal Producing Counties 1890-1893 Map adapted from 
nationatlas.gov/mapmaker. Accessed January 11, 2014. 
 
 
he received only five dollars for his toil. Keeping his word when his employer did not, 
the miner split the five dollars with his assistant and purchased the promised beer out of 
his own earnings.9    
Jack’s and the Kansas miner’s experiences demonstrated two ways in which these 
two worlds of wealth met. To a coal miner like Jack, the Mines Building was a source of 
                                               
9 L.A. Quellmalz to Lorenzo D. Lewelling, July 29, 1893, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS. 
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both pride and vexation, symbolizing the astonishing wealth he produced but could not 
obtain. “It is a pity 
that every miner could not have been able to visit the mines building in the World’s fair,” 
the frustrated miner wrote to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. He wanted all miners to 
see that their products were needed and their labors unappreciated.  It did not seem fair, 
one Illinois mine laborer’s wife agreed. The nation depended upon the miners’ labors 
“and yet,” she grumbled, “the miner today is thought very little above the brute.” 10 
The Kansas miner’s story seemed to confirm the validity of the wife’s claim, yet 
his experience demonstrated a second way these worlds of wealth met. The need to 
maintain this abundance caused companies to over-invest in raw material production, 
lowering material prices, making it impossible to pay their workers like the Kansas miner 
the wages they were promised. Indeed, after spending over $30,000 to construct its palace 
of coal, the owners of the Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace were forced to sell “Ottumwa’s 
Pride” at public auction for $3,000 barely one year after its official opening.11 Coal was 
at the heart of progress, but, as the Mines Building demonstrated, it was pumped out of 
nearly every corner of the earth, shipped further, and in greater volumes than the 
burgeoning industrial societies could consume. Coal was everywhere and, like the miner, 
it was undervalued.12 
                                               
10 “A Mine Workers’ Wife” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892. 
11 “Ottumwa’s Pride to Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 189; “Coal Palace,” The Des Moines 
Register, December 2, 1891. 
12 Edward Atkinson, a businessman and industrialist commissioned by President Grover Cleveland to 
investigate the state of financial centers in Europe reported that the global trade values of coal in relation to 
Germany had fallen from 27.46 Marks per kilo in 1873 to 11.88 Marks in 1886. In comparison, wheat fell 
from 25.94 Marks to 15.06 Marks in that same period. Edward Atkinson, “Report Made by Edward 
Atkinson… Upon the Present Status of Bimetalism in Europe, October 1887,” 50th Congress, 1st Session, 
Senate Executive Document No. 34 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887) p. 229, 244, 275; 
Tim O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893; “Jack,” letter to the editor, 
9 
 
Rural producers like Jack, the Kansas miner, and the miner’s wife were well 
aware of these forces that continually increased coal and crop production while the 
products’ monetary value continued to decline, despite their necessity in the industrial 
age. It was why Jack wanted every miner in the world to visit the Fair to see not only the 
world’s dependence on the producer’s toil, but “the power he holds if he only would use 
it.”13 But most miners did not use the power Jack described. In fact, as Jack wandered the 
exhibits of the 1893 World’s Fair, the “mine workers’ union,” officially known as the 
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) was barely three years old and nearly dead. 
Farmers’ Alliances and other rural producer organizations were husks of the once vibrant 
organizations that seemed to hold such promise in the mid-1880s throughout the South 
and Midwest. Workers simply were not interested in organization, Illinois mine worker 
organizer Pat Donnelly observed. “There is no reason in God’s World why Illinois mine 
workers should have less than 10,000 members in a union,” he wrote of the 30,000 
miners who labored in his home state in 1893.14  But instead of 10,000 members, Illinois 
had less than 3,000.15  
What caused this lack of interest in organization? This is the question this 
dissertation seeks to answer. Farmers and miners throughout the southern Midwest 
coalfields of western Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern 
Missouri, and eastern Kansas were all exploited. Miners were seldom paid regularly or in 
cash, were forced to shop at company-owned stores, and compelled to rent company 
homes or purchase their own. Farmers, facing high taxes, high mortgages, and low crop 
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profits did not fare any better. As the nation faced the greatest economic depression in its 
history, miners and farmers alike were debt-ridden and hard-pressed to make ends meet. 
But instead of organizing into an “Industrial Crusade” that Donnelly and dozens of other 
farm and labor leaders advocated, the nation’s potential “producer army” remained 
overwhelmingly uninterested in the cause.16  
Historians have long acknowledged this inability to unite, but disagree over how 
tight bonds were between farmers and laborers, as well as the reasons for their 
organizational failures in the late nineteenth century.   Lawrence Goodwyn claimed that 
organized labor was too weak and undeveloped to create a movement culture that would 
allow workers to ally with Populist farmers.  Robert McMath and others disagreed, 
noting the vibrancy of organized labor and its involvement in similar farmer-labor 
coalitions in the years leading up to the Populist push. Such a legacy prompted Matthew 
Hild to argue that farmers and laborers did form a strong alliance, but that this alliance 
could not overcome the other factors that inhibited movement, namely the pervasive 
racism that undermined Populist strength.17  
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 Such sentiments not only undermined the strength of farmer-labor alliances, but, 
as many historians of farmer and labor movements have claimed, also weakened 
individual farm and labor organizations. Gwendolyn Mink and others have observed that 
the growing diversity among workers made it increasingly difficult for wage earners to 
unite as a solid oppositional force. Similar sentiments fractured farmers’ organizations 
and caused black farmers to form their own independent Colored Alliance when the 
Farmers’ Alliances forbid black membership.18  
These issues were compounded by additional factors that sapped union strength.  
The well-documented competition between labor leaders regarding whether trades, 
industrial, or labor unions would best care for workers’ needs further divided an already 
comparatively small rank and file. Robert Weir and others likewise noted that divisions 
within single organizations further crippled their effectiveness.19  Meanwhile, the also 
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well-documented employer and government hostility toward labor and agricultural 
organizations crushed both union and cooperative alike.20 
 Historians such as Bruce Laurie, Richard Oestreicher, and others have argued that 
these factors inhibited more than organizational effectiveness. The limitations created 
through workers’ ethnic divides, simplification of trades, organizational infighting, and 
employer or government hostility also affected what members and union leaders believed 
they could achieve. Organizations adopted a method of what Laurie called “prudential 
unionism,” that made goals more conservative than they had been in the past. Likewise, 
Oestreicher found that those who joined organizations expecting major gains became 
disillusioned when the orders fell short of their expectations. This awareness of obstacles 
preventing union success created what sociologist Kim Voss called a “cognitive 
encumbrance” that caused workers to lose faith in labor organizing and abandon their 
orders.21 
 Recent scholars, however, tend to see this period as one not necessarily of union 
decline, but of business and labor organizations learning how to function in a new 
industrial age. Although they acknowledged the limitations unions faced, the instability 
of a new industrialized market system dependent upon trade networks and transport upset 
old ways, creating a kind of instability in market negotiations that gave workers such as 
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miners, considerable bargaining power. Richard White, Andrew Arnold, and others have 
demonstrated that workers, far from powerless, inserted themselves into the ongoing 
power struggle between coal operators and railroaders for control of the coal industry. In 
the process, they helped shape business negotiations and labor relationships that laid the 
foundation for modern day business and labor dealings.22 
 Taken together, the studies of union decline as well as unions’ place in a changing 
market structure demonstrate both the weaknesses and strengths of organized labor in the 
Gilded Age. Still, the overwhelming focus on organized workers has greatly narrowed 
our understanding of what working class life looked like in industrializing America, 
implying that only organized workers embodied the spirit of working class reform. Non-
organized workers, then, become an anomaly. If organization was the only way to protest 
low wages and poor working conditions, most Gilded Age workers would seem to have 
accepted defeat, became complacent in poverty, and did not try to improve their 
conditions.  These conclusions trickle into the work of contemporary journalists, activists, 
and scholars who observe that despite living in a “Second Gilded Age,” union numbers 
remain low. Workers, they claim, “vote against their interests” in elections, seemingly 
tricked, either by their employers or political party platforms, into supporting candidates 
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who care little for the working class.23  Such assessments imply that workers, both in the 
first Gilded Age and today, are easily misled, apathetic to the problems they face, and are 
not capable of discerning what is best for them or their families.24  
But Jack’s experience at the World’s Fair indicates otherwise. Far from unaware 
of the global forces on Gilded Age industry and economics, this coal miner from Illinois 
understood quite readily that the coal he mined sat beside coal from all over the world.25 
All of it, from the Pennsylvania samples to those from New South Wales were shipped 
easily to Chicago, a city far removed from oceanic ports. More importantly, Jack knew 
that although to most patrons the samples presented all looked to same, very important 
differences affected their worth. Some industries found Pennsylvania anthracite more 
useful than the softer bituminous coal mined nearly everywhere else in the United States. 
Even among bituminous coals, the materials fused in with the coal, how fast it burned, 
and the amount of smoke it produced when burning created a graduated scale of qualities 
that affected the value. 26 These factors were complicated by other logistical concerns 
such as the amount of labor needed to mine the coal and the cost of shipping it to market, 
creating a “scale” that dictated how much coal miners earned for mining in a particular 
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York: Henry Holt, 2004); Linda Tirado, “Opinion: Why the Poor Vote ‘Against Their Own Interests,’” 
MSNBC, September 24, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/opinion-why-the-poor-vote-against-their-own-
interests, accessed December 3, 2015; MacGillis, “Who Turned My Blue State Red?,” NYT, November 22, 
2015. 
24 For a deeper examination of working-class voting trends, see Richard Oestreicher, “Urban Working-
Class Political Behavior and Theories of American Electoral Politics, 1870-1940,” Journal of American 
History 74:4 (March, 1888): 1257-1940. 
25 For a detailed examination of global coal trade expansion in the late nineteenth century, see “‘Bound Out 
for Callao!’ The Pacific Coal Trade 1876 to 1896: Selling Coal or Selling Lives? Part 1,” The Great Circle, 
28:2 (2006): p. 26-45 and “‘Bound Out for Callao!’ The Pacific Coal Trade 1876 to 1896: Selling Coal or 
Selling Lives? Part 2,” The Great Circle, 29:1 (2007): p. 3-21. 
26 J. F. Limerick letter to G. C. Boradhead, February 15, 1890, Box “3271-3299 Miscellaneous 
Manuscripts,” File 3276, SHSM, Columbia; For a detailed discussion on the science behind determining 
coal quality in the nineteenth century, see Peter Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security 
in Industrial America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p.43-46. 
15 
 
region. Such distinctions had always existed within the coal industry, but Jack and miners 
throughout the nation understood that the market that placed their coal side by side and in 
competition with other regions also pitted miners in a competition with each other. Those 
who mined coal for the lowest prices would produce the cheapest coal, allowing their 
mines to sell more. Mines that sold the most could afford to stay open full time year-
round, ensuring miners steady work, even if it was for a depreciated wage. 
But not all miners were affected by the national market in the same way. As 
Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky were pulled into competition with Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, and West Virginia, other mining regions, such as the railroad-owned mines in 
Missouri and Kansas were only indirectly affected by market competition. Their 
concerns, which were distinct from those competing for national markets, caused an east-
west divide to become more pronounced in unionizing efforts. As organizers focused on 
creating a national pay scale in the competitive districts, miners west of the Mississippi 
did not see how such efforts met their immediate needs. Miners in Indiana’s “block” coal 
field voiced similar cries of neglect. As a type of coal more valuable than typical 
bituminous coal mined elsewhere in the southern Midwest, block coal miners’ wages and 
concerns differed from those in the rest of the competitive district. Despite its differences, 
however, the block field was classified as part of the Indiana bituminous district and, like 
Missouri and Kansas, was often forced to accept UMW wage terms that applied more to 
bituminous mines in the competitive fields than to those west of the Mississippi or the 
mines of Clay County, Indiana. As a result, in different ways, the national coal market 
dictated nearly every aspect of the mining industry even if a region’s coal did not enter 
the competitive market. 
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Labor organizers claimed that this connection between regions and miners 
demanded that all mine workers from West Virginia to Kansas work together. If miners 
could organize into a national “union,” they could regulate wages and working 
conditions. But such a term can be misleading. Although late-nineteenth century workers 
used the term “union” freely, their understanding of unionism differed greatly from the 
unionism that grew in the twentieth century. Like many fraternal organizations of the 
period, groups like the Knights of Labor and Patrons of Husbandry fused moral 
understandings with their understandings of how society should function, allowing these 
orders to be as much fraternal and social clubs as they were laborer organizations. In 
addition to committing to overarching goals like abolishing the wage system and 
establishing cooperatives, Knights were to abstain from alcohol and quoted Biblical 
scripture in meetings. In the workplace, they observed “honest principles” of not stealing 
or undercutting fellow workers and working together for the collective good. Such moral 
components carried over into other farmer and laborer organizations as well. 
Organizations like the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers, the National 
Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers or the Farmers’ Alliances all professed 
moral and at times even religious conviction to their tenets. Consequently, a moral 
obligation undergirded union affiliation so that to organizers and dedicated organized 
rank and file workers a true “union man” was not only a member of a labor organization, 
but also one who lived and labored with moral conviction.  Conversely, when organizers 
or rank and file members identified someone as “non-union,” their claim implied that the 
worker rejected union membership and its principles. To go against the union, then, was 
to act immorally. 27 
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But in the late nineteenth century, national unions tended to be more abstract and 
feeble than the ideologies they claimed to embody. Often, national labor organizations 
were barely functioning orders with more ambition than strength. Leadership, though 
claiming authority over the rank and file masses were seldom more than figureheads who 
preached the ideologies of labor unionism with few practical means to implement.28  
As national labor leaders waged a war with labor ideology, many workers, both 
outside and in organization ranks, held a more complicated yet pragmatic view of 
unionism. Although the coal market operated on a national scale, wages and working 
conditions were still dramatically influenced by regional issues such as unique mining 
conditions in each mine, or a mine’s specific cost to ship its coal to market. 
Consequently, local organizers, pit committees, checkweighmen, and other local leaders 
who represented the miners’ interest in the workplace influenced miners’ decisions more 
than the national organizations. These pit committees and checkweighmen were not 
always union leaders, but simply experienced miners well-known and respected in the 
mining community. As a result, union involvement was already a secondary factor in 
negotiations between miners and boss. Most miners saw organization as one of many 
ways to take care of themselves and their families. Whereas labor leaders stressed the 
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importance of year-round union membership and dedication to protect miners from wage 
decline or lax enforcement of labor legislation, many workers saw membership as a tool 
to secure immediate goals. For miners, this caused union numbers to increase in April 
and May when yearly wage contracts were signed and strikes were most likely to occur. 
These part-time members as well as those who refused to join the union entirely rejected 
the notion that the only “good men” were those who resided in union ranks. They were 
quick to point out that, despite leaders’ claims, union membership did not denote 
“honest” labor. Rather, plenty of union members disregarded the “honest principles” they 
professed or rejected leader orders. Likewise, “good men” upheld “honest labor 
principles” without ever joining union ranks. Such instances prompted many local 
organizers to insist that hundreds of workers had the “spirit of unionism” even if they did 
not carry its card. 29 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the distinction between union and non-union grew 
increasingly muddled as market competition intensified in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century. One mine labor organizer noted that the miners were like unsorted or 
“mine run” coal, a pressurized mix of slate, clay, and silt, fused with the coal as it was 
pulled from the earth. They were “run of the mine” men, the organizer explained, because 
like the coal they extracted, their identities were muddled and blurred together, leading 
them to seemingly contradictory actions.30 They advocated dependence as they clamored 
for freedom, professed notions of honor and dignity while describing themselves as 
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unhuman, claimed to be moral when breaking strikes, and expressed an unyielding hope 
for their futures even as they proclaimed their despair.  
 
Blind Spots 
Historians have long noted the radicalism inherent in late nineteenth an early 
twentieth century organizations.31 Such a focus on the most radical adherents to unions, 
however, may make analyses of labor organizations cleaner and much less messy, but it 
ultimately misconstrues nature of late nineteenth century working class life, creating 
substantial blind spots in studies of late nineteenth century organizing. First, this attention 
to worker radicalism, particularly through union or political mobilization, reflects a 
tendency to select and extract aspects of working class life without considering the 
variegated nature of workers’ identities. Laborers who do not fit the worker radicalism 
mold, such as those who rejected labor organizations or who openly opposed labor 
legislation are frequently overlooked. Only the workers most dedicated to labor 
organizing are examined. By allowing only the most dedicated and radical voices to 
speak for the entire working class, our understanding of labor becomes skewed and, 
given the faith in organizing espoused by these workers, organizational failure becomes 
more difficult to explain. Emphasis on the radical minority makes it seem larger and 
more vibrant so that membership surges appear higher and membership decline to appear 
more dramatic than it actually was.  
                                               
31 For examples, see John Laslett, Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the 
American Labor Movement, 1881-1924 (New York: Basic, 1970); David Montgomery, Fall of the House of 
Labor: Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987); Howard Kimeldorf, Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers, and the Making 
of the Union Movement (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999). See also James Green, The Devil is 
Here in These Hills: West Virginia’s Coal Miners and Their Battle for Freedom (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2015). 
20 
 
This exclusive focus on labor organization members leads to a second blind spot 
in studies of labor organizing. While examining membership numbers or dues rates to 
monitor how membership grew or shrank in a given period can be useful, it can also 
make the organization appear more steadfast than it truly was. High membership or high 
dues are frequently taken to indicate a kind of worker “solidarity” that presumably came 
from common experiences binding workers together while low numbers or low dues 
payments indicate “fragmentation” or growing differences between workers that 
eventually dissolves worker bonds and the organization that supports them.32 In a general 
sense, this assessment is correct, but it also overstates the commitment and cohesion of 
union members whose “membership” was always tentative and conditional. Such 
analyses leave little room for rank and file members who were dissatisfied with 
organizational leadership, disobeyed organizational orders, or behaved contrary to its 
advocated principles. Without examining the fragmentation that was endemic among the 
rank and file, the organization appears more solid and united than it truly was, creating a 
larger disparity between organized and non-organized workers. 
 Finally, focusing only on organized members often causes scholars to examine 
one specific organization or industry rather than placing the organization in a broader 
context both within the labor movement as well as society. As Matthew Hild has shown, 
this exclusive focus on one industry or organization has caused historians to create a false 
dichotomy between farmer and labor organizing and political efforts.33 Connections 
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between occupations or organizations forged outside the meeting hall are therefore 
hidden, skewing our understanding of how rank and file workers interacted with each 
other and the organizations that claimed to represent their interests. For the thousands of 
farmers who worked in the mines during the winter months, these intersections were a 
critical part of life, even though they seldom called themselves “miners” and rarely joined 
the miners’ organizations year-round. 
 “Run of the Mine” seeks to restore the messiness and confusion within late 
nineteenth century organizing efforts by examining all aspects associated with it instead 
of focusing on organizations or their most devoted members. In particular, this 
dissertation considers the hundreds of thousands of workers who remained outside 
organizational ranks and those within the ranks that questioned organizational tactics, 
leadership, and decisions. Looking beyond those who carried union cards reveals that a 
wider range of working class mobilization existed and that was part of a more complex 
working class life and culture than historians usually describe. It pulls together workers in 
seemingly disparate industries, such as farming and mining and includes groups like 
strikebreakers, stockholders, mine managers, and small business owners whose worlds 
overlapped in complicated ways.  
This wider scope also pulls in actions of rural workers’ wives who were seldom 
union members themselves, regardless of their husbands’ union affiliations. Because 
women like miners’ wives could not work in the mines, they could not join industrial 
unions like those in the mining industry. Until unions formed auxiliaries in the twentieth 
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century, these women had no official relationship with their husbands’ unions.34 As such, 
historians have been slow to recognize women’s contributions to the development or 
failure of male-dominated unions in the late-nineteenth century. Like traditional labor 
studies, examinations of workers’ wives tend to imply that wives’ union activism began 
only with official organizational affiliation in the twentieth century, overlooking wives’ 
constant but informal involvement decades earlier.  
The few scholars that have considered nineteenth century workers’ wives largely 
depict them as followers rather than forceful decision-makers. They highlight supportive 
actions such as taunting strikebreakers and seldom offer examples of independent or 
sustained involvement in the late-nineteenth century labor movement. Consequently, 
even in this literature, wives only rallied during periods of strife and were uninvolved in 
union decisions.35 
As historians of farmers’ movements have observed, however, distinctions 
between “public” and “domestic” spheres were not as clear as this scholarship implies. 
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Rural wives were intimately involved in family financial affairs, often helping earn 
income and save money. For farm wives, this allowed them to join and participate in 
organizations like the Grange and Farmers’ Alliances.36 These women gave lectures at 
Grange and Alliance meetings, voted on organizational matters, and as Julie Roy Jeffery 
observed, regularly voiced their opinions in newspapers like the Progressive Farmer.37 
Such interest in activities typically associated with the “male sphere” also carried over 
into national politics. Although most women could not vote in the late-nineteenth 
century, wives and daughters took an active interest in political affairs, campaigning for 
their candidates of choice, debating political questions in local newspapers, and even 
wrote to political figureheads to help shape campaign agendas.38 Elsa Berkley Brown 
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likewise found that newly enfranchised black working class families decided together 
which way to cast the husband’s vote in elections.39 
These instances indicate that women retained a degree of influence in both 
politics and labor despite not officially having a right to vote or a job title separate from 
their husbands. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, rural wage earner wives like miners’ wives 
also participated in union decisions even though they were officially barred from 
membership. Although they never entered the coal mine, wives were intimately aware of 
the workplace issues and wage problems that affected the mining industry. To them, 
mining, like farming, was a lifestyle that pulled in all members of the family. Miners’ and 
farmers’ wives, were responsible for helping family finances, allowing them to call 
themselves “miners” without touching a pick. As a result, wives in both industries took 
an interest in labor organizing and helped their husbands decide whether or not to join. 
Those who cast their lot with the labor organization readily wrote to organizational 
newspapers like the National Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers Journal, 
participating in debates. Moreover, their forcefully expressed opinions about 
organizational affairs were entertained as valid and valued proposals from members of 
these organizations, allowing women to shape union actions and agendas without ever 
entering the meeting hall. In light of this, the bold women typically cast as anomalies in 
the male political world such as Annie Diggs, Mary Lease, or Mary Harris “Mother” 
Jones are more typical than previously understood. Consequently, no study of labor 
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organizing is complete without careful consideration of wives’ contribution to 
organizational decisions. 
Because the trade newspapers typically gave equal voice to women and people of 
color, they became a forum that allowed a freer discussion of thoughts and opinions than 
likely would have been tolerated in other arenas where physical differences were more 
apparent. Although women, immigrant, and black writers frequently identified 
themselves as such in their letters, these differences mattered less when their letters 
appeared in the newspaper.40 Instead, most tended to treat the letters as though all the 
writers were white and male unless discussing issues of race and immigration. This 
essentially allowed conversations to flow across divisions of race and gender as 
participants discussed the most pressing problems of the mining industry and the miners’ 
organizations. Due to the anonymity associated with late-nineteenth century letter writers, 
it is not always possible to discern whether writers were male or female, black or white. 
When possible, I distinguish between men and women writers simply because men 
typically had the firsthand experience in describing workplace conditions or events that 
transpired during a union meeting whereas wives’ reports could only be hearsay. 
Similarly, because black, immigrant, and native-born white miners’ experiences and 
grievances with their employers and union leaders were similar, I do not identify miner 
ethnicity in most chapters. This is because regardless of their ethnicity, the letter writers’ 
complaints come from their experiences as miners first and foremost and they speak on 
behalf of the entire industry, regardless of ethnic background. The exception to this is 
when miners clearly speak on behalf of one particular ethnicity or voice concerns and 
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experiences clearly related to their identities as black or immigrant miners. In these cases 
where ethnic background is relevant, I identify a miner’s race or ethnicity.    
Such inclusion in a  union forum make newspapers a valuable source in 
understanding non-unionism in the late nineteenth century. Like many other industries, 
coal miners’ and their labor organizations relied on newspapers to report information 
quickly and reliably to a population of workers spread across the rural countryside. State 
organizers and leaders frequently maintained official columns in the National Labor 
Tribune and United Mine Workers’ Journal that reported organizing success and failure, 
meeting minutes, and topics up for debate at national meetings. For miners wishing to 
locate better paying work, letters to the editors of labor newspapers like the National 
Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers’ Journal provided a way for miners to report 
wages and working conditions in their mines, whether the boss was fair, or whether the 
mine was on strike. Such information proved valuable to miners who traveled from mine 
to mine searching for work, but also allowed miners to voice their grievances and use the 
newspaper columns to carry on nationwide discussions of how to remedy their common 
problems.  
Such a forum for airing grievances, however, was not limited to miners frustrated 
with wages or working conditions. They also used the newspapers to discuss problems 
within their own labor organizations. Workers upset with officers or wished to see change 
in union structure frequently wrote to these same newspapers to discuss how to resolve 
organizational problems as well as those of the workplace. This trend, which had existed 
since the 1870s as miners’ organizations formed and faltered, continued when the United 
Mine Workers established its Journal in 1891. By then, miners had developed a 
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longstanding mistrust for labor leadership that grew particularly strong as UMW officers 
also served as the editors of the organization’s official organ. To remedy this, UMW 
officers and Journal editors insisted on a strict promise to publish all letters submitted to 
the newspaper, regardless of how critical they were of the miners’ organization.41 Such 
an effort, designed to build the miners’ trust for the organization, made the Journal a 
unique place for members and non-members to voice their frustrations against the UMW, 
its leaders, and its policies. Consequently, the letters printed in the pages of these labor 
papers are integral to understanding how and why rank-and-file support for workers’ 
organizations like the UMW broke down in the Gilded Age. 
This study focuses on the coal industry in the rural southern Midwest states of 
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas for several reasons. Contrary to popular 
conceptions of industry, most of the Gilded Age industrial workforce lived and worked in 
regions that were more rural than urban. Mining, railroad work, sawmills, turpentine 
making, and much of the metalmaking industries all took place in rural regions, meaning 
that most Gilded Age industrial workers resided and worked in small towns scattered 
throughout the countryside.42 Secondly, although the southern Midwest was deeply tied 
both to the national competitive coal market and the railroad industry, few histories 
consider the region’s mining history. In this region, mining often took place beside—or 
under—farm fields, allowing labor organizing to coincide with the farm organization 
efforts that swept portions of the southern Midwest in the 1890s. Third, as Gilded Age 
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prices declined, coal was often at the head of this decline, forcing prices in other 
industries down as well. While this was ideal for industrialists desiring cheap steel and 
consumers who wanted more affordable products, it also continually pulled down miners’ 
wages. By 1896, coal miners made roughly sixty-eight percent of what the average 
manufactory worker earned.43 If any industry had the grievances to bind a workforce 
together in a solid labor organization, coal would be among the likeliest of candidates.  In 
addition, although it was extremely dangerous work and often demanded precision and 
care, coal mining was largely semi-skilled labor learned on the job without prior 
experience. Coal mining therefore better reflects the 1880s and 1890s workforce that 
grew increasingly unskilled rather than the skilled workers frequently examined in labor 
studies. The fact that coal mining was unskilled/semi-skilled labor also eliminated some 
of the unionbusting tactics employers used. Anyone who wanted to mine coal could do so 
without any prior training or experience, learning the trade as they performed it. 
Employers or “operators” paid the same wage regardless of skill or ethnicity so that all 
workers shared the same experiences, dangers, and earnings with no stratification as 
appeared in many other industries to thwart worker organizations.44 
All of these factors should have helped create a strong miners’ union, and in some 
respects, historians have claimed that it did. When the Knights of Labor mining trade 
assembly merged with the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers to 
form United Mine Workers (UMW) formed in January 1890, the new miners’ 
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organization claimed to have over 34,000 in its ranks. Historians of the organization cite 
this number and frequently jump forward to the late 1890s when the UMW made its first 
major gains as a labor organization under the direction of UMW President and former 
Illinois miner John Mitchell. Those that do consider the period focus more on union 
leadership learning the importance of “disciplining union members.”45  Such claims 
imply that the UMW was numerically strong, but that the rank and file simply lacked the 
discipline to obey leadership. But the trouble the UMW faced extended beyond leaders’ 
inability to control their ranks and miners’ actions in the late nineteenth century were 
caused by far more than a lack of discipline. Rather, most of the nation’s miners 
remained outside the organization and still more abandoned the union when membership 
proved unbeneficial. By 1892, the UMW was in a steep decline that only continued 
despite organizer efforts to revive the order. 
 
Examining the Non-Union Spirit 
This dissertation also examines why a strong coalition of mine workers never 
formed in the nineteenth century. Pulling primarily from mine workers’ and wives’ own 
letters, it explores the lives and decisions rural workers made, giving careful attention to 
the factors that influenced whether a mining family supported the miners’ unions. As a 
result, this dissertation puts forward four main arguments. First and foremost, it argues 
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that distinctions between farmer, business owner, investor, wage earner, and wife were 
not as separate as scholars have implied. Rather, these identities overlapped considerably 
in the late nineteenth century in ways that directly impacted family life, incomes, and 
behavior. Second, it demonstrates that workers were well aware of the economic forces 
that dictated work conditions and wages as well as what successful collective action 
could potentially achieve. Third, it maintains that worker rejection of formal unions did 
not denote a dislike for union principle. Instead, workers and wives formed their own 
objectives and concepts of unionism that did not always fit with union agendas or 
allowed them to affiliate with two seemingly different unions simultaneously. 
Consequently, the divisions emphasized between organizations like the Knights of Labor 
and the American Federation of Labor were more important to union leadership than to 
the rank and file. Finally, this dissertation argues that workers failed to join unions not 
because they were apathetic about their conditions or disillusioned with unionism, but 
because they believed that the labor organizations did not adequately address their most 
pressing needs and desires. 
To present these key points, I examine five events that did not happen. A national 
union that never united, union miners who failed to strike, a planned strike that never 
occurred, a union that failed to accept all who carried membership cards, and a putative 
victory that looked more like defeat are the focal points of the five chapters that comprise 
this work. Each non-event highlights a distinct aspect that contributed to worker rejection 
of labor organizations or decisions to disobey union leader orders. The next chapter offers 
a brief overview of late nineteenth century business and producer responses to it. It shows 
that producer concerns that figures with authority were deceiving average people and 
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taking advantage of them ultimately generated mistrust for labor leadership. Although 
leaders in the Knights of Labor and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers 
insisted that these problems would fade when the two organizations merged into a single 
national miners’ union, these concerns of fraud and deception ultimately caused workers 
to reject the new order so that despite much fanfare and promise of cooperation, the 
united miners’ union did not form. 
The third chapter looks more closely at the rural workers’ world. Although they 
criticized the hypocrisy and greed of businessmen, investors, politicians, and ministers 
who took advantage of workers, many of these workers committed the very acts they 
condemned. This chapter examines the overlap between farmers, miners, and investing, 
demonstrating that miners not only understood business concepts of profit, but that 
looking out for one’s own interest was infectious.  Workers, like businessmen, often set 
aside union principles when it was more advantageous to break a strike or work for less 
pay than the union demanded. While union leaders were supposed to push for higher 
wages for workers, such pushes did not always occur. This chapter ends with an 
examination of an instance where after encouraging miners to strike for higher wages, 
labor leaders backed away from their claims and told miners to accept a wage reduction. 
As non-union miners went on strike for an “honest wage,” organized miners, under leader 
orders broke the strike. As a result, lines between “union” and “non-union” became 
blurred. 
Chapter Four continues with this theme of worker dissatisfaction with a close 
examination of the effects of a strike that never occurred. Despite constant campaigning 
and advertising for a nationwide strike for the eight-hour workday set to begin on May 1, 
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1891, union officers called off the strike at the last minute, claiming that the newly 
formed United Mine Workers (UMW) was too weak to achieve its goal. The following 
months marked the beginning of steep membership decline that came not from miners’ 
disillusion with unionism in general, but a firm belief that UMW leaders had “backslid” 
from the principles they were supposed to uphold. As a result, miners throughout the 
nation not only left the UMW, but formed new miners’ organizations that rivaled the 
national order. Although labor leaders insisted that those who turned their backs to the 
UMW were the true “backsliders,” the workers’ actions indicated that their faith in 
unionism did not waver even if their faith in labor organizers did.  
While Chapter Four examines those who turned their back to major labor 
organizations, Chapter Five focuses on the workers who claimed national unions like the 
UMW turned their backs to them. Although organizations like the Knights of Labor and 
United Mine Workers claimed to accept workers of all races, religions, and ethnic 
backgrounds, such inclusion never truly occurred. This chapter therefore explores those 
who were on the fringes of labor organizing, who did not completely fit with the white 
male miner profile. Black, non-native-English-speaking miners, farmers who worked in 
the mines, and miners’ wives who did not work in the mines were associated with the 
miners’ unions in ways different from the white males who dominated the order. This 
chapter examines the grievances unique to these outlier groups, giving careful attention to 
how factors of ethnicity affected worker expectations for the unions that claimed to 
represent their interests. Careful examination of labor legislation pursued by groups like 
the UMW indicate that despite their claims for inclusion, native-English-speaking white-
dominated labor organizations were uninterested in promoting racial and ethnic equality 
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in the workplace or society. This disregard for racial and ethnic concerns pushed many 
black and non-English-speaking miners away from the order and at times caused them to 
form their own rival unions. Such instances show that white women and white farmers 
were more accepted by the miners’ orders than the non-white and non-native-English-
speaking miners of the trade.  
The sixth chapter turns away from the workplace and looks at workers’ 
understanding of union leaders’ responsibilities and dedication to the workers’ interests. 
It focuses specifically on the outcome of the 1894 bituminous miners’ strike when over 
100,000 bituminous coal miners set down their tools in hopes of earning a higher wage. 
With UMW membership only measuring 13,000 at the time of the strike, union officials 
and miners alike marveled at the turnout that almost entirely shut down bituminous coal 
production. The massive numbers caused both miner and organizer to believe that victory 
was certain, but as farmers and other workers entered the mines to fill the national coal 
demand, UMW leaders ended the strike and settled for a wage less than what the miners 
desired. Miners questioned leader dedication to the workers’ cause. Although leaders 
insisted that the small wage increase the workers secured was still a victory, the miners 
disagreed. This chapter, then, examines the outcome of a strike victory that appeared on 
paper, but not in the mines. As charges of UMW leader corruption surfaced, organized 
miners overthrew their leadership in an effort to “purify” their decaying union. Their 
efforts coincided with other organizations’ efforts to revive their own orders, which 
ultimately led to the Knights of Labor ending its alliance with the UMW, and prompted 
union miners, along with workers in other industries, to form a new organization that 
would rival the Knights. While leaders of these fracturing orders fought over the 
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remaining scraps of their failing unions, thousands of workers questioned why they 
should join an organization more interested in fighting other labor organizations than 
improving workers’ lives. As a result, as union leaders “sold out” the miners’ interests, 
workers turned in their union cards, believing they had a better chance of taking care of 
their families without it. 
In the end worker rejection of unions or union leadership is neither a sign of 
unwillingness to care for “their interests” nor unique to the Gilded Age. Rather, the “non-
union spirit” that ran rampant in southern Midwest mines reflected a disconnection 
between labor organizations and the rank and file they represented that can be found in 
all industries an in all time periods, including the present day. What follows is a story of 
those, like Jack, who worked in and was worked by the worlds of wealth that fueled the 
Gilded Age. But it is also a story of hope and despair, of community and division, and of 
union and non-union that are mixed and fused together in ways that cannot be separated. 
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Chapter Two 
Imposters: Markets, Deception, and the 1888 Union Merger 
 
Edgar Simpson had just sat down to supper when the alarm whistle pierced the 
quiet Kansas countryside. The thirty-two-year-old iron smelter froze. Having worked as a 
coal and metal miner in Colorado and Kansas before joining the smelting trade, he knew 
the alarm signaled an accident at one of the mines. Within minutes, a young boy, running 
over a mile and a quarter through sleet and freezing rain, had burst into Simpson’s home 
and exclaimed “that mine number 2 had blown up and everybody in it.” Upon hearing the 
news, Simpson ran to join the rescue effort. Without breathing a word, he “got up and got 
my pit coat and… struck out for number 2.” 1 
It was already dusk when Simpson reached Frontenac Mine No. 2 a half an hour 
after the explosion, but as he peered through the sleet and rain, he stood in awe of the 
chaos. The November 1888 explosion tore through the earth, creating rifts in the soil. It 
blew out the fan house, moving it two feet from its foundation. It shattered the hoist and 
shot out blazing timbers, which lay smoldering around the shaft. Haggard wives stood 
planted with their children by the shaft despite the winter storm, screaming for someone 
to enter the mine while local men and miners from nearby towns worked frantically to 
clear airways and rig a new hoist.2 
Everyone knew the mine’s breathable air was running out, but it still took 
Simpson and the other rescuers hours to reach the bottom of the shaft. Enduring the 
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searing heat, smoke, and mine gas, the party worked until three in the morning, moving 
methodically down the mine track replacing timbers, clearing air passages, and searching 
rooms for survivors.3 Amid the debris, Simpson discovered the charred body of John 
Baptiste Labecq, burned beyond recognition.4 The thirty-one-year-old miner’s hair was 
“singed to a crisp; the flesh singed to a crisp.” But to Simpson, the most memorable 
damage was caused by Labecq’s poorly-fit clothing. His shirt, Simpson explained, “was 
too short for him and it left a band of flesh exposed between it and his pants.” While 
Labecq’s ill-fitting clothing always made labor in the mines more difficult, it had 
especially distressing effects in the explosion. In the blast that melted dinner pails and 
soldering, Labecq’s unprotected skin burned instantly. Not realizing this, Simpson tried 
to move the miner by grabbing what he mistook as Labecq’s leather belt “and the flesh 
came off in my hands.”5 
The circumstances that created Labecq’s “belt” demonstrated how national 
markets, company authority, and unsafe working conditions had an impact on every 
aspect of a miner’s life. Rural mines like Frontenac No. 2 were often spread apart for 
miles, making it difficult for mine inspectors to check mines or enforce mining laws.6 
Mine owners took advantage of the lax law enforcement and decreased production costs 
by ignoring safety protocol like wetting dry mines to prevent coal dust from hanging in 
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the air.7 To lower wages they hired inexperienced miners, such as Jimmy Wilson. The 
seventeen-year-old farmer’s son was hired as a mule driver, but when the company 
ordered the mine to increase production, the mine boss put Wilson to work digging coal.8 
During the evening blast to loosen the coal, Wilson packed his “shot” improperly. His 
blast backfired, ignited the coal dust in the dry mine, and shot fire down the corridors. It 
incinerated Labecq’s flesh that was exposed because the company store he was 
compelled to shop at did not sell properly-fitting clothing he could afford. Lacodia 
Labecq later identified her husband’s charred body by this peculiar burn, but she, like 
many wives, could not afford a proper burial.9 Instead, John Labecq and many of the 
other fifty-six men and boys killed in the explosion were buried in an unmarked mass 
grave.10 
The company, then, dictated not only how Labecq worked but also how he lived 
and died. In their efforts to increase profits, companies discounted miners’ safety and 
lives, turning them into replaceable parts. Employers used company stores, debt, and a 
host of other techniques, forcing miners to risk their lives for company gain.  
Many of those who labored in the mines saw this treatment as part of a larger 
problem that plagued the nation. They were members of an enormous body of 
“producers” who toiled to provide the wealth that went to someone else. As coal and crop 
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that listed the names of all miners known to occupy each grave. Nikki Patrick, “Today Is Anniversary of 
Mine Disaster,” Morning Sun [Pittsburg, Kansas], November 9, 2008.  
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prices fell, miner and farmer earnings decreased drastically. Meantime, they watched 
their employers, bankers, merchants, and stockholders grow wealthier. Thousands of 
farmers and laborers throughout the southern Midwest understood that they were little 
more than “slaves.” In their employers’ eyes, they became “brutes,” “things,” and “mice” 
whose lives were expendable.11  
But, like Labecq’s belt, the way things seemed was not as they actually were. 
Edgar Simpson understood this when he grabbed for a leather belt and instead felt the 
miner’s flesh tear away from his body. The miner’s bare skin showed the company’s 
disregard for his life and demonstrated on a fundamental level how grotesque and 
disturbing this relationship between employer and employee was. Employers and much 
of Gilded Age upper and middle class society may have regarded the poorer classes as 
immoral and untrustworthy beings, but producers saw themselves as honorable and 
upright. Men and women such as those who spent the long, wintry night at the Frontenac 
shaft stood in stark contrast to their employers. Instead of working for profit, men like 
Simpson walked away from their supper and spent days rescuing his neighbors while 
miners from other towns sacrificed their own pay and risked their lives for men they had 
never met. 
The producers of Frontenac believed they were the ones who lived upright lives in 
a selfish world. They were the ones with hearts, souls, and morals whereas their 
employers and the rest of society were the true heartless beings who gambled, lied, and 
stole simply to earn more money faster. Such a revelation prompted the Christian 
Advocate to call for missionaries to “Christianize the upper masses” rather than focus 
                                               
11 On the expendability of miners and how miners reacted to it, see Michael K. Rosenow, Death and Dying 
in the Working Class, 1865-1920 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 68-97. 
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solely on converting the lower classes to Christianity. “If religion is a good thing to make 
a servant submissive, why is it not a good thing to make an employer human?” the editors 
asked. “If the Christian religion will… prevent miners from deeds of violence, why will it 
not also cause mine owners to treat their men as men?”12 
Historians have been careful to highlight the common religious and moral rhetoric 
that mobilized producers and earned sympathy and support from middle class 
constituents.13 Less is known about how average farmers and workers understood and 
applied these thoughts to their daily lives. For thousands of rural producers like Labecq 
or those who viewed and buried his body, the moral injustice they witnessed was far from 
rhetorical. To them, the exploitive relationship between those who produced the nation’s 
wealth and those who benefited from it was morally wrong and unconstitutional. They 
couched their grievances in moral and political terms that continually reaffirmed their 
identities as moral citizens and human beings entitled to kindness and fair treatment 
rather than disposable tools that had no souls to save. 
These beliefs resonated among laborers in multiple occupations who were not 
only frustrated with poor treatment, but understood that these conditions would continue 
as long as market competition increased. Still, even though organizers emphasized these 
points in their speeches, their words were not enough to convince producers to unite and 
confront their common foes. Instead, many producers applied their misgivings for 
leadership to labor leaders as well, questioning whether they truly cared about the 
workers as they claimed. Even as the Frontenac miners buried their dead, two 
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organizations vied to be the sole defender of the miners’ interests: the Knights of Labor 
and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers (NFM). As leaders fought to 
kill their opposing order, miners found good evidence that worker concerns were 
secondary to union survival and demanded that the war between unions stop. 
Yet, when leaders of the two orders finally decided to put aside differences and 
merge into a single union as their rank and file demanded, thousands of union miners 
refused to join. The two unions’ failure to merge was the first in a series of un-makings of 
a national movement in the coal industry. This false start came not from workers’ apathy 
toward unionism, but from their belief that labor leadership was another facet of Gilded 
Age fraud, akin to deceitful businessmen, corrupt politicians, selfish employers, and 
money-loving ministers who acknowledged the nation’s producers only enough to exploit 
them.  
 
Deceptive Markets 
To many rural producers, deceit ran rampant through Gilded Age business and 
was epitomized by men like Charles J. Devlin. Born around 1853 to Irish immigrants in 
northern Illinois, Devlin grew up in poverty. His mother, Bridget, worked as a 
washerwoman and raised her son and his eleven-year-old sister alone. Devlin was 
arrested for larceny as a teenager and spent the early years of adulthood in the Illinois 
State Penitentiary. Upon his release, he began working as a clerk for a coal company.14 
He climbed the ladder to manager and in 1884, with the financial support of his father-in-
                                               
14 Devlin’s term in prison, originally only three years, was elongated due to his escape and recapture. 
“Charles J. Devlin,” Illinois Department of Corrections, ―Alton State Penitentiary and Joliet/Stateville 
Correctional Center – Index to Registers of Prisoners, Record Series 423.201, Illinois State Archives, 
Springfield, IL; “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910; “United 
States Census, 1870," Family Search, “Charles Devlin,” https://goo.gl/1xaccE (accessed October 23, 2014). 
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law, Devlin founded the Spring Valley Coal Company, the start to a vast and wealthy 
coal-powered empire.15 By 1896, Devlin lived in Topeka, Kansas, but his authority in the 
coal industry spanned from Illinois to New Mexico and included the Frontenac mine that 
exploded in 1888. His influence reached into board rooms in St. Louis and Chicago, New 
York City and Boston. The twenty-six companies he owned or managed in the mining, 
railroad, real estate, and banking industries made him a millionaire, but his methods of 
earning his fortune were not always transparent. 16 Rather, Devlin’s life reflected a 
broader trend within Gilded Age business where false fronts, false markets, and false 
products generated millions of real dollars.  
Devlin’s rise from criminal to coal baron was not due solely to hard work, owning 
major corporations, or even savvy investing. Rather, it came from the railroads, eastern 
businessmen, and government financers who needed a manager to look after their 
companies and investments in rural and western lands. In addition to his father-in-law’s 
funds, Devlin received subsidies from local businessmen and railroad operators seeking 
to develop Spring Valley. Journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd claimed that several local 
railroads worked with Devlin’s Spring Valley Coal Company to control the city’s 
development and ensure their businesses received the greatest profits. This growth, Lloyd 
asserted, only came with hushed agreements for “special freight rates needed to enable 
the ‘enterprise’ to steal the business of its competitors.”17 More importantly, although he 
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was one of its founders, Devlin was not the primary shareholder of the Spring Valley 
Coal Company. He managed the mines, but Devlin answered to eastern stockholders such 
as Democratic Pennsylvania Congressman William L. Scott, who was more than an 
investor and politician. His interests tied him to multiple regions and industries, making 
him a shipping magnate, New York Stock Exchange operator, railroader, bank president, 
and racehorse breeder. To miners, however, he was a “coal king” with mines in 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Illinois, including the Spring Valley Coal Company.18  
Devlin served as Scott’s manager and continued this relationship with other investors 
when he moved west and started a new coal company affiliated with the Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad (ATSF).  There he amassed a fortune while managing the 
Devlin Coal Company along with several other coal companies affiliated with the ATSF 
railroad.19   
Devlin’s relationship with his employers reflects a critical trend often neglected in 
histories of Gilded Age politics and investment. Historians investigating these areas often 
focus on the changes taking place at the state and national level. Railroad expansion not 
only transformed product shipment and markets, but also opened new doors for investing, 
connecting railroaders, mine owners, stockholders, bankers, merchants, and government 
officials in complex webs that spanned across multiple states. As Richard White noted in 
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19 “Devlin’s New Move,” OCFP, September 17, 1896; “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles 
Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910. For a deeper examination of railroad involvement in the development and 
function of the coal industry see Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, especially p. 37-43; 92-102, 185-220. 
43 
 
many instances, this web was often controlled by the same individuals under a host of 
complex business and investment fronts that failed more often than they flourished.20  
Less is known about how these failing fronts operated on the ground level. 
Managers like Devlin were integral to Gilded Age investment, handling businesses and 
accounts in the rural countryside for employers that lived in urban centers hundreds of 
miles away. In cases like the mines Devlin managed for Scott and the ATSF, individual 
mines or mining companies were small parts of a larger whole that often teetered on the 
edge of bankruptcy.21 Devlin’s multiple companies were little more than shoddy entities 
that moved property between each other to avoid expenses and bankruptcies.22 
Consequently, when the Frontenac miners’ families settled with the Cherokee and 
Pittsburg Coal Company eight years after the 1888 explosion, Devlin overdrew the coal 
company’s account. Within days, ATSF board members and accountants shuffled funds 
to float the Cherokee and Pittsburg $40,000, most of which originated from the ATSF’s 
“surplus cash.”23 When a similar need for cash occurred in 1905, however, the ATSF did 
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not come to Devlin’s aid. As the manager, Devlin was responsible for several indebted 
companies, nearly four million dollars of missing government and corporate money, and 
at least four bank closings in three states. After filing for bankruptcy, Devlin was placed 
under investigation and died of a stroke before his case was settled.24 
Although historians have observed how major corporations overextended 
themselves and often failed, Devlin’s experience showed that this happened to companies 
more often than was publicly known. Despite his close relationship with the railroad, the 
ATSF was not implicated and seldom even mentioned in the news stories regarding the 
scandal. Even by 1907, two years after Devlin’s failure and death, the investigation had 
not untangled the web of Devlin’s business connections and a 1910 article in FUEL 
remembered Devlin as a coal magnate who singlehandedly developed the western 
coalfields.25 In reality, he was a railroad employee whose coal interests depended on the 
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ATSF. His companies, moreover, appear as isolated entities when they were actually 
small parts of vast corporate holdings that spanned the nation.  
This national expansion was critical to the coal industry. Unlike other industries 
where a handful of corporations dominated the trade, no single corporation had a hold on 
the market. Most nineteenth century coal mines in the southern Midwest were hand 
mines, or mines that required little industrial equipment and low upfront cost. As long as 
a landowner had a means to reach the coal and hoist it out, his coal was as good and as 
cheaply produced as the largest mine enterprises.  This meant that small-scale coal mines 
with ten to thirty miners continually cropped up along the countryside.26 And as railroads 
stretched into the countryside, these mines began shipping their coal to urban markets, for 
the first time causing Indiana and Illinois mines to compete with those in Ohio and 
western Pennsylvania. The sheer number of mine owners and operators made it 
impossible for the nation’s coal operators to organize like other industries that would 
control prices or keep unions out. Even if some of the biggest coal kings like William 
Scott attempted to set a high coal price, other companies underbid them, rendering any 
operator organization powerless to raising profits.27 
Still, if they could not corner the coal market, large operators could undersell it. 
By underpricing coal, companies landed more contracts with urban coal dealers and 
consumers so that the increased volume of their coal sold absorbed the cut in profit.28 
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Mine owners with vast holdings like William Scott who owned dozens of mines could 
shut down a mine or region, relying on other holdings for revenue until mining became 
more profitable. In doing so, they could drive out single-mine owners who could not 
afford to run their mines with such low profit margins. The result, however, created a 
competitive and overstocked national coal market as companies battled for the lowest 
prices that would steal coal contracts from competitors.29 
Although farm labor is seldom classified with industrial operations, farmers faced 
a similar problem. Like coal, the crops they produced were sold in nationwide markets 
that were flooded by the 1880s. Enormous farms consisting of hundreds of thousands of 
acres, such as the bonanza farms in the Dakotas, turned farming into a corporatized 
industry. These farms, often owned by landowners who lived in the east, were divided 
and sub-divided into tracts worked by hundreds of farm laborers who earned daily wages 
and were managed by foremen. Similar to miners in company towns, these workers lived 
in company-owned boarding houses and some shopped at company stores. The scale of 
production enabled bonanza wheat farms to sell their grain at a substantially lower price 
than smaller farmers, affecting grain prices throughout the nation. The Missouri Bureau 
of Agriculture found that these farms were one of the primary factors in declining grain 
prices. Wheat, which averaged $1.14 in Chicago in 1882 fell to $.85 in 1889. Corn and 
oat prices during the same period were cut in half.30 But production only increased. By 
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1892, the US Secretary of Agriculture reported that wheat production in the Dakotas 
alone surpassed the entire national output just fifty years earlier.31  
Unlike other industries that produced finished products whose surpluses could be 
shipped to other regions or countries, farmers’ and coal operators’ products were 
produced in nearly every industrializing country more cheaply than ever before.32 David 
A. Wells, an economist and free-trade advocate, claimed this fact combined with the 
rapidly expanding railroads in North America, Australia, Argentina, Russia, and India 
created an intensifying global market with prices and sales that hinged on a region’s 
ability to ship their products by land or sea affordably.33 According to historian Chester 
McArthur Destler, this dynamic “served to stimulate economic expansion until world 
markets were glutted with both agricultural and industrial products.”34  
Few industries were more competitive than the global wheat market. By the1880s, 
the United States exported roughly one third of its wheat crop each year, primarily to 
European countries. Market competition intensified as wheat farmers in India, Argentina, 
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and Egypt dramatically increased their production in the 1880s and sold their crops at 
lower prices than US farmers could afford. Between 1868 and 1887, India increased its 
wheat production from 558,852 bushels to 41,558,765 bushels. This escalation was 
mirrored in wheat-producing nations throughout the world, all competing to sell their 
grain to Europe. In an 1887 study of global wheat cultivation, the statistician to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture reasoned that European immigration to South America would 
only intensify the “wheat culture” in Argentina and Chile. Such a “stimulation of the 
industry” would dramatically increase competition. Wheat prices, which were governed 
by the global market, would steadily decline.35  
But such a decline was not as visible at the New York Produce Exchange, 
Chicago Board of Trade, and the dozens of other trading centers throughout the United 
States and Europe. Despite the growing agricultural crisis in the fields, traders a world 
away bought and sold wheat and other crops before they were ever harvested. The new 
kind of trading, known as “futures” markets was a kind of market speculation and trade 
that gambled on the expected value of future crops without any products physically 
changing hands.36 Like coal companies that formed contracts with businesses promising 
to supply coal, dealers in agricultural products like wheat, cotton, hemp, and livestock 
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arranged contracts settling prices for goods yet to be produced.37 This allowed merchants 
who purchased crops from farmers or farmers’ agents to sell their future products while 
prices were high rather than for the market price when the crops were ripe. Doing so 
involved investing with money borrowed from banks with interest.38 If the merchant sold 
at the right time, his profit absorbed the interest and his investment proved worthwhile. If 
he sold at the wrong time his gains would be substantially less, even leaving him in 
debt.39   
The risks involved with futures investing and the uncertainties that came from 
selling products not yet grown, however, gave many farmers and merchants pause. By the 
late 1880s, futures trading had become a major form of trade, but to many, the entire 
system seemed dishonest and immoral. “This gambling—I call it gambling—the most 
shrewd, subtle system that ever emanated from the brain of man and the most hard to get 
at the bottom of. They will bamboozle you out of your senses,” former grain dealer 
William Howard argued to a congressional committee investigating futures trading. A 
farm agent for Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Minnesota farmers, Howard argued that 
futures trading involved more than merchants hedging their purchases. It only protected 
merchants when the price of crops went down and therefore encouraged merchants to 
manipulate crop prices in order to increase investment returns. “How is it? How is it that 
the hog product of the United States has not paid the cost for the last ten years and yet 
these [merchants] have grown to be millionaires. How did they do it?” In the constant 
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fluctuation of prices, Howard claimed, futures stock opened the door for corruption and 
wild speculations disproportionate to crop supply.  “I say it is the greatest evil that ever 
struck the United States of America,” he insisted. “I tried it far enough to see that an 
honest man could not make a living at it and I got out.”40  
The notion of evil lurking within the burgeoning economic system indicated a 
growing conflict within society between capitalist profit and morality. Because of the 
potential for high returns, futures markets reached as far as the global wheat and cotton 
trade, from England to India to Chile to Kansas. But farmers like C. Wood Davis of 
Kansas believed it injured farmers’ profits and gave businessmen more control over crop 
prices than the farmers. To Wood, the physical supply of wheat did not matter as much as 
the amount traders anticipated on the exchange floor when they traded “enormous 
quantities of fiat or fictitious products.” Everything emanating from the futures sale 
seemed fabricated by businessmen who turned a profit without physically owning 
anything.41 Historian Ann Fabian contends these claims of dishonesty and immorality 
came out of citizens trying to reconcile not only how hard work was not rewarded, but 
also how previously unacceptable practices such as gambling became the norm. Farmers 
saw those who won in the futures markets as “modern incarnations of the scheming 
gamblers who brought nothing to market but tricks and ruses and crept away with profits 
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to which they had no right.”42 Such an understanding prompted farmer A. M. Burdick to 
declare that “[t]hese men who ‘operate’ on the boards of trade (more appropriately called 
gambling hells) have no more right to the consideration of honest men than the devil has 
to a seat in heaven.”43   
More and more, it seemed, the new industrial age found ways to replace old ways 
with new versions that seemed less honest. Like “fictitious” wheat sales, the invention of 
a “false butter,” made mostly from tallow and lard leftover from the meatpacking 
process, incensed dairy farmers and alarmed consumers who feared that the new 
oleomargarine was less wholesome than traditional butter.44 Each of these cases, from 
enormous but financially weak corporations quietly branching into multiple industries to 
stock trading, to industrialized butter seemed to go against natural and moral ways. They 
hurt producers while reaching for profits and fabricated cheaper products that kept the 
prices of genuine products lower. 
Citizens looked to the government to regulate these practices, to check the 
expansion and corruption that seemed to stretch everywhere. Yet, state and federal 
governments often overlooked even blatant corruption. Railroads and coal mines 
continued to generate profits through loopholes that exempted them from government 
                                               
42 Ann Fabian, Card Sharps and Bucket Shops: Gambling in Late Nineteenth Century America (New York, 
Routledge, 1999), 154. 
43 A. M. Burdick to M. C. Hatch, Fictitious Dealings,306. 
44  “Imitation Dairy Products,” 49th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record vol. 17 pt. 5  at 4966 (1886); 
HCA, The Oleomargarine Bill: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture  and Forestry, United States 
Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture, H.R. 3717, 56th Cong. 2nd sess, Report 2043 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1901); “The Fraud Upon the Dairymen,” Lawrence [Kansas] Daily Journal, 
May 14, 1886; “National Grange,” Bloomington [Illinois] Pantagraph,, November 23, 1887; “Country 
Butter,” letter to the editor, “Don’t like Oleo,” NLT, February 13, 1892; Ruth Dupré, “‘If It’s Yellow, It 
Must Be Butter’: Margarine Regulation in North America Since 1886,” The Journal of Economic History 
59:2 (June, 1999): 353-371; Richard A. Ball and J. Robert Lilly, “The Menace of Margarine: The Rise and 
Fall of a Social Problem,” Social Problems  29:5 (June 1982): 488-498; Christopher Burns, “Bogus Butter: 
An Analysis of the 1886 Debates on Oleomargarine Legislation” MA thesis, (University of Vermont, 
2009). 
52 
 
oversight. Railroad mines, for example, were not held to the pay laws other mines were 
supposed to follow, allowing mines like Frontenac No. 2 to pay their miners whenever 
they saw fit.45 After years of trying to discern between “gambling,” and futures markets, 
the U.S. government declared futures trading legal. They believed that banning them 
from the United States would not stop the global futures trade and that the profit from 
futures aided the nation’s growth as powerfully as the thousands invested in railroads.46 
Although the Supreme Court ruled that marketing margarine as the equivalent of butter 
was “fraudulent” in 1886, the Oleomargarine Act passed that same year declared it was 
an honest product as long as it was not colored yellow.47 To the average rural producer, 
these changes were part of a dizzying world of dishonesty where invisible empires rose 
out of nothing, profits came from pushing prices lower, and success seemed to defy 
morality and logic. The government’s willingness to allow these practices seemed to 
indicate that business mattered most and the producers were worth little at all. 
 
Inhuman 
The business practices inherent in the new market system stood at odds with how 
many rural producers believed the nation should function. Thousands in the southern 
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Midwest remained rooted in a worldview that fused together “Jefferson and Jesus.” 
Moral acts such as respecting one’s neighbor, not stealing, not lying, working hard, and 
pursuing honesty over corruption, they believed, were the keys to a successful life.48 Yet, 
the new fast-paced market system offered a new alternative for success. Instead of 
rewarding labor, the national market rewarded greed, corruption, and gambling while 
slighting those who toiled. Efforts to gain higher profits forced debts onto producing 
classes, created high interest rates on mortgages, contributed to falling earnings in mining 
and agriculture, and cut corners in workplace safety while demanding more work for less 
pay.49  
Falling crop prices, combined with shipping costs, taxes, interest, and mortgage 
all chipped away at a farmer’s earnings so that, as one Kansas farmer put it, “farming 
don’t pay.” 50 Each year farmers throughout the South and Midwest were deeper in debt 
to banks and local merchants who allowed farmers credit until their crops were harvested. 
Because bankers “prefer the interest to the property,” they seldom foreclosed on indebted 
farms. Still, thousands of farmers searched for ways to avoid “subsist[ing] as a slave.”51 
The Kansas and Iowa statistics bureaus acknowledged that land tenancy increased not 
because of foreclosures, but because it was more lucrative for farmers to sell their farms 
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than to farm land they owned.52 Farmers like Frontenac’s Richard Wilson and his son 
Jimmy looked to the mines as a way to supplement their incomes. Others, along with 
thousands of unneeded farm hands, entirely abandoned their farms for the mines, iron 
works, railroads, and factories.53 
The presence of Jimmy Wilson in Frontenac No. 2, then, was not an anomaly, but 
part of a broader trend taking place in rural America as farm profits declined. Far from 
remaining committed to a single occupation, rural farmers and laborers flowed from one 
occupation to another, searching for better pay. For Jimmy Wilson’s seventeen years of 
life before dying in the 1888 explosion, this involved balancing farm and mine work. For 
Edgar Simpson who helped search for Wilson’s body, it meant going from the mines to 
the iron works, but still keeping his “pit coat” close by.54 In 1888, neither Wilson nor 
Simpson were technically miners, but both were connected to the mines in ways that 
allowed them to understand on a personal and powerful level how the market system not 
only took producers’ livelihoods, but also their lives. 
Few industries showed the growing disregard for workers’ well-being more than 
the coal industry. Like other rural industries, miners’ wages were low, but fighting for 
higher pay involved challenging more than the mine employer. In an industry governed 
by market competition, pushing for higher wages meant potentially losing coal contracts 
that provided steady work to neighboring mines that produced coal more cheaply. One 
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Indiana miner claimed that these conditions prevented miners from dealing with their 
employers “between man and man” and forced them to accept any terms their employees 
offered. Missouri miner “A K. of L.” agreed, claiming that “[t]he operators here hardly 
realized that the miners were human beings. The company has ruled with an iron rod so 
long that they thought when a man went to work for them he had no voice in 
anything….” Instead of being equals in society, they asserted, miners were less than men 
and cowered to their boss’s demands.55 
This juxtaposition of man and “thing” intensified as industrialization transformed 
the way Americans worked. In the legend of John Henry, a “steel drivin’ man” for the 
Chesapeake and Ohio railroad in the 1870s out-drilled the latest steam-powered drill. 
With a hammer in each hand, Henry drilled fourteen feet while the drill only drove 
nine.56 In swinging two hammers simultaneously, Henry’s skill made him faster and 
more efficient than a machine, but it also invited a comparison between the two.57 He 
labored fast, methodologically, and efficient. Henry worked like a machine. For an 
instant, he became something other than human. Still, in most versions of the legend, 
Henry’s humanity is emphasized. In some ballads, he says, “You know that I’m a man.” 
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In others, Henry’s hammers crash to the ground as he falls dead after defeating his steam-
powered foe.58 Working like a machine drove Henry to his death. 
By the late nineteenth century machines had simplified dozens of industries, but 
were less useful in workplaces with unreliable working conditions like mines.59 On level, 
dry ground, wide openings, and with the right type of rock or large seams of coal, 
machines could fly at unprecedented rates. The holes that machines made were jagged 
and kicked up clouds of rock and coal dust as they drilled, but in ideal conditions, they 
moved as fast as human hands. On uneven and flooded spaces, hard rock, small coal 
seams, and narrow passages, however, human labor remained most efficient. Human-
made holes were smooth, their blows comparatively dustless, and when they mined coal, 
men could discern between rock types to extract the coal cleanly.60 Unlike other 
industries, then, the distinct uses between man and machine made the two labor forms 
complements to each other instead of competitors. Both were tools used to complete the 
same task, used based on which was more efficient in specific conditions. Yet, in sharing 
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this job with and in comparing his work to the latest steam-powered contraption, man 
became interchangeable with machine.61 
 The limitations of mining technology prevented machines from making hand 
labor obsolete.62 For miners then, their conflict with mechanization was less a fight for 
their jobs than a fight against being compared to a machine. Northern Illinois miner “Pro 
Bono Publico” claimed that the hand miners were “driven from pillar to post to get a 
living” due to the competition with machine mines. Because miners were paid according 
to the amount of coal they produced rather than earn a flat daily wage, machine miners 
could produce more coal than hand miners, increasing their tonnage. But machines did 
not work in northern Illinois, Pro Bono Publico explained, “while in southern Illinois the 
conditions are reversed.” The mines in the southernmost part of the state were ideal for 
machines, allowing them to turn out more coal faster and cheaper so that they could sell 
their coal in the Chicago market for lower prices than the northern hand mines. “We are 
asked to come down [in wages] and compete with machinery that is producing coal in an 
8 foot vein, while we have the human machine and 2 ½ to 3 feet, except in one or two 
places,” the miner continued. “Now it is unjust and unreasonable to ask the miners of 
northern Illinois to compete. They cannot do it.”63  
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Pro Bono Publico worked like a machine for a machine miner’s wages even 
though he worked by hand in his mine, but the devaluation of workers did not end with 
wage decline or competition with machines. Illinois miner “Jim” echoed hundreds of 
miners’ complaints when he claimed that his mine implemented a “damnable system” of 
overcharging for mining supplies and issuing fees.64  Most mines required miners to 
perform extra jobs such as laying railroad track, pumping water out of mines, or propping 
up the roof. Commonly known as “dead work,” these tasks took a miner’s time and 
energy but did not add to his coal production or pay.65 In one Kentucky mine, dead work 
included prying up rail tracks from old parts of the mine and re-laying them in a new 
room. Otherwise, the miners had to push their loaded coal cars across the mine floor from 
their rooms to the roadway. “[A] man should have iron track,” miner “Justice” grumbled, 
but the company would not furnish it. “Illiterate” and “A Would-Be Knight” described 
similar conditions. Their mines saved on mule purchases by having the miners “tram their 
own coal instead of mules pulling it.” Still, Illiterate commented bitterly, “even if they 
had long ears, [the miners] could not favorably compare with mules,” because unlike 
miners, mules “kick when overloaded.”66  Miner “Jumbo,” complained that his mine 
cared more for its mules than its miners.  When the safety catch broke on one of its two 
cages the company did not fix it, even though the malfunction would kill its riders if the 
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cage fell. “The north cage is the best,” the miner noted, “and they use it for hoisting and 
lowering the mules, and the men have to go on the broken cage.”67The decision to protect 
mules over miners reflected how the competitive market shifted the ways companies 
valued their workers. A miner could be replaced at no cost whereas a replacing a dead 
mule required additional funds.  
In other cases, mines disregarded safety protocol because upkeep was too 
expensive. Ignoring regulations like timber spacing, gas monitoring, “sprinkling” dry 
mines to keep coal dust down, and proper powder storage saved the company money, but 
increased the risk of accidents. Having clear airways was not only essential to proper 
mine ventilation, but also offered the surest means of escape in the event of an accident. 
Still, mines often neglected their upkeep. One western Kentucky miner reported that the 
only way to escape his mine in the event of an accident was for all the miners to climb “a 
very narrow winding stairway up which you must crawl on your hands and knees for over 
200 feet in the dark with water pouring down like rain upon you.” The distance made it 
unlikely that all men would escape, yet in order to have a new airway, the miners had to 
dig it for free.68  
Such a precaution would have been valuable to the miners in the Diamond Mine 
in Braidwood, Illinois. After an accident flooded the mine, the company refused to dig a 
new shaft to drain the water and aid in the rescue. Rescuers instead waded through the 
water, taking days longer to search for miners. They pulled out twenty-eight bodies, most 
                                               
67Mia Bay found similar comparisons among black slaves and workers who claimed they were treated as 
mules. “Jumbo,” letter to the editor, “From Grape Creek,” NLT, August 3, 1889; E. A. Sparls, letter to the 
editor, “Elliott, Mo.,” UMWJ, January 4, 1894; “A Thinker,” letter to the editor, “The Man and the Brute,” 
UMWJ, June 28, 1894; Mia Bay, Chapter 4 “Us Is Human Flesh,” in The White Image in the Black Mind: 
African-American Ideas about White People, 1830-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117-
149. “Jumbo,” letter to the editor, “From Grape Creek,” NLT, August 3, 1889. 
68 “New Kentucky, No. 2,” “Mine Postals,” UMWJ, October 12, 1893. 
60 
 
either drowned or suffocated, but the last six recovered, according to miner Adam 
Stewart, “neither drowned nor choked.” Rather, “they starved to death.” Believing the 
miners remaining in the mine had suffered the same fate, the company declared the 
missing miners dead, abandoned the search, and closed up the mine. For Stewart, who 
lost two sons in the mine, this was unthinkable. “I believe it is possible that there may be 
live men in the mine yet,” he wrote, noting that miners in other disasters found their way 
out of mines weeks after rescuers abandoned the search. The grieving father claimed the 
action was a “disgrace to humanity,” and asserted that “[n]o country that claims to be 
civilized would have done the same as was done at the Diamond mine.” But many mines 
did. Unless a mine was in good enough condition to resume production, companies saw 
little point in repairing the mine or locating miners that were likely dead. It was more 
economical to entomb the miners and sink a new shaft elsewhere.69  
The sheer number of mine injuries and deaths each year was staggering. 
Accidents were so common that state mine inspectors measured mine safety according to 
the number of deaths in relation the amount of coal produced. Missouri mine inspector C. 
C. Woodson reported that there was “one fatal accident for every 222,347 tons mined” in 
his state in 1889, or twelve deaths and twenty-two injuries.  Missouri mines fared better 
than Kentucky mines that claimed one life for every 156,134 tons that same year, but 
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ranked worse than Illinois, which lost one miner for every 263,590 tons.70 The actual 
number of dead was substituted for a ratio that correlated deaths with mine productivity, 
giving government officials a baseline to determine the number of deaths acceptable for 
the tons produced. In the process, miners became collateral in the drive to fuel the Gilded 
Age.  
Mine inspectors, then, also played a role in the devaluation of miners. Missouri 
mine engineer William Porter argued that at least two mine inspectors were needed to 
visit “the most important mining operations scattered over so large a territory as in this 
State.” Even in his plan, smaller mines, such as the hundreds of Missouri mines that 
employed less than ten workers, would not be inspected at all.71 In some cases, inspectors 
used this to their advantage, accepting bribes from mines to not inspect their facilities 
carefully or avoid them entirely.  Indiana miner George Johnson claimed that the 
conditions in his mine were so poor that miners in the best spots worked in water a foot 
deep.72 “I heard a miner that was emptying the water out of his big gum boots ask the 
boss if the inspector ever came around. The boss said yes. Well, how does he get around? 
we asked. Says the boss: ‘We haul him around.’”73 The statement implied that the 
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inspector followed the will of the company, and cared less for the well-being of the 
miners. A miner in Weir City, Kansas, confirmed this when he reported that the mine 
inspector never inspected the inside of the mine. Instead, he “only inspected the mine 
from the tipple of the shaft.”74 Throughout the nation, miners made similar complaints 
that state mine inspectors failed to do inspections, were too unfamiliar with the mining 
process to do inspections adequately, or gave their mines safety approvals despite 
eminent and visible dangers.75 “I am under the impression that the mine inspector laws 
are lived up to on one side, but not the other,” Illinois miner William Gardner claimed. 
“The salary side is lived up to, but the duty side is deficient.”  His words came in 
response to the latest death in a local mine. “He was a Polander that was killed, but a 
Polander is not supposed to be human, so I did not hear of any investigation [into] how 
the accident occurred.” Gardner’s bitter words, which indicated the inequalities that ran 
through the mines and government, also revealed the inspectors’ power of discretion. 
Some accidents were more worthy of investigation than others. Some deaths were not 
worth reporting at all. As such, even the callous ratios of deaths to coal produced may be 
substantially higher than what the officials claimed.76 
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The hardship that miners suffered, from the indifference to their labor to the 
disregard for their deaths all indicated to the miners that their employers and those 
appointed by the government to look after them, viewed the mine workers as less than 
human.  Indiana miner “Cambrian” claimed miners were defenseless “prey to every 
vicious human being.”77 Miner “Justice” agreed, writing that miners struggled between 
being “men or mice.”78  The phrase, which referenced the century old poem “To a 
Mouse,” was familiar to thousands of Scottish miners throughout the southern Midwest. 
Written by Robert Burns, it told the story of a farmer’s drive to clear his field that 
ultimately destroyed the home of a timid field mouse. Dozens of miners referenced the 
poem, identifying with the mouse whose possessions were overturned by a more 
powerful being with the ability to quash its life.79 Such a fragile existence was 
particularly clear to mine workers. Mice often ran rampant in the mines, but seldom 
served a purpose except to monitor the amount of breathable air.80A mouse’s only value 
was that it was worthless, its very breath was an expendable tool for the mines.81 To the 
miners, this was a poem about their own poverty and powerlessness. They became timid 
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“mice” who labored hard in harsh conditions, entering the mine each day wondering if 
they would emerge unharmed. 
 
Unpaid 
Company and governmental effort to protect earnings at employee expense 
extended beyond the mine and into nearly every aspect of miners’ and their families’ 
lives. Although some historians have claimed that miners had the power to move to the 
best paying mine thus avoiding exploitation, the complexity of the payment system made 
this exceedingly difficult.82 A simple “cent per ton” wage could not be compared 
between mines without accounting for the amount of dead work, supply costs, and 
weighing method.83  While miners settled on a payment rate for winter and summer 
mining each year, the cent per ton agreement was subject to the deductions as well as 
dead work that chipped away at a miner’s earnings. In addition to these factors, the 
companies frequently switched between a variety of weighing techniques, further eroding 
miners’ paychecks while maintaining that they paid a high cent per ton wage.  
Because there was no uniform weighing method, it was simple for companies to 
lower wages even if the cents paid per ton remained the same. When the coal was 
extracted, the “slack” or clay, stone, and silt mixed in with the coal needed to be filtered 
out before the coal was sold. To do this, the coal was placed over large “screens” with 
“bars” spaced apart to allow the slack to fall through. Coal chunks remained above, 
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eventually tumbling into a new car separate from the slack. “Run of the mine” coal, 
which was weighed before it was filtered, was heavier due to the slack, making it worth 
less than “screened coal,” which was filtered before it was weighed. In some cases, mine 
run coal earned fewer cents per ton than the screened wage, in other instances, operators 
paid screen wages for run of the mine coal, but deducted a percentage of the overall 
weight to account for the slack, and at times deducting as much as fifty percent of the 
weight.84 
 Screened coal was more common in late nineteenth century mines, but even the 
screening process was uneven. Mines often changed the “bars” on the screen to increase 
the amount of slack that fell through the gaps. In changing the bars’ shape or spacing or 
using corroded bars and broken screens, companies could increase the amount of slack.  
“I have been told that on one certain occasion,” Illinois organizer William Scaife 
quipped, that the spaces between bars in one Illinois mine were so large, “the operator’s 
pug dog went down the screen and fell through into the nut car.”85  
In doing this, the company not only increased the amount of slack or, in Scaife’s 
case, small dogs, filtered away but also caused smaller pieces of coal called “nut coal” to 
fall through the screen and into a separate car designated for nut coal. This coal was not 
credited to the miner’s coal weight, meaning he dug it for free even though the company 
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sold this coal.86  Kentucky miner “Snake Eye Saul” claimed that at his mine, the 
company charged the miners fifty cents a load to burn nut coal in their homes. “We 
consider this very unjust as we get [paid] nothing for mining and sending out nut coal,” 
he complained, asserting the action was nothing better than theft.87  
But company theft from miners was not limited to large screens and nut cars. 
Companies frequently “lost” cars of coal prior to weighing. When this happened, the 
miner’s tag was separated from his coal car so that he received no pay for the load when 
it was filtered and sold.  Illinois miner “K. of L.” reported that at his mine often lost up to 
five tons of coal, “and [the pay discrepancy] don’t get rectified for weeks and months 
after, and some never get it.” 88 Such operators who dared to “steal” weight from the 
miners were especially deplorable, Indiana miner and organizer Aaron Litten wrote. “I 
believe there should be a special place prepared in hell for such men as this operator.”89   
As deplorable as the acts were, however, the behavior K of L and Litten described 
was commonplace in the southern Midwest coalfields. In most instances, it was not only 
part of a larger system of withholding payment in part to offset expenses, but also a 
means of keeping workers dependent upon their employers that many rural industries 
practiced. The heavy investing and high debt inherent in railroad speculation and other 
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forms of big business meant that these corporations rarely had money on hand to pay all 
of their employees. Some mines, such as the C. C. Company Mine No. 4 in Danville, 
Illinois, solved this problem by dividing its workforce into quarters and paying each 
group on a different day of the week. According to miner “Joe,” this achieved “entire 
satisfaction with the miners,” but few mines implemented the tactic. In fact, when No. 4 
received new managers, the payment system quickly ended. The inexperienced new 
manager ordered the miners to widen the entry by two feet, which “became a drag” on 
coal production and upset the mine’s small but carefully balanced budget. Short on cash, 
No. 4 changed its pay schedule so that it could use the miners’ pay to cover expenses for 
an extra week. Within weeks, the company was so far behind it stopped paying the 
miners regularly altogether. When the miners demanded their pay, the manager offered 
them the choice between weekly pay at 43 ½ cents per ton or monthly at 48 cents.90  
For companies with small budgets or large railroad mines like the ATSF that 
often flirted with bankruptcy, avoiding laborers’ payroll was crucial to keeping the 
company afloat. Even when miners were paid, companies seldom paid miners their full 
amount due. An 1891 Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics study, for example, reported 
that even the largest coal corporations withheld five to twenty days’ worth of wages in 
each pay.91 Many companies paid their employees as little cash as possible in part to 
maintain their limited cash supply, but also to keep the workers tied to the company. In 
addition to mines, railroads, sawmills and even larger plantation or bonanza-style farms 
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not only paid irregularly, but often avoided paying their workers in cash. Many 
employers paid in “checks” that could not be cashed immediately. In an extensive study 
on rural wage payment, Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether found that the 
checks frequently required workers to wait anywhere from one to ten years before 
redeeming the check for its full cash amount.92    
According to Meriwether, the check system frequently worked in conjunction 
with commissary stores that the company owned. Known by the miners as the “truck” or 
“pluck-me” store because they “plucked” wages from the miners, these stores frequently 
charged high prices for goods that could be purchased without cash. For thousands of 
miners facing unreliable and irregular payment periods, these stores were often the only 
place that extended credit. Similarly, although the checks were seldom good anywhere 
else, workers waiting for their checks to mature could spend the full amount in the pluck-
me before the cash-in date. Any amount not spent when the check had matured could be 
redeemed for cash, but the checks often could only be cashed at a bank, which was often 
several miles from the coal camp. In other cases, company issued vouchers known as 
“coupons” or “scrip” used in place of legal tender.93  
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Whether the company used checks or scrip, the outcome was the same. If the 
worker wished to cash a check prematurely or if he wished to exchange his scrip for cash, 
he typically received only seventy-five to eighty cents for each dollar earned.94 
Meriwether argued the companies implemented this delayed payment system to force 
miners to remain in debt so that they had to shop at the company store. The tactic 
worked. Less than two years after Meriwether’s initial report, the Missouri BLS reported 
that the majority of miners in the state received all of their wages in food and 
merchandise purchased on credit prior to pay day.95 One Louisiana sugar plantation 
laborer claimed that such a system was designed to “make you a slave” over twenty years 
after the Civil War.96  
The incentives for shopping in the company store often compelled mining 
families to accept the system rather than challenge its procedures. “J. D.”  claimed that 
his Iowa mine did not pay their miners in scrip and did not force them to purchase their 
items at the commissary through debt. Rather, the company used the prospect of 
punishment to guarantee patronage, telling the miners, “The more you spend in our store 
the harder you may work; the more you spend in our store the better place [in the mine] 
we will give you.” Conversely, those who did not shop at the store found that their wages 
were less. “I notice when I do not buy there that some thing is the matter with my coal,” 
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one miner reported to Meriwether. “It has more sulphur in it or more slack, or I get a 
room where it is harder to mine coal. My wages invariably decrease, and I have found the 
only way to get a better room and fairer wages is to deal at the company store.”97  
Combined with low wages, irregular pay periods, and withheld wages, the 
presence of a pluck-me meant that many miners were tethered to the company until their 
debt was paid.98 Although not all miners were compelled to shop at the store, those that 
were had no control over the store’s selection of brands that they could purchase. They 
also had no means to fight how much they cost. One Missouri wife claimed that she had 
no wash tub and that her husband was shoeless because the commissary had neither items 
in stock. Because no other stores accepted the company’s tender, she “was compelled to 
wait two months until the Holladay store had obtained its new supply.”99 These 
conditions enraged miners who claimed the pluck-me stores were unconstitutional. “It is 
a system that plucks me of my civil rights,” Missouri miner S. C. Pierce complained to 
Meriwether. It took “one of the dearest privileges of my life, that of having the dollar that 
I have earned by the sweat of my brow, to go with it to the place I like, to trade it for food 
to put on the table and for clothes to put on my children’s backs.”100  
It was not fair, Iowa miner J. D. railed. “They rob us while producing their 
wealth. They rob our wives while they are compelled to trade in their store. Is this all? 
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No. They rob our children of the intellect that God has given them.” 101 Even in his 
frustration, J. D. knew that legislation overlooked this kind of “robbery.” Since most 
“anti-truck” laws focused on either abolishing scrip or compulsion to shop at the 
commissary, the miners had no way to fight the stores.102 Worse, as Meriwether 
discovered, operators regularly defied standing laws with impunity. “The law requires 
corporations to redeem all checks or tokens of indebtedness issued to their employees 
within thirty days after the date of delivery,” Meriwether explained. “This law is laid 
down so plainly and explicitly that I hesitated to believe any company in Missouri made a 
practice to issue checks to their employees and refuse to redeem such checks in cash until 
the expiration of ten years.”103 Yet not one, but several companies in Missouri and 
elsewhere violated this law and others regarding pay, weighing techniques, and mine 
safety.104 “We seemingly have no means of protection,” J.D. concluded.105 Miners and 
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farmers desperate for work had no choice but to accept the terms offered or try to find 
work elsewhere. 
These experiences of powerlessness, surrender, dependence, and submission, 
from the mine to kitchen table, stood in contrast to producers’ understanding of what it 
meant to be men and free citizens. Elongated periods between pay and increasing debt 
made it difficult for mining families to move away. Consequently, what began as wage 
decline spread to nearly every aspect of life, eroding producers’ abilities to make their 
own decisions. Miner “Veritas,” claimed that tolerating wage deductions or agreeing to 
shop at the company store “only drives away those of sterling moral worth, and invites a 
population low in morals, low in self-respect, and depraved in every God-given 
attribute.” Such an undercutting of virtue, he argued, was inevitable “when manhood is 
surrendered” to the will of the company.106  Similarly, knowing that the latest failed 
agreement between miners and operators in 1889 would trigger another reduction, Illinois 
miner “Pro Bono Publico” warned National Labor Tribune readers that the situation 
would only worsen.  “If we are to do the behests of the operators and submit to their will 
without question,” he cautioned, “then we lose our manhood and our freedom.”107 
From the workplace into the home, it seemed that those who looked for work in 
the mines sacrificed their manhood and freedom. In these regions, “free labor” had turned 
in the eyes of many into “wage slavery,” with no hope of improvement.108 “Men who 
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want to be men cannot get along here,” miner “G. F.” complained, noting that low wages 
and pluck-me made conditions in his current mine worse than what he had left behind in 
England. The irony was not lost on him. “This is called the land of the free, but if this is 
freedom, where does slavery exist?”109  His castigation was both moral and political. A 
nation that prided itself in offering freedom and opportunity allowed the market system to 
cripple producer life and liberty, turning a blind eye to suffering and starvation for want 
of cheaper coal and grain prices. There was simply no hope to get out of debt, Illinois 
miner “D. B. T.” explained after his mine underwent a twenty-five percent wage 
reduction. But the reduction was not the only problem. After employer fees and wage 
garnishments, D. B. T. and his fellow miners were paid only twenty-five cents for each 
dollar they earned. “I think this will show slavery and serfdom, and that we are all, black 
and white, in bondage under the present system.”110 
 
Hypocrites 
For thousands of rural workers, the system that allowed businessmen to grow 
wealthy while treating others as less than human seemed blatantly immoral. Observing 
the greed within the coal industry, “A Well Wisher,” called attention to the irony of 
businessmen “claiming to be civilized, and some of them Christianized” while treating 
their laborers harshly. They forced their employees “to work down in the dark and 
dangerous mines more than eight hours per day, while they themselves are enjoying all 
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the sunlight and the pure fresh air and riding about to all the places of amusement… and 
then claim to be human.”111 
 A Well Wisher’s claim reflected how thousands of rural producers regarded the 
business practices inherent in the new nationally and globally competitive market system. 
The businessmen who engaged in it and the government officials who condoned it, both 
behaved in ways contrary to the values they professed. In treating their employees as less 
than human, employers acted as soulless heathens, even as they professed Christian 
values. Likewise, the government officials and ministers charged to look after all people 
but cared little for workers were equally as hypocritical. Yet workers, like miner “Fair 
Play,” condemned this treatment, asserting,“[w]e are not slaves but human beings and 
demand to be treated as such.”112 Often, they used their own Christian convictions, 
understandings of citizenship, and moral right not only to show themselves as moral 
citizens, but to shame those who treated the poor unjustly.  
Most late nineteenth century workers seldom attended church or affiliated with a 
specific denomination, but still upheld general Christian beliefs.113This religious thought 
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was more than rhetoric. It offered a way for rural producers to present their hardships as 
clear moral, economic, and political wrongs against them and their families. Although 
reformers played into such religious sentiments, these understandings transcended union 
rhetoric and came out of genuine spiritual conviction often independent of the religious 
values middle class society professed.114 Rural producers asserted their own Christian 
values not only to push for reforms, but to challenge their place in society, asserting that 
they were humans with Christian souls that deserved respect.  
The hypocrisy they witnessed within society was the precise reason many rural 
producers did not affiliate with traditional churches despite their religious convictions.  “I 
used to be a very good church member, and I admire the teachings of Christ very much 
yet,” Illinois organizer William Scaife wrote, but he would not attend or give it money 
any longer. During strikes, ministers favored operators who gave more money to the 
church than workers. “[The ministers] profess to be followers of ‘the meek and lowly’ 
Jesus, but it is only a profession with them,” he insisted. In Scaife’s mind, this made 
ministers part of the “moneyocracy” that hurt the poor. “Better to be without a church 
than hire a man or men to stab you in the back when you are engaged in a conflict with 
the oppressors of this earth.” 115 This was not Christianity, the Des Moines, Iowa, 
Farmers’ Tribune argued. Rather it was “churchianity” where the “greed for power and 
popularity welcomes to its folds the very men whom Christ drove from the temple.”116To 
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Scaife, the “so-called Christian ministers who in time of conflict go out of the way to 
abuse the weaker party in the fight,” were worse than strikebreakers. “Doubly so,” he 
argued, “because they are all educated men, and ought not to allow their sense of right to 
be overcome by their desire for gold, and that is what most of them do.”  Scaife believed 
these actions made them “the worst characters in the sight of God,” and as worthy of 
damnation as the operators who sat in their congregations.117  
 Indiana miner wife Laurene Gardner agreed. Although she and her husband were 
faithful church members, her ailing husband’s request for spiritual guidance shortly 
before his death was met with indifference from their minister. “One poor perfunctory 
visit was all the minister could find time to give.” Instead, her husband’s coworkers came 
to his aid. They performed his last rites, arranged the funeral, and held the ceremony over 
his grave. This was why workers did not attend church, Gardner explained. “When the 
church does the work then the common people will again hear them gladly. If they leave 
the work among the working classes to the trade unions then the church people should 
not wonder that workingmen prefer their trade unions to the church.”118 
 Unions, not churches, were the organizations that truly followed the “principles” 
all should follow, “A Laborer” wrote. “Honest labor,” as thousands of workers called it, 
involved working hard, helping those in need, not stealing, and not showing 
favoritism.119 “[T]here is Christianity in these principles,” he argued, yet the wealthy did 
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not follow this. “The rich are crushing the poor; many of them make a profession of 
Christianity one day out of seven; while man and his wife and family living near the 
place of worship are debarred from attending for the want of wearing apparel and that 
they may not be made light of by others who are rich in the world’s goods.”120 
 Yet workers’ agreement that their treatment was immoral was not enough to bind 
them to unions.  Both the Knights and the National Federation of Miners and Mine 
Laborers (NFM) attempted to tap into these understandings in an effort to win the 
allegiance of the nation’s mine workers. Despite their efforts, neither organization 
swayed a majority of the nation’s coal miners into their ranks. Even those who joined one 
or both organizations did not always follow their leaders’ orders. Just as Christian 
convictions did not correlate with worker church attendance, so their desire to reform the 
system that injured them did not always lead to union faithfulness. 
 Part of the lack of faith in labor organizing came from the enormity of the system 
that hurt rural producers. Worker mistreatment stretched across the nation and connected 
disparate industries together in complex ways. For the coal industry, resolving miners’ 
grievances required a powerful national union capable of addressing questions of crop 
prices and farm debts so that the farmers and their farm hands could return to the fields. It 
meant engaging the steel and railroad industries that not only demanded cheaper coal, but 
were also crucial to coal mining and transport. It required government support to pass 
new safety laws and enforce those already in place.  Most importantly, it meant finding a 
way to fight the entire coal market that forced companies to constantly undercut prices by 
cutting costs in their mines.  
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 Although workers understood the enormity of this undertaking, both the Knights 
and the NFM confronted these issues differently. The Knights’ cooperation and education 
plans were long-term endeavors that many producers believed were essential to restoring 
economic independence.121 More importantly, its structure of “mixed locals” allowed 
farmers, miners, and other trades to all attend the same union meetings, fortifying 
connections across trade lines. The NFM, which was founded in 1885, was more adept at 
looking after specific trade concerns. Its dedication to the mining industry allowed it to 
focus on regulating companies’ cutthroat competition by negotiating a nationwide pay 
scale with coal operators each year from 1886 forward. Often, leadership in the two 
orders stood at odds with each other. Many of the founding members of the NFM began 
as Knights and, like hundreds of workers in other industries, left the order to organize 
along trade lines.122  
Thousands of miners, however, believed the two organizations complementary. 
Many held membership in both unions. G. W. Dinsmoor noted that his Missouri mine 
maintained memberships in both orders without conflict, declaring “[t]his method is far 
the best I have ever seen tried yet.”123  Thomas Faulds of Indiana similarly asserted, “I 
think if the different labor organizations would work in meeting directions each in their 
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own sphere, perhaps what could not be achieved in one might in the other.”124 In his 
mind, cross-union cooperation was not only possible, but ideal. 
By 1886, neither group was strong enough to secure the changes they promised. 
The Federation established a national pay scale but could not enforce it in all states. 
Companies in weakly unionized areas took advantage of the agreement and undersold 
mines that honored the scale, intensifying competition rather than diminishing it.125 
Similarly, the Knights’ rapid growth in the mid-1880s did not translate into successful 
mining reform. The mixed occupational leadership within assemblies made it difficult for 
the union to address problems specific to the mining industry. In many cases, Knight 
decisions regarding the coal industry were not made by miners, but by workers in other 
industries whose unfamiliarity with the coal industry was a liability.126 Because of this, 
the Knights formed National Trades Assembly 135 (NTA 135) in 1886. Like the 
Federation, NTA 135 was specifically for miners, essentially a trade union under the 
Knights’ umbrella. This structure allowed miners to remain as Knights while providing 
leaders over the miners who were well acquainted with the mining trade.127 
In many ways, NTA 135’s formation upset an already shaky balance between the 
two orders. Federation leaders viewed it as an open attack on their trade union structure 
and saw it as the Knights working to undermine Federation authority in mining reform. 
NTA 135 officers were outraged at the Federation leadership’s unwillingness to 
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cooperate, particularly at its resolution that forbid any NFM officer from holding an 
office in any other labor organization.128  
The following two years were plagued with bitter disputes between organization 
leaderships. Although the Knights of Labor declined in the urban centers that once 
formed the union’s stronghold, rural workers often remained in the order.129 NTA 135 
fell into the internal disputes within the Knights, which hampered its effectiveness, but 
even in late 1888 the order remained as strong as its rival organization.130  Unable to win 
all miners’ support, the NFM could not enforce pay scales or safety laws. The two orders’ 
leadership therefore remained locked in a battle to destroy their rival in the name of 
protecting miners. 
The miners disagreed. They saw little benefit in the ongoing division between 
Federation and NTA 135 leadership. Many questioned whether the leaders’ actions, like 
those of ministers, government officials, and employers, were guided more by personal 
ambition than by care for the rank and file. Illinois NFM organizer P. H. Donnelly 
claimed that in founding NTA 135, the Knights strayed from their original goals of 
eradicating the wage labor system and building up the workers. “The heart of the great 
body of the K. of L. is right,” Donnelly asserted. Yet, to many miners, the organization’s 
latest efforts seemed focused more on quashing its competition than aiding miners. “We 
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feel that there can be no peace or comfort until that rule or ruin policy is abandoned and 
the order of the K. of L. brought back to first principles again,” he continued. If the 
organization truly cared about the miners, he insisted, it would “do away with the so-
called National District Trades assemblies of different callings.”  T. J. Roberts argued 
that NTA 135’s formation brought unnecessary strife to the miners who were already 
struggling in their workplaces. “I myself respect the K. of L. as much as any man living, 
having been connected with it for a number of years, but I don’t like to hear men trying to 
break down the best trades union my craft has ever had, simply to further the ends of a 
few men who really have not the interest of my craft at heart.” Roberts did not love the 
Knights of Labor any less, he insisted, rather, “I love the Federation more.”131 
Despite the dual loyalty, there was no denying that the union divide came at the 
miners’ expense. “[W]e are the ones who have to suffer,” miner and organizer John 
Duddey explained. Because of the division, the miners were “taxed and levied on by both 
organizations.” Indiana organizer Samuel Anderson described similar conditions, noting 
that miners in his district paid dues to both organizations but could barely earn a living. If 
the miners of both organizations could cooperate with each other, surely their 
organizations could as well.132 In December 1888, union leaders heeded the miners’ 
demands. Meeting in Columbus, Ohio, leaders in both organizations agreed to sever ties 
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to their old orders, killing both NTA 135 and the NFM while dissolving the autonomous 
state unions within the NFM. In its place, they established the National Progressive 
Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU).133   
This was what the miners had demanded for years, but rather than join the unified 
order, hundreds of NTA 135 members refused to abandon the Knights. The NPU was 
little more than a renaming of the Federation, they complained. There was no structure 
that resembled what the Knights offered. Miners who had enjoyed the benefits of both 
orders saw no reason to desert NTA 135, even if its leadership did. Kansas organizer 
Robert Linn wrote he was not pleased with NTA 135’s structure and function, but he 
could not justify leaving the order. “I am, and have been for the past ten years, a Knight 
of Labor,” he declared. “I never have had a thought or expressed a wish to abandon N. T. 
A. 135 or the Order of the Knights of Labor.” His words reflected thousands of southern 
Midwest miners’ sentiments regarding the amalgamation debate. As a result, many opted 
to retain their dual memberships in both orders while some refused to join the NPU 
altogether.134  
Instead of unity, the NPU’s formation drew an even larger divide between 
organizations and therefore increased frustration from the rank and file.135 Indiana miner 
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“Coffee,” one of the thousands who refused to abandon NTA 135 and instead retained a 
membership in both orders, claimed that the division between the organizations created a 
cloud “as dark as a coal operator’s conscience” that hovered over the miners. Coffee’s 
description equated the union fighting with operators’ callous actions in the mines that 
endangered miners’ lives. “Now I would like for some one of either side to show me 
where there is anything gained by being continually at ‘outs,’” he demanded.136  Dual 
member Aaron Littin agreed, charging “This [fighting] originated and is advocated 
principally by disappointed office seekers.” Such men, like employers, government 
officials, and ministers only looked to the miners as a means for personal gain. “A man 
that will join an organization to get an office is not worthy of recognition by any honest 
laboring man,” he insisted, “and when [honest men] find one of that caliber [they should] 
at once brand him as an imposter, and when they succeed in getting the heads of all such 
demagogues chopped off then they will find peace and success will crown their every 
effort.”137  
Coffee and Littin’s descriptions of organization leadership as selfish impostors 
tapped into the already present suspicions rural producers had against national leaders 
who claimed to help rank and file, but did not act so. They were worthy of as much 
mistrust as employers who did not treat their employees fairly, government officials who 
did not uphold the law, and ministers who did not behave as Christians. In short, the 
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unions became another foe to many miners. “A man can be a hypocrite in a labor 
movement just as easily as in church,” Indiana miner “X” wrote.138 His statement made 
the parallels between faith and union abundantly clear. Neither the church nor the union 
was wrong, but dishonest leaders in both could injure miners more than they helped. Just 
as miners’ belief in Christian values prevented them from attending church, so their belief 
in honest labor principles prevented them from fully supporting union leaders’ decisions. 
 
The NPU’s inability to unite the miners or earn their trust was part of a larger 
culture of suspicion and fraud in the Gilded Age. Corporations’ reach into multiple 
industries, government ties, and backroom deals that pulled up profits while driving down 
prices contributed to a sense that corruption lurked everywhere from business, to 
churches, to their own trade organizations.  
Although union leadership also claimed that producers were exploited, rhetoric 
alone did not sway miners to the union cause. When unions focused more on defeating 
each other than promoting safety and fair treatment, miners believed their claims were 
less than genuine. In these cases, even the thousands that joined the labor movement 
stopped short of supporting leadership objectives. Consequently, although thousands of 
organized miners called for a peaceful merger between the unions, they refused to obey a 
new organization that demanded they abandon their labor union ties. The officers who 
orchestrated the failed merger, they believed, acted out of their own self-preserving 
interests and seemed equally as fraudulent as their employers, government officials, or 
the ministers who often claimed to have the miners’ best interests at heart. 
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Still, miners and farmers found it difficult to hold fast to their sense of moral right 
in a competitive market. A network larger than local community bonds had changed the 
rural producers’ world. As earnings continued to decline, the competition between mines 
and farms, union and non-union seeped into the ground itself. Producers’ need to provide 
for their families facilitated a new kind of competition on the local level, turning 
neighbor against neighbor and complicating the divisions between miner, farmer, and 
businessman more than ever before.  
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Chapter Three 
Undermined: Winter Diggers, Union Strikebreakers 
 
 
One hundred feet below the frozen Illinois topsoil, a handful of farmers turned up 
the earth not by the plow, but by the pick. Rather than work their fields, they spent 
February 1888 in the Enterprise Mine, digging coal destined for the Chicago market. 
Their mine was located in the southernmost region of the state, commonly known as 
“Egypt,” whose coal industry was among the fastest growing in the southern Midwest. 
Nearly four thousand Egypt miners turned out over 2,600,000 tons of coal in 1888 alone, 
almost one-quarter of the state’s total output.1 Miners came from all over the nation and 
world to dig Egypt coal, but in February 1888, only farmers went down to work in the 
Enterprise Mine. 
No one but farmers dared descend the Enterprise shaft because it was one of 
several Egypt mines on strike. The miners were already working below scale rates when 
Egypt coal operators ordered another wage reduction that would bring their wages nearly 
twenty-five percent lower than competing mines. “[T]he men thought it unjust,” miner 
Robert Smith explained, because it not only cut wages deeper than market competition 
required but it also would trigger wage reductions in mines throughout Illinois, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania as they lowered costs to compete with Egypt for the Chicago 
market. “We therefore resolved to resist the cut, and not give the operators surrounding 
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us the excuse to cut their miners, as it seems southern Illinois is always below our fellow 
craftsmen.”2 
But not all Egypt residents shared this conviction. Smith’s emphasis on the 
miners’ desire to not go further “below” their craftsmen stood at odds with the local 
farmers who broke the strike. Run as a joint stock company, anyone who wished to 
purchase stock in the Enterprise Mine could do so at twenty cents a share. Several local 
farmers had seized the investment opportunity and purchased as many shares as they 
could afford in hopes of generating extra income for minimal effort.3 The February strike 
jeopardized their investment. Unwilling to let the mine shut down and risk losing their 
money, the farmers entered the mines to dig the coal themselves. As the miners remained 
above ground fighting a reduction that would lower wages throughout the region, the 
farmers protected their financial assets by literally going under the miners to mine the 
coal. The farmers’ ideological actions mirrored their physical labor. By going into the 
mines, the farmers went “below” their neighbors, undercutting the wage scale, taking 
their jobs, and challenging the cooperation that bound community members together.  
The Egypt farmers who became miners because they owned a stake in the mines 
reflected how the competitive market fundamentally altered daily life in the Gilded Age. 
As farm profits decreased, farmers and farmhands alike looked to mines and other rural 
industries to cover expenses. Some, like the Egypt farmers, approached these industries 
as small scale investors. Others entered the mines as hired hands employed by the miners 
themselves. Such occupational confusion allowed workers to be owner, employer, and 
employee simultaneously and stretched into multiple industries, allowing rural laborers 
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like farmers, miners, and railroad workers to work in a host of industries from farms to 
mines to lumber camps. By cobbling together various incomes, rural men and women 
etched out a living. Rural folk had used these connections between industries for decades, 
but as the agricultural crisis intensified, coal profits declined, and the number of 
industrial laborers looking for work swelled, the overlap between industries became more 
hazard than help. As budgets tightened, rural workers like the Egypt farmers and 
countless others moved to protect their own interests. They “cheated” their coworkers by 
accepting favoritism in the mines, discarded mine rules to earn extra pay, and broke 
strikes to preserve investments or simply to earn a wage. Laborers who once worked 
together now competed, turning communities against each other as they turned out more 
coal. 
In many ways, historians have noted this change, demonstrating how the 
economic forces that pushed thousands of producers into poverty also pressed them 
against each other, even as they held fast to the community bonds and cooperation that 
undergirded rural society. Throughout the nation, ordinary farmers and laborers worked 
to reconcile ideas of republican equality and reciprocity with their need to earn a profit or 
a living wage.4 But these shifts did more than drive wedges in local communities. They 
reconfigured relationships between owner, laborer, and neighbor tangling them in new 
                                               
4 The classic example of this line of scholarship is Lawrence Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise. Goodwyn 
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See also Eller, Miners, Millhands and Mountaineers; Altina Waller, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social 
Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Jane Adams, 
Transformation of Rural Life: Southern Illinois 1890-1990 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994); Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor; Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy; Gutman, “Work, 
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Industrializing America, 3-78;  Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth. For a 
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ways within the national market system. The term “neighbor” took on new meaning as 
states grew connected through trade, competing against each other for the first time. 
Consequently, the “honest principles” that miners prized such as honoring contractual 
agreements, not undercutting wages, rejecting favoritism in the mines, and not “stealing” 
another worker’s livelihood grew harder to maintain as coal and crop prices fell. Local 
and individual need tugged against the grain of national competition and growing 
national unions, blurring rural producers’ understandings of how to live a moral life. 
Time and again, self-preservation proved more important than “honest work,” compelling 
them to compromise their moral principles and undermine their community networks to 
survive.5  
 In such cases, union miners did not always act according to the values they 
professed. Thousands of union miners broke each others’ strikes and filled each other’s 
coal contracts. They insisted their actions were justifiable due to their economic need, but 
condemned miners in other regions performing these same acts, calling them dishonest 
and immoral “blacklegs.”6 In the process, honest labor in the mines and community was 
often determined more by occupational background and geographic lines than by any 
clear definition of moral behavior. In 1889, this led hundreds of Illinois union coal miners 
to not strike for higher wages and better conditions as labor organizations typically did. 
Instead, they followed their union leaders’ orders and broke a strike waged by their non-
union coworkers. The circumstances that prompted farmers not to farm and union miners 
not to strike indicated the complicated ways the market system turned rural workers 
against each other and prompted them to put personal need before public good. Their 
                                               
5 IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, February 25, 1888. 
6 “J. D. C.,” letter to the editor, “DuQuoin, IL,” JUL, May 28, 1888; “C.,” letter to the editor, “Against 
Summer Strikes,” NLT, February 22, 1890. 
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justification of their decisions to abandon their neighbors and principles, however, 
signaled to many miners not only the futility of local strikes in a national market, but also 
the moral bankruptcy that seemed to run through in the miners’ unions and Gilded Age 
business alike. 
  
Assorted Incomes 
Peter Shirkey was already an experienced coal miner when he arrived in the US 
from the British Isles at age fifteen in 1850 and on his arrival, he quickly set out for the 
coalfields traveling from mine to mine for higher wages. In 1870, he worked in a mine 
outside Wadsworth, Ohio, boarding with miner Henry Mendinhall’s family and several 
other miners before heading west. He later settled in southern Indiana where he married 
Lydia Minnis in 1891.7  By then, however, Shirkey was more than a migrant coal miner. 
Even though he still identified himself as a miner on the 1900 Census schedule, Shirkey 
also owned his own farm, mortgage free. He and his wife shared their home with 
seventeen year-old Isum Stout who worked with Shirkey in the field and the mines.8 
Shirkey’s life demonstrated how multiple incomes and cooperation jointly shaped 
rural life in the Gilded Age. As Rob Weise has shown, average farmers and laborers 
regularly made small-scale investments to earn extra cash. They borrowed money to 
                                               
7 “United States Census, 1870,” Family Search (https://familysearch.org/pal:MM9.1.1/M6L3-BTH: 
accessed December 18, 2013) Peter Shirkey in household of Henry Mendinhall, Ohio, United States; citing 
p.10, family 74, NARA microfilm publication M593, FHL microfilm 00552740; "United States General 
Index to Pension Files, 1861-1934," Family Search, “Lydia J Minnis” in entry for Thomas M Minnis, 1888, 
https://goo.gl/Q9NCrN (accessed 6 February 2015), citing Indiana, United States, NARA microfilm 
publication T288 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.); FHL microfilm 
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“Peter Sherkie,” https://goo.gl/SQIozc (accessed December 18, 2013). 
8 In the case of Stout, who is listed as both Shirkey’s servant and a coal miner on the 1900 census schedule, 
it is likely that Shirkey hired Stout to work both the mine and the farm. “United States Census, 1910,” 
Family Search, “Peter Shirkey,” https://goo.gl/krENMA (accessed December 18, 2013). 
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purchase more land in efforts to increase crop yields, bought and sold items on credit, and 
sold their lumber for cash.9 Johnathan Levy found this same trend among farmers who 
participated in futures market speculation and pursued western farm mortgages, believing 
such investments would generate larger income or at least protect their economic 
stability. It kept Shirkey traveling from mine to mine in search of better pay, ultimately 
enabling him to purchase a farm. Census schedules from 1880 and 1900 show that 
Shirkey was not alone in this endeavor. Hundreds of southern Midwest miners owned or 
rented houses surrounded by farms, rented a parcel of farmland, or, like Shirkey, owned 
their own farm while listing their occupation as a coal miner on the Census.10  
But not all workers experienced Shirkey’s success and instead used multiple 
incomes simply to make ends meet. Peter Shirkey’s neighbors, Daniel and Martha 
Hornback understood this point well. Although they were the same age as the Shirkeys 
and farmed in the same community, the Hornbacks did not own their land. Instead, they 
shared their rented farm with their disabled son and sixteen-year-old grandson, Shirley, 
who worked in a local coal mine.11 Unlike Shirkey, who saved funds and used his dual 
                                               
9 Robert S. Weise, Grasping at Independence: Debt, Male Authority, and Mineral Rights in Appalachia 
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occupation to maintain a steady income, the Hornbacks faced a steady decline in farm 
profits combined with the added expense of caring for a disabled relative. For the 
Hornbacks, mining was a way to make ends meet. By 1910, the Shirkeys and Stout still 
lived on their farm while the Hornbacks had relocated. Shirley Hornback continued to 
work as a coal miner, but lived in a rented home with his wife Lillie and a widowed 
Daniel.  In the following years, the Hornbacks regularly uprooted and roamed throughout 
the southern Midwest coalfields looking for work.12 
Cobbling together multiple occupations, then, was away for the Hornbacks to 
balance their budget and for Shirkey to get ahead. Their efforts were part of larger 
cooperative networks engrained in rural society that allowed multiple hands and multiple 
revenues to contribute to a single family’s income.13 For decades, farmers like the 
Hornbacks took advantage of the seasonal rhythms inherent in both farming and mining 
industries. During the winter months, when farms lay dormant, more mines were open. In 
Illinois alone, the number of miners working in the mines increased from 16,771 in the 
1887 summer to over 23,648 the following winter.14 Farmers often took advantage of this 
seasonal work, laboring in the mines before returning to the farm in the spring. “We farm 
in summer and dig coal in winter,” one Kansas farmer and small mine operator explained 
to the Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics. In the summer months, his mine 
                                               
12 "United States Census, 1910," Family Search, “Shirly Hornback,” https://goo.gl/sE3yM3 (accessed 
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that he shared with other local farmers closed and only resumed after harvest when coal 
demand increased.15 Likewise, miners often found work as farmhands in the summer 
months when mines shut down or worked only part time.16 Large and small mines 
throughout the southern Midwest followed this pattern. Those that did not shut down 
used smaller workforces in the summer and dramatically increased their number of 
employees in the winter months.  
These trends rippled through families, connecting sons to the same rhythms their 
fathers followed. Like farmers who used their sons in the fields, miners used their sons to 
help load coal in the mines, in some cases sending them to school at night so that they 
could work in the mines year-round.17 Companies granted father-son mining teams extra 
cars to transport coal, increasing the overall amount credited to the miner while allowing 
the son to learn the mining trade. Men without sons, like Shirkey, hired “contract miners” 
to help. Such hired loaders were often young men like Isum Stout or farmers like Shirley 
Hornback who needed the additional income while tending the farm. As with sons, 
companies granted miners with loaders extra cars but because they were the miners’ 
employees, loaders did not receive their pay from the company. When a loader placed 
coal on a coal car, the company counted it as coal belonging to the miner. On payday, the 
miner then paid his loader a flat daily wage out of his own earnings.18 
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In many cases, this shared labor made the difference between rural workers 
earning a living wage and going into debt. For farmers, it provided an income that 
supplemented crop profits. It dramatically increased a miner’s coal output, well-worth the 
money spent to hire a hand. In an 1893 study of coal mining families, the Missouri BLS 
found that miners’ yearly wages ranged from $200 to $560. Those who worked alone 
typically earned a little over $200 each year and never earned more than $300. Miners 
with a loader reported earning $400 to $560 each year.19 
But family income streams depended on more than fathers and sons. Tight 
budgets demanded that even women contribute to this work. “I never will marry a 
farmer,” Gussie Reuter declared to her cousin. Growing up on an Illinois farm, she knew 
that farm labor, even when shared, was grueling. “I will marry but not a farmer, don’t 
care who he is.”20  Reuter’s disdain for farm life came from knowing that farmers’ wives 
worked hard at long hours. Like other rural wives, they cooked and cleaned, raised 
gardens and livestock, made and sold whiskey, and took in sewing and laundry for extra 
money.21 Their actions granted many rural women a degree of authority over household 
finances. In her diary, Nannie Stillwell Jackson differentiated the livestock she raised and 
the money she earned from her husband’s income and grew frustrated when he spent her 
money unwisely.22 Historian Sally Zanjani found that wives of Western prospectors were 
                                               
19 Missouri BLS, Fifteenth Annual Report, 1893, 306-312. See also Iowa BLS, Fourth Biennial Report, 
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far from passive helpmeets. Instead, women like Ellie Nay labored passionately in the 
prospecting field.  They “saw themselves as full partners” in their husband’s, father’s, 
and brother’s prospecting enterprises and “demanded the financial rewards due them as 
such.”23 In the process, wives included themselves as crucial components in balancing 
family budgets, not only helping to decide how money would be spent, but also in 
discerning the proper time to strike. 
Southern Midwest wives also fit this description. Although Henry Mendinhall 
owned the house that boarded young bachelor Peter Shirkey in 1870, Barbra Mendinhall 
cared for him. In paying board, Shirkey and the other miners hired her to cook their meals 
and wash their clothes. Other wives used these same roles differently. Unlike 
Mendinhall’s housemates who were boarders, the Shirkeys declared that their housemate 
was an employee. The room and meals Isum Stout received were a portion of his 
payment, making Lydia and Peter Shirkey joint employers.24 In other cases, wives were 
even more enterprising. Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether noted that farmer 
wives with cash purchased mine scrip and company checks from local miners’ wives for 
roughly eighty percent of their value. These arrangements enabled mining families to 
have cash without forfeiting wages to the company, freeing them to shop for cheaper 
goods elsewhere or even move away if desired. Meanwhile, farm wives saved the scrip 
and checks for purchases when company store goods were cheap, maximizing the return 
on their investment.25 Such actions as employees, employers, and investors made 
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southern Midwest wives crucial not only in sustaining family finances, but also placed 
them in the center of rural market networks.  
These trends coincided with larger community bonds that allowed neighbors to 
aid each other in times of need. David and Lizzie McMaster of Carbondale, Kansas, 
described to the Holt family how their community combined their resources to survive 
after a particularly bad year when crops and cattle failed. In addition to aid from the 
Grange, residents purchased groceries and provided housing for neighbors who fared 
especially poorly.26 In other instances, such as an 1893 strike in Kansas, rural farmers 
gave striking miners wheat when local stores refused to sell to them.27 “Tommy the 
Tramp” and union organizer Tim O’Malley, two wanderers famous in the Midwest 
mining industry, frequently described miner and farmer wives who opened their homes 
and cupboards to road-weary workers or fellow miners who shared their dinner pails with 
those who had none.28 
The multiple incomes and occupations provided by rural men and women in 
industrializing rural society, then, were built upon longstanding cooperative networks that 
relied upon friends and family aiding each other. A miner hiring a neighboring farmer to 
load coal in the winter helped both men increase their incomes just as a farm wife 
purchasing mine scrip from a neighboring miner wife granted both women better options 
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for purchasing their families’ necessities. Such traditions opened the door for neighbors 
to join each other in forming cooperatives with the expectation and understanding that all 
would benefit from jointly owning and investing in a store or mine.29 Industrialization did 
not separate farmers from laborers at all, but instead drew them together as they cobbled 
their incomes side by side. 
 
Turns 
If common experiences and community ties could pull workers in various 
occupations together, it could also push them apart. For many, the wedge between miners 
and farmers who worked in the mines began with “the turn.” In the mines, the turn 
referred to the length of the miners’ wait for a car to transport their coal to be weighed. In 
most mines, the number of available cars was limited or the weighing process was 
backlogged so that miners might only receive four cars a day, which limited the amount 
of coal he produced. When mines became overcrowded, such as when companies 
recruited miners from elsewhere or when farmers entered the mines, the number of 
miners “claiming a turn” increased. This elongated each miner’s wait, making the turn 
“slow,” and decreased each miner’s total output.30 Because a miner’s wage depended on 
the amount of coal he produced, even miners working at high paying mines found it 
difficult to make ends meet. Iowa miner “Rambler” complained that miners came from 
all over the country to take advantage of the high wages paid at his mine, but in the 
process overcrowded the mine and slowed the turn. “[T]he shafts here would need to run 
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night and day to hoist all the coal the men here could send out, and still they come,” he 
continued bitterly. Despite the company’s high wages per ton of coal, the slow turn meant 
that the average miner in Rambler’s mine still only received a $1.50 for a day’s labor.31 
But crowded mines did not solely come from traveling workers. Mines also 
became overcrowded as farm profits decreased and farmers grew more dependent on the 
mines to sustain their families. Farmers like Shirley Hornback who began working in the 
mines as miners’ employees working for a flat daily wage soon learned they could earn 
more by mining and loading their own coal during the winter months or abandoning their 
farms entirely. 32 Their decisions to work as miners further glutted the labor market, 
slowing the turn so that all miners earned less. “The farmers have crowded us out,” 
Indiana miner John Neal complained. The “coal butchers from the farm,” needed only a 
supplemental income rather than a living wage. They accepted increased dead work and 
lower wages to gain a spot in the mine, forcing “practical miners,” or those who mined as 
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their primary occupation, to accept the same terms.33 Miner “Bald Head” replied to 
Neal’s grievance, claiming that the practical miners had no one but themselves to blame. 
In their quest to increase their pay, the “practical miners that are so selfish” had trained 
the farmers how to mine. “They go to work and give the Hay John [farmer] fifty or 
seventy-five cents per day, and about three or four weeks afterward they get to ask the 
boss for a room to themselves, and the boss gives them one,” he explained bitterly. 
“That’s the way winter diggers have got such a foothold,” he continued. “You don’t 
count the risk you are taking when you hire such men as they.”34  But little could be 
done. The need that drove farmers to the mine was the same that prompted miners to hire 
farmers to help load coal.  
As the turn slowed, mining and farming families turned their own value systems 
to accommodate their need, twisting and molding them into new notions of honor and 
respectability previously deemed undignified. In the coal mines, labor deemed 
“dishonest” came in several forms. Some miners took advantage of the mines’ constant 
accessibility, which allowed them to loosen or load coal on Sundays or late nights when 
the mines were closed. Because the cars used to load the coal were almost always in short 
supply, loading cars when the mine was closed enabled a worker to load his coal without 
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waiting for a car. In the process, it took cars away from “honest” miners working during 
operating hours. Miner “Working Slack” noted that fathers claimed turns for their sons, 
but the sons did not fill them. Instead, fathers loaded extra coal on their sons’ cars while 
the son earned daily wages as mule drivers.35 Other miners complained of coworkers 
accepting wage reductions, extra dead work, or large spaces between screen bars in order 
to gain a better spot in the mine or secure steady work. In doing so, miners allowed 
employers to charge less for their coal, sell more coal, and keep the mines open longer. 
Such an arrangement was so effective that an Indiana state investigator found that miners 
working at 75 cents per ton earned more in wages than those who earned one dollar per 
ton due to the amount of coal the company sold.36  Still, the dead work and large screens 
combined with miners accepting wage reductions ultimately forced other miners and 
mine operators to accept the same terms or else face shutdowns in their own mines.37 
Illinois miner, “K. R.” insisted no honest man of union principle would engage in such 
“cut-throat” actions, yet desperation drove many to accept the terms. “[T]he result,” he 
claimed, “is that good men are made the target of by the operators,” forced to accept 
lower wages that would only increase the wage decline or lose their jobs entirely.38 
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101 
 
Few components of the mining industry revealed this moral compromise more 
than the “free click.” Much like the pluck-me, the free click or “free turn” was a system 
companies enforced in mines throughout the nation. Most mines required “entries,” or 
long corridors that extended from the shaft to the “face” of the mine. The majority of 
miners worked in “rooms” situated along these corridors, but a handful of miners were 
needed to “drive entry,” or dig the coal from the face to extend the corridor for more 
rooms.39 The faster the “entry men” cleared, the faster production increased. Companies 
therefore lost money when entry men waited for cars to transport their coal. To solve this, 
many operators implemented the “free click” which permitted entry men to skip the line 
and take an empty car whenever they needed it instead of having to wait with the room 
men. 
The practice was needed to keep the mine functioning, but it had the added 
benefit of dramatically increasing the entry men’s pay at the expense of the room men 
who continued to wait for access to coal cars. In most instances, companies used entry 
driving positions to reward miners for good behavior, such as taking on extra dead work, 
shopping at the company store, or accepting a wage reduction without complaint. Such 
favoritism used the miners’ economic need to keep the workforce divided.40 Although 
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some miners and companies managed to create a system that allowed all miners a turn at 
the entry to keep wages even, this grew more difficult to uphold as wages declined. “We 
had a mass meeting and a resolution was passed for the entry men to get six cars ahead 
and then to stop until the room men can catch up to them,” Kentucky miner “Penrod” 
reported. “This worked all right until they had to stop [after their six cars] and then they 
kicked against it and now it is the same old tune—free click.”41  Mine workers may have 
remained opposed the idea of favoritism in the mines, but such an opportunity to earn 
more proved too valuable for workers who benefited from the system. 
 
Enterprise  
The moral turns that working families faced demonstrated how economic 
circumstances transformed social and cultural norms, undermining resident’s values even 
as they tried to hold onto them. But not all dishonest labor came by force. Hoping to 
grow wealthy, some producers invested in businesses like cooperative stores or coal 
mines while others took advantage of workplace favoritism and strikes to gain higher 
wages. Hundreds of producers, like the employers and merchants with whom they dealt, 
adopted cut-throat practices not to scrape by, but to improve their economic position. 
Hundreds of farmers operated what many knew as a “one-horse rig,” or a small 
mine on their land that used a single horse to hoist the coal out of their pit. Their wives, 
children, and hired hands often aided in the labor, allowing them to produce a meager 
amount of coal cheaply.  Because these mines were informal arrangements rather than an 
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actual mining company, one-horse rigs did not always pay their miners a per-ton wage, 
but instead gave their miners a percentage of the profit earned on the coal, further 
reducing production costs compared to miners paid by the ton. One-horse rigs often 
operated only in winter months and seldom produced enough to compete for coal 
contracts. Still, their production supplied local markets so that, collectively, these low-
cost enterprises cut into demand enough to force larger companies to lower their own 
production costs. More importantly to miners, when miners struck against coal 
companies one-horse rigs often remained in operation, benefiting from the high coal 
demand. 42 
Landowners with private mines were not the only small-scale operations to turn 
their back to honest principles and break strikes. Small mine owners, like the farmers 
who owned stock in Egypt’s Enterprise Mine also discarded their neighbors’ and 
employees’ interests when their investments were at risk. Scholars, however, seldom 
consider these connections between cooperative investment and strikebreaking and 
instead highlight differences between the two. Early examinations of worker cooperatives 
and strikebreaking often depicted such participants as ill-equipped to participate in the 
modern market. Cooperative participants were bent on reviving bygone market systems 
while strikebreakers were little more than tools to serve company agendas.43 Even the 
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most sympathetic depictions of cooperatives have maintained this clear division between 
producer and capital. Lawrence Goodwyn agreed with previous assertions that farmer 
cooperatives grew out of traditional community values, but asserted that these groups 
“challenged the existing structures of … the nation’s financial system,” envisioning a 
system wholly different from the culture big businesses offered.44 
Recent examinations of cooperatives and strikebreaking have done more to 
emphasize producers’ business-minded pragmatism, but in many ways distinctions 
between union and non-union remain. Historian Charles Postel saw cooperative efforts as 
evidence of business-minded farmers and farm laborers capable and willing to participate 
in the modern market, yet cast their efforts as an alternative vision to mainstream market 
ventures.45 Scholars of strikebreaking have maintained a similar dichotomy. They have 
highlighted social, economic, and cultural reasons for strikebreaking, but in most 
instances, these examinations cast strikebreakers as the antithesis of union workers.46 
                                                                                                                                            
Discipline in the United States, 1855-1946,” Historical Journal 29, no. 1 (March 1986): 96; Thomas G. 
Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
385; Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, 20, 25, 130. 
44Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, Chapters 1-5 passim, especially 80-81, quote xxi; Chester 
McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901, Essays and Documents (New York, Octagon Books, 
1963), 10, 199-205. For a more recent treatment of this cooperative commonwealth vision, see Gourevitch, 
From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth. 
45 Postel, Populist Vision, 104-108. 
46 Theresa Ann Case provides a detailed outline of strikebreaking historiography in “Losing the Middle 
Ground: Strikebreakers and Labor Protest on the Southwestern Railroads,” in Rethinking U.S. Labor 
History: Essays on the Working-Class Experience, 1756-2009, ed. Donna T. Haverty-Stacke and Daniel J. 
Walkowitz (New York: Continuum, 2010), 54-81. See also William M. Tuttle, Jr., “Some Strikebreakers’ 
Observations of Industrial Warfare,” Labor History 7, no 2 (Spring 1966):193-197; Warren C. Whatley, 
“African-American Strikebreaking from the Civil War to the New Deal,” Social Science History 20, no. 
4.(Winter, 1993): 525-558; Robert Michael Smith, From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of 
Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 2003); Eric Arnesen, “Specter of the Black Strikebreaker: Race, Employment, and Labor Activism in 
the Industrial Era,” Labor History 44, no. 3 (2003): 319-335; Eric Arnesen, “The Quicksands of Economic 
Insecurity: African Americans, Strikebreaking, and Labor Activism in the Industrial Era,” in Arnesen, The 
Black Worker: Race, Labor, and Civil Rights Since Emancipation (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 
2007); 
Stephen H. Norwood, Strikebreaking & Intimidation: Mercenaries and Masculinity in Twentieth Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 7-12. 
105 
 
Although Jarod Roll has recently noted the difference between non-union and anti-union 
strikebreaking, the distinction between union and non-union, striker and strikebreaker, 
remains.47 In fact, cooperatives and strikebreaking are seldom examined in tandem, so 
that those who established cooperatives appear to have little in common with those who 
broke strikes. 
In practice, however, union-associated entities like cooperatives and actions like 
strikebreaking overlapped. For thousands of workers in the southern Midwest and 
elsewhere, the nation’s leading capitalists were not the only investors privy to risk 
management tactics like joint-stock ownership or cooperative investment. Instead, they 
involved average workers looking to earn extra income for their families. Such 
opportunities had more in common with strikebreaking than historians have typically 
understood. Cooperative mines could seldom price their coal competitively without 
cutting into shareholder profits. When prices fell, they were frequently the first mines to 
sit idle and the last to resume work. For the duration of its closure, investors gained 
nothing. Larger businesses absorbed the loss, but small investors, like farmers and 
miners, lost their wages in addition to their investment. As was the case with the 
Enterprise mine in Egypt, the prospect of losing such an investment was enough for 
stockholding farmers to become strikebreakers.48 
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 The farmers’ willingness to strikebreak demonstrated the surest way for an 
individual or cooperative to survive in the competitive market. The comparatively few 
cooperative mines that succeeded often did so by implementing the same cut-throat 
tactics as other firms. A Knights of Labor cooperative in Avery, Iowa, not only cut coal 
prices but offered a free car of nut coal for each ten cars of coal purchased. The tactic 
stole contracts from their biggest competitor, the Avery Coal Company, allowing the 
cooperative to dominate the local coal market.49 Regardless of the Knights’ ideals of fair 
labor, the cooperative’s survival depended on its ability to competitively market its 
product.50  
Consequently, although they were founded on the premise of allowing average 
workers ownership, cooperatives and joint-stock initiatives often helped the owners at 
their employees’ expense. The Knights of Labor executive board, for example, owned the 
Mutual Mine near Cannelburg, Indiana. It had operated as a cooperative since 1884, but 
only a few of its owners worked in the mine. Instead, most were Knights from Ohio, 
including the mine superintendent and NTA 135 Master Workman, William T. Lewis. 
But by 1892, the Knights could not afford to run the mine and leased it to the Watkins, 
Lunch and Company, a coal company based in Peoria, Illinois. Technically, the mine 
remained a cooperative. Its owners continued to receive a twelve cent per ton royalty on 
all coal mined, but like hundreds of other mine owners, the Knights were absentee 
proprietors who left most decisions to local managers. In these instances, already low 
profits fell further for cooperative owners who split their dividends with third party 
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companies while those working in the mines received little or no benefit from the 
cooperative at all.51  
Similarly, joint-stock companies like the Enterprise mine in Egypt were forced to 
comply with the wage reductions or shut down entirely.52 Indiana miner and union 
organizer J. C. Heenan’s joint-stock mine in southern Illinois faced a similar problem. 
Unable to compete while paying the union-sanctioned scale, Heenan and his business 
partners cut their miners’ wages to price their coal under the largest Egypt mines. While 
mining coal and organizing local unions in the Indiana coalfields, Heenan simultaneously 
drove down wages under union scale rates as a mine owner in a neighboring state.53 
Such instances blurred divisions between owner and employee as well as union 
and non-union. Heenan was all four at once. While he pushed for higher wages, market 
competition made it impossible for him to pay what he and other miners deemed fair. The 
need to recuperate his investment led Heenan to undermine the very policies he 
advocated.54 In Petersburg, Illinois, mine stockholders gave themselves first access to 
mine cars so that their employees “only get what cars they can’t fill and that is few.” 
Stockholders ran a company store and forced their miners to shop there. When the miners 
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complained, the stockholding miners fired their employees and continued mining coal on 
their own.55  
Companies with more capital frequently used similar incentives to their 
advantage, offering miners mine stock to soothe wage grievances. In doing so, companies 
decreased the likelihood of miners striking for higher wages because it sliced into their 
gains as shareholders. In at least one case, these tactics were so injurious to miners that 
one committee of Illinois miners wrote to the National Labor Tribune to end the practice. 
“[W]e earnestly implore of you fellow men not to increase the force of the shyster 
stockholders whose acts always tend to keep the iron heel of oppression down heavily on 
us.” Claiming their actions were “a dodge from men’s duty,” the committee wanted these 
stockholding miners to “be branded as traitors to their fellow men and the people’s 
cause.”56 
The committee’s distinction between duty to the community’s well-being and 
personal investment opportunities tied into a larger moral conflict that ran throughout 
nineteenth century society. According to historian Ann Fabian, as the market economy 
shifted to one fueled by immediate profits and enormous gains, it changed the entire 
nation’s attitude toward investment, risk, and gambling, not just those of big investors.57 
Farmers may have decried the speculators that seemed to manipulate crop prices in New 
York and Chicago, but by the late 1880s futures trading was as accessible to ordinary 
people hoping to turn a dime into a dollar as it was big investors. Unofficial trading 
venues commonly known as “bucket shops” brought the exciting new world of futures 
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speculation and stock trading into rural communities throughout the nation.58 Because 
they were unincorporated venues, they were classified as illegal gambling dens in most 
states by the mid-1890s.59 Regardless of their legality, however, bucket shops functioned 
on the same principles as future traders in urban market exchanges. They “gambled” on 
future prices by selling “fictitious” or “fiat” products without actually owning or 
exchanging any merchandise.60 Such cases blurred the lines between reputable business 
owner, successful businessman, and gambler. The hope for easy profit drove big 
businessmen and ordinary people alike into the world of shareholding and futures 
investing.  
Few aspects captured this conflation of business, gambling, and dishonesty better 
than the term “blackleg.” Labor historians often dismiss it as a taunt during strikes and 
seldom consider its meaning. As such, they often imply that “blackleg” and 
“strikebreaker” were interchangeable terms.61  But in the late nineteenth century, 
“blackleg” had multiple meanings that most miners and farmers understood well. To 
farmers and ranchers, it was a name for the gangrene that killed crops and cattle, literally 
eating away the investments they worked so hard to raise. Throughout the nineteenth 
century the same term described gamblers and degenerates, not unlike bucket shop 
patrons, who gambled illegally with the futures market. By the end of the century, it 
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applied to any dishonest “cheat” or “swindler” who unfairly took another person’s 
rightful gain.62   
All of these meanings likely ran through rural workers’ minds when they heard 
and used the word “blackleg.” Those who used it meant it as an insult that not only 
described a dishonorable action, but dishonorable intent. Far from simply describing a 
person who broke a strike, a blackleg took what did not belong to him or her without 
caring who they injured. Blacklegs were malicious beings whose behaviors seemed to 
spread like disease, ravaging the earnings of honest laborers, creating a moral, mental, 
and physical threat. In the mining industry, “blackleg labor” implied any kind of 
dishonest mining practice that injured one’s coworkers for the sake of personal profit. 
While this often applied to strikebreaking, it also included men who labored below scale 
rates, accepted free clicks, stole another man’s coal, loosened coal on a Sunday, and 
engaged in any practice that miners deemed dishonest.63  
To many miners, blacklegging of any sort was a cardinal sin. Indiana miner Lige 
Jones claimed that miners who accepted free clicks were “brutal and savage and 
heathenish and hell-like…. monsters who were too greedy to give their fellow-man a 
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chance to live.”64 Miner “D. N. P.” likewise asserted that free clickers had lost their souls 
“– soulless communists I call them,” he declared. “I happened to be in church and heard 
them giving their experience at a love-feast, and rise on their feet and thank God that they 
could ‘read their title clear to mansions in the skies.’”  To D. N. P. and hundreds of 
others, such miners were hypocrites. Their good fortune did not come from God’s 
blessing, but from accepting what was not theirs. D. N. P. insisted, “I would ask your 
readers how these men can sit on their seats, in the sight of Almighty God and the men 
they are sitting and working beside, whom they know that they have taken, as it were, the 
bread out of their wives and children’s mouths to satisfy self.”65   
But the distinction between dishonest and upright was not always as clear as D. N. 
P. envisioned.66 Thousands of miners acknowledged that they labored unscrupulously, 
but insisted that they were not blacklegs. Rather, they claimed they were forced to accept 
dishonest labor in order to protect their own interests. Consequently, although the 
National Labor Tribune charged such miners were “a little too enterprising,” and looked 
after themselves while betraying other workers, the promise of living comfortably 
tempted union miners just as it did non-union.67 Although both Knights and miners’ 
unions condemned the free click, union miners continued to participate in the system. 
The reward it offered was too great for them to reject the system on principle alone. “I am 
sorry to say the majority of the entry men are Knights of Labor,” western Kentucky miner 
“Penrod” claimed of his local mine. Such men, he insisted, were Knights “in name only, 
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not principle, if I am not mistaken, or they would not accept of a free click if they want to 
act right towards their fellow man, as they get all [the work] they can do and the 
roommen in some parts of the mine not making a livelihood.” But Penrod’s coworkers 
were not the only organized men who disregarded honest principles. Indiana miner 
“T.B.T.” noted that his local’s president “and most of the committee” regularly took free 
clicks, causing him to conclude that “we ought not ask others to join [the Miners’ 
Federation] if we violate the rules ourselves.”68  
William Houston of Indiana noted that the Knights at one local mine accepted a 
10 cent per ton reduction that would force all mines in the region to “go down” in wages.  
“There is only one name for this and that is blacklegging,” he argued. But the effects of 
blacklegging did more than allow blacklegs an advantage to earn more at their neighbors’ 
expense. Like a contagion, it spread as miners injured by those they condemned as 
blacklegs had no choice but to labor dishonestly themselves. Illinois miners faced a 
similar situation when operators initiated an immediate 10 cent per ton reduction in 
wages that would increase to 20 cents if the miners resisted, National Progressive Union 
organizer Patrick H. Donnelly advised the miners to “keep cool” and accept the terms. 
“All who can get work at something else should do it,” he asserted, continuing that “those 
who can’t get work should adapt themselves to the conditions and make themselves as 
useful to the cause as possible.”69 Such orders were a far cry from the rallies that 
typically associated unionism with solidarity and strength. Rather, Donnelly’s words 
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reflected a language of compromise that came from the realization that market prices for 
coal had dropped too low for unions to enforce the agreements made with employers. 
Yet, in the process, miners continued to undermine their neighbors, allowing wages to 
fall ever lower70 “We are getting more demoralized every week in Clay City,” Houston 
concluded in his letter, acknowledging the guilt many union miners felt when they 
accepted their wage reduction.  The mining Knights were over 1200 strong, he observed, 
but they could not honor their own principles.71   
 
Concessions 
Miners’ belief in honest principles, then, did not forestall their hardships. When 
Iowa miners in NTA 135 fell on hard times, they had little choice but to undercut their 
neighbors. Rather than face scorn in their own communities, several miners traveled to 
Grape Creek, Illinois, a Miners’ Federation (NFM) stronghold in the midst of an ongoing 
strike. Carrying union cards, the Iowa Knights insisted they were honorable men forced 
to break the strike and meant no harm. “My God, what way would they help us?” Illinois 
Federation officers asked “My neighbor to starve my family and then ask that I consider 
him a good and true neighbor!”72 
The officers’ description of the strikebreaking union miners as “neighbors” 
reflected the difficult position southern Midwest miners occupied in the Gilded Age. 
Although the Iowa mines were over one hundred miles removed from Grape Creek, rail 
lines placed miners, and their coal, side by side. Regardless of distance, they were 
neighbors. At the same time, the word pulled on miners’ sense of working-class 
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community. More than ever before, miners across the nation were connected and their 
actions had an impact on each other. Such an image called for miners to “love thy 
neighbour as thyself,” and look after each other’s needs rather than tear them down.73 
Still, a miner’s duties to his neighbors remained secondary to his personal duties. 
Miners may have been connected through national markets and even common labor 
principles, but responsibilities to hearth and one’s union brothers remained paramount. 
Regional boundaries and union divides therefore became means for otherwise “honest” 
men to justify non-unionlike behavior. Notions of honor that caused a miner to think 
twice before blacklegging at home held less sway when he did not personally know the 
miners he injured. Thus the Iowa Knights were not alone in their behavior. Missouri 
miners broke Kansas strikes, Indiana miners broke strikes in southern Illinois, and 
western Kentucky miners broke strikes in southern Indiana.74 
But in the growing competitive market, miners no longer needed to travel to a 
nearby mine to break the strike. Because the goal of the strike was to dry up the coal 
supply, miners who accepted the low-paying coal contracts belonging to striking mines 
technically blacklegged by ensuring the supply of cheap coal remained unchanged.75 
Business boomed in Danville, Illinois, when nearby Springfield miners went on strike. 
But, as one Danville miner noted, it would not be long before Springfield’s strike would 
end with a defeat that forced Danville to take a reduction. Danville would go on strike, 
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the miner continued, and while it was out, Springfield would fill its contracts until the 
Danville strike failed. Both towns technically broke each other’s strikes and claimed its 
competition was blacklegging, but neither viewed its own strikebreaking actions as 
blacklegging. Rather, it justified its willingness to fill strikers’ contracts by claiming that 
it was only taking back what the “blacklegs” had taken from it in its last strike. “That is 
the way Springfield and Danville men have been fighting for twenty years,” he 
concluded. 76   
This dynamic grew more complicated as the national market web expanded, 
pulling more mines into the same competitive network. Springfield and Danville not only 
competed against each other, but the entire field reaching from Pennsylvania to southern 
Illinois. By 1889, miners in Ohio could fill Illinois contracts or Pennsylvania miners 
could compete against Indiana without leaving their home state.77 Although the National 
Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU) had formed less than five months 
earlier, the organization failed to unite the miners and could not stop the steady fall of 
wages across the coalfields. Pennsylvania and Ohio mines reduced their wages by five 
cents per ton, forcing Indiana and Illinois mines to lower their wages to compete for the 
Chicago market. In Indiana, bituminous wages fell from 75 to 55 cents per ton and block 
coal from 90 to 70.78 Even more harsh, mine owner William L. Scott, “coal king of 
Pennsylvania,” instructed his mine manager Charles J. Devlin to reduce the Spring 
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Valley, Illinois, miners’ wages from 90 cents per ton to 72 ½ cents per ton, double the 
dead work, and crowd the mines by adding a third miner to each two-man room.79  
In the course of negotiating, most Indiana miners managed to settle for a five cent 
per ton reduction comparable to a reduction Pennsylvania and Ohio miners accepted.80 
Some Illinois operators offered similar terms as long as the miners agreed to sign an iron-
clad agreement rejecting the union.81 Progressive Union leader Dan McLaughlin advised 
the miners to accept all terms except the iron-clad agreement. The operators had 
stockpiled coal and would not need to reopen their mines for at least six months, “so that 
when the markets require our labor we would, through hunger and other causes, be ready 
to accept their terms.” Accepting the reduction immediately, he and other union leaders 
insisted, “is the very best we can and should do.”82 
The miners disagreed. Calling a mass meeting in English, Polish, and German, 
miners discussed the terms, deciding that they were dishonest and unjust. Although the 
majority was not affiliated with NTA 135 or the Progressive Union, they voted to go on 
strike.83 Furious at McLaughlin and the other leaders’ willingness to abandon the 
principles they professed, the non-union strikers of northern Illinois and the Indiana block 
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field insisted that they would fight for honest principles and fair pay even when the 
unions would not. 84 
As the miners walked out, however, their actions were met with disdain from 
union leaders. If the miners wished for higher wages, McLaughlin contended, they 
needed to be thoroughly organized across state lines. Southern and central Illinois needed 
to honor the pay scale or their cheap coal would flood the Chicago market. The only way 
a strike could be successful was if all underpaid miners in all states struck 
simultaneously. In light of this, McLaughlin condemned the northern Illinois strike, 
calling the striking miners “knaves” for believing that a regional strike would solve a 
national problem. They were willing to ruin the progress the national organization had 
made for the sake of a local pay increase, “though some of them [claim] to be followers 
of the meek and lowly Savior,” he continued. Such a claim indicated that the non-union 
strike for higher wages was not only ill-conceived, but morally wrong and dishonorable. 
“They will have plenty of time to do penance in sackcloth and ashes for the ruin they 
have brought on our people.” The strikers meant well, McLaughlin insisted, “but they 
have listened to the wily tongue of the deceiver and not to their friends….” With that, 
McLaughlin and other NPU and NTA 135 leaders ordered all organized men to sign the 
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contract and return to the mines.85 In the following days, several union miners 
complied.86 
The balance of the strikers grew more outraged. They believed that McLaughlin’s 
orders, which encouraged union men to blackleg and break an overwhelmingly non-union 
strike, were “a cowardly stab at manhood’s rights.”87 Such a phrase implied that 
McLaughlin’s actions to preserve the union over miners’ wages made him no better than 
employers who treated their workers poorly. “Old Dan [McLaughlin]” had no right to 
order the miners living “under enforced slavery” to further “sign away their manhood,” 
miner and local organizer T. J. Lewellyn observed.88 Such an accusation indicated that 
organizers like McLaughlin were as guilty of making miners less than human as the 
employers who refused to treat them fairly. “As to Dan meeting tyranny and oppression,” 
Pro Bono Publico asserted, “it is an easy matter to meet in the way he has advised for 
eight years. We have been advised to accept reduction after reduction until the thing has 
grown monotonous and irksome.”89 Unlike McLaughlin, the miners could no longer 
afford to wait for the day when all miners could strike together. Union officers like 
McLaughlin, it seemed, were so far removed from the miners’ daily struggle that they 
had lost sight of honest principles. Instead, they grew complicit to the cut throat practices 
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that drove wages down. “Keep quiet, ‘Dan,’” Pro Bono Publico ordered. “Don’t censure 
any man or men for doing something you never dared do.”90  
To them, McLaughlin and those who followed his orders and accepted the 
depreciated terms were bowing to company demands. Missouri miner George 
Palfreyman, like many northern Illinois miners at the time, insisted that such miners were 
not humans but “things in the shape of men.”91 Illinois organizer William Scaife agreed, 
writing that the “hordes” of union men who broke the strike were worse than mice who 
timidly accepted company terms. Rather, they were “rats” that “did not possess a spark of 
manhood.”92 Accepting the terms did more than make it impossible for northern Illinois 
miners to live, northern Illinois striking miner John Rowe argued indignantly. In addition, 
it “would cut the throats of our fellow miners in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, who 
have got settled on reasonable terms, and we propose to hunger awhile rather than do 
this, even though Dan McL. calls us knaves.”93At a special convention governed by 
Illinois NPU officers, the miners agreed. They not only decided to continue the strike, but 
officially censured McLaughlin “for branding us as knaves and deceivers of the men of 
this district, who are actuated by motives as pure and honest as those of any man….”94 
But honesty meant little when coal flooded the market. As miners and officers 
fought over who had the purest motives, the families of strikers suffered. Neither the 
NPU nor NTA 135 could support the hundreds of striking families. By August, the 
Bloomington [Illinois] Daily Pantagraph reported that at least two infants had already 
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died from starvation, with more expected if the strike continued without relief.95 
Consequently, as union miners broke the strike in the northern Illinois mines, hundreds of 
desperate strikers traveled to the non-union mines in Egypt to find work. Both groups 
mined coal below the scale and both sent their coal to the Chicago market. Although both 
claimed to be “brave fellows” fighting for what was right for them and their families, 
both were also deemed “blacklegs” by other miners who claimed their willingness to 
mine coal rendered the strike ineffective.96  
By December, most northern Illinois mines had resumed work. The Illinois strike 
officially ended when Spring Valley miners signed a new contract accepting a 7 ½ cent 
per ton reduction and increased dead work, but allowing two men to a room. Dead work 
taken into consideration, the entire reduction averaged 10 cents per ton rather than the 
original 20-25 cents. Within days, the last Indiana mines on strike conceded as well.97 
Although the miners secured better terms, northern Illinois and Indiana miners 
condemned the unions for betraying their cause.98 Dishonesty and selfishness, they 
recognized, existed on both sides of the union line. Acknowledging the dissatisfaction, 
William Scaife attempted to mollify the embittered workers. The terms were unfair, he 
conceded, but the miners’ struggle was no longer a fight between right and wrong. 
Instead, it was an ongoing choice between “the least of two evils.”99 
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The national market twisted and stretched understandings of honor and morality, 
complicating workplace conflicts in ways that turned workers and unions against each 
other. Efforts to generate larger personal profit were never limited to the big businessmen 
and bankers that rural producers so readily condemned. Though on a smaller scale, 
producers engaged in similar acts not only upsetting local relationships as small mine 
owners extracted their profits by decreasing their neighbors’ incomes, but making it 
impossible to overcome local interests to create an effective national union. 
Consequently, as wages declined, union affiliation did not denote honest behavior any 
more than miners’ and farmers’ rejection of union organizations indicated a lack of 
“honest” labor principles. 
 For farmers, miners, and owners, from cooperatives and joint stock ventures to 
blacklegging, the concessions that national market competition demanded remained the 
same. To fight debt and exploitation producers had to compromise their sense of what 
was moral and fair.  Miners and farmers gambled, cheated and stole. They cried 
“blackleg” when dishonest labor threatened their own  livelihoods, but accepted terms 
that they knew would “cut the throats” of their fellow miners, breaking their strikes, 
filling their contracts, taking their coal cars, and ignoring their scales. It was the lesser 
evil than subjecting their families to hardship when increased income was within 
reach.100  
But it was still an evil. Miners throughout the southern Midwest looked in disgust 
at the 1889 strike failure, observing the markets, declining wages, union officers, 
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blacklegs, and the families who survived the summer on little more than bread and water. 
To them, it was a fresh reminder of the immorality inherent not only in their employers’ 
business practices, but the practices of their own neighbors. “In the past we have sown to 
the lust of flesh and we are reaping a harvest of evils,” miner “Pumpkin Smasher,” said of 
the 1880s conflicts. In training the farmers that overcrowded the mines, in flooding the 
market with coal, and in accepting more reductions, he observed, the miners contributed 
to the dire circumstances they faced. “[O]ur craftsmen have become so greedy of pelf that 
they sell their souls to get a dime more,” he continued. Such a phrase was a reminder of 
the cost dishonest labor demanded. If operators were “soulless” for demanding higher 
profits at workers’ expense, workers forfeited their own souls when they injured their 
own neighbors.101  
Few miners, least of all those defeated in 1889, believed the Progressive Union or 
NTA 135 could end this moral erosion. But the experiences in the late 1880s convinced 
the miners that they needed a way to live according to the honest principles they claimed, 
to love their neighbors without starving their families. To many, national unity between 
the vying unions seemed the only viable option. Union officers “have shown their 
inability to look after the interests of their craftsmen,” Indiana organizer William 
Houston acknowledged; yet he remained convinced that unionization was “the only rock 
and foundation to build upon for the salvation of all.”102 As the strikers returned to work 
in December 1889, miners throughout the nation expressed this same hope, willing the 
national miners’ union to be born again just one month later. But even as they formed the 
new order, the problems of the 1880s remained. Competition and wage decline 
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intensified, more farmers entered the mines, and miners remained skeptical of union 
leadership. Cutthroat competition was steadfast, informing the actions of operator and 
miner alike and undermining the trust miners had for each other and their organization. 
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Chapter Four 
Backsliders: Union Betrayal and the Aborted 1891 Strike 
 
“I dislike to speak against those who claim to be engaged in the service of labor reform, 
but he who wears your colors and professes to fight on your side, and then turns his 
sword against you in the thickest of the fight, is the most cowardly and miserable of all 
traitors….”1 
—Thomas Faulds 
 
“Everyone was struck dumb when they heard the telegram read,” nineteen year-
old block coal miner John Mooney reported to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. The 
stillness lingered in the crowded meeting hall as Indiana block coal miners considered 
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) National Secretary Patrick McBryde’s refusal 
to support their proposed November 1891 strike. According to McBryde, the miners were 
selfish fools for considering the endeavor. Even though the operators refused to pay the 
agreed winter wage, the UMW would offer no assistance in enforcing the scale, nor 
would the miners have the union’s support if they struck.2 
The silence quickly turned to rage. “Do our national officers know what they are 
doing? Are they aware of what they are doing? If not they will have to define their 
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position and explain their reason for such conduct,” Mooney demanded. His anger came 
not only from the telegram’s harsh words, but from what Mooney and thousands of other 
miners saw as the officers’ continued retreat from the principles they were supposed to 
defend. Six months earlier, national officers canceled the UMW’s first nationwide strike 
days before it was to begin. Although officers had once promised certain victory, they 
ordered the miners to accept the best terms employers offered.3 
Mooney’s anger toward the national office, then, was part of a broader pattern of 
what many miners saw as the officers’ indifference and betrayal of the very principles 
that they were elected to uphold. Like their accusations of government officials who 
failed to live up to their political beliefs, many rank and filers asserted that union officers 
had turned away from union principles and pulled the UMW astray with them. 
But frustrations with leadership did more than demonstrate rank and file mistrust 
of union leaders. It also reflected the formidable difficulties that grew from forging a 
national organization that could regulate a national but decentralized industry. Interstate 
competition between coal mines demanded a strong and centralized national union to 
negotiate and regulate the wage scale, but doing so often came at the expense of local 
concerns. More than ever before, the new union structure forced UMW leaders to look 
after national interests and larger mining regions like the western Pennsylvania field over 
the issues of smaller mining regions and areas like Mooney’s block field. Consequently, 
what appeared to Mooney to be an abandonment of union principle was really evidence 
of an overtaxed union spread too thinly to look after all regions simultaneously. 
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Still, in 1891, Mooney and thousands of other miners wondered why they should 
wait for officers’ blessings to earn a living wage. “We have blacklegged long enough,” 
Mooney grumbled. By following union orders, they had worked below the pay scale, 
which drove down wages in neighboring mines and made union miners indistinguishable 
from the “blacklegs” who broke strikes, the most hated workers in the industry. The 
national officers had endorsed the “blacklegging” Mooney described, content with letting 
Indiana workers fall in to deeper poverty. But neither Mooney nor the rest of the Indiana 
miners and even the district officers agreed with this approach. Recognizing this, Indiana-
Kentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy ordered the entire state to strike, despite 
the national leaders’ orders. Mooney and thousands of Indiana miners cheered. True 
union miners fought for fair treatment in the mines, Mooney argued, “and if the national 
officers do not help us let them keep hands off and we will fight our own battles.”4   
The Indiana rejection of the UMW national officers in November 1891 was not an 
isolated event. By the early 1890s, laborers across the nation were dissatisfied with union 
leadership, causing membership to wane.5 Although historians have cast this decline as a 
kind of disillusion that eroded union “solidarity” when the successes that once appeared 
guaranteed no longer seemed attainable, Mooney’s assertions show that workers did not 
always join or abandon unions based solely on union potential for success.6  Instead, 
many like Mooney, remained in the union long after major organizing failures even 
though they disagreed with union leaders and their actions. 
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In many respects, the UMW’s experiences in the early 1890s are crucial because 
of what did not occur rather than what did. The UMW’s 1891 national strike that did not 
happen demonstrated that membership numbers did not indicate union strength. Although 
the union claimed to be 70,000 members strong the February before the cancelled strike, 
only a fraction were willing to strike just a few months later.7 Second, the UMW’s 
decision to cancel the strike did not come from antagonistic employers, but from the tens 
of thousands of miners who would not honor the strike, indicating that the young union’s 
biggest threat came from within the order. Yet, even when leaders canceled the strike and 
confessed the UMW’s frailty, miners did not immediately abandon the union as studies of 
organizing suggested they should have. Moreover, when miners decided to leave the 
union, many still believed in unionism even if they did not have its membership. They 
did not abandon the UMW because of any disillusion with organized labor but because 
they believed the UMW leaders had turned away from the organization’s original goals. 
In the months following the May 1891 strike cancellation, miners and officers 
struggled to save the union, wrestling with dissatisfied miners and defiant local unions. In 
officers’ eyes, miners who “kicked” or fought against the union by not paying dues, 
rebuking leaders, and disregarding union orders were “Judases” who “backslid” away 
from the honest principles they had once held. Conversely, miners like John Mooney who 
had insisted that the miners could “fight our own battles,” believed that the true 
backsliders were the officers who forced miners to blackleg, leading the union away from 
its founding principles. Miners “kicked” to regain control of the union supposed to look 
after their interests. When their efforts to reclaim the UMW seemed fruitless, miners 
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throughout the nation questioned whether the UMW’s centralized structure and national 
scope ever would be able to look after all miners’ interests. Thousands formed their own 
local unions that rivaled the UMW. The Indiana miners’ actions in the months after the 
1891 strike cancellation, then, were part of an ongoing struggle between national officers 
and coal miners both inside and outside the UMW.   
Close examination of the Indiana miners’ grievances with national and state 
UMW officers provides a useful means to understand when and why droves of rank and 
file miners abandoned the UMW in nearly every mining region of the nation. These early 
UMW failures and mining families’ responses to them indicate that union decline in the 
late nineteenth century was not necessarily due to company hostility or worker disillusion 
with unions’ ability to improve workplace conditions. It did not denote a waning faith in 
unionism at all, but was a conscious effort to recommit the union to its own principles 
and create a union that fit with their needs and visions for their futures.  
 
Misled 
Over seventy thousand coal miners were supposed to strike on May 1, 1891. 
Instead, less than ten thousand struck, and most of that number went out by accident. 
Planned by the UMW national officers to initiate the eight-hour workday throughout the 
coal industry, the strike would be the first time all miners walked out in unison. For over 
a year, officers and organizers trumpeted the strike, promising that it would begin an 
aggressive campaign for fair treatment in the mines, increasing wages and improving 
work conditions. Despite months of campaigning and assurances of certain victory, 
however, UMW leaders called off the strike less than three days before it was to begin. 
As the officers explained in a circular sent to all locals, union membership was too low 
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and too many miners had declared they would not honor the strike. Considering these 
factors, it was “impossible to unite the country in one solid phalanx for any given object 
of reform.”8  
Although it was abandoned, the UMW’s effort to initiate a nationwide reform no 
isolated event in late nineteenth century labor organizing. It was part of a great push for 
political and economic reform. Throughout the nation, groups pushed for moral, civic, 
and economic reforms ranging from temperance to tax reform. Farmers in the South and 
Midwest, long frustrated with the economic conditions that slighted “producers,” 
gradually built a movement that, by 1890, became a powerful force in several states. 
Legislation such as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and countless state and federal laws 
regulating workplace conditions and railroad practices, and stronger laws against “pluck-
me” stores seemed to indicate that the government was on the producers’ side. As 
Southern farmers worked to fight jute prices, the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association 
(FMBA) along with Midwestern Granges mobilized wheat farmers to stand against the 
“twine trust” that charged exorbitant prices for the string used to bind wheat.9 After years 
of organizing, groups like the Knights of Labor and Farmers’ Alliances forged farmer-
laborer alliances to challenge railroads and monopolies.10 By early 1891, farmers and 
laborers planned to meet in Cincinnati that May to form a third political party that would 
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reform the nation.11 Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) made headway 
securing the eight-hour workday, helping the carpenters gain it in 1890 and planned to 
extend the push into other industries.12 
The UMW added to this excitement when it formed in January 1890. After years 
of fighting, the miners’ unions finally united, creating one of the largest unions in the 
nation. Learning from failures, the new union’s structure dissolved neither the 
Progressive Union nor Knights Trade Assembly 135. The UMW promised to smooth past 
differences between the two orders by creating a flexible framework that allowed Knights 
to remain over their local assemblies while the former Progressive Union miners 
followed the AFL. Both groups answered to the UMW’s national executive board 
members who were required to hold membership in both orders. This board made all 
decisions for the UMW, including which strikes the union would support and how much 
aid the strikers would receive. The officers and many of the rank and file believed the 
centralized power of the union would give it the strength to confront the competitive coal 
market, adding mine reform to the growing list of producer-led transformations at the end 
of the century. The UMW’s decision to join the AFL’s fight for the eight-hour workday 
only seemed to further confirm this promise that change would come soon. 
“I never so much regretted that the best half of my life is past as I do now, when I 
see what grand possibilities lie in the years to come,” Laurene Gardner wrote excitedly.13 
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The forty-two-year-old miner wife expressed the sentiments thousands of producers in 
the southern Midwest held. Although she had never been a union member herself, she 
followed both labor and political issues closely. Her interest began at age thirteen with 
the American Miners’ Association in the 1860s and continued when she married a coal 
miner and settled in southern Indiana. As she raised her three sons and two daughters, she 
watched miners’ unions come and go, reading union proceedings “while rocking the 
cradle” of her children.14 She raised them “to take no mean place in the grand march of 
liberty to the worker.” 15This was her duty, and Gardner did it well. Her sons, she 
bragged, “have never been called blacklegs yet.”16  
For Gardner, a white woman who was both a part of and apart from political and 
labor movements all her life, the mobilization of the UMW and the Populists gave her 
hope for the future. But the enthusiasm Gardner expressed and successes she witnessed 
were short-lived. As promising as 1890 appeared, the years that followed demonstrated 
that the excitement was premature. State after state became enmeshed in battles over the 
constitutionality and enforcement of their new workplace and pluck-me laws. Meanwhile, 
Populists failed to establish their third party at a convention in Cincinnati. Despite the 
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silver purchase act, economic conditions continued to worsen for producers across the 
nation.17   
In the midst of this, the UMW called off its nationwide strike. The cancellation 
and its aftermath, known by the miners as “the first of May,” stood in sharp contrast to 
what organizers had proclaimed only one week earlier. The miners, then, saw the aborted 
strike as more than evidence of the UMW’s inability to look after miners’ concerns. To 
them, it was proof that the officers had misled the rank and file by pushing a movement 
that failed while lying about union strength. In joining the union, miners had risked their 
jobs and sacrificed their pay for what the New York Times dubbed a “May Day fizzle,” a 
movement that failed before it began.18   
Those who were ready to strike expressed more outrage at the officers’ 
misleading actions than the union’s abandonment of the eight-hour movement.  Miners in 
Flagler, Iowa, expressed “great dissatisfaction” at the strike’s cancellation. “[W]e are 
open to confess the calling it off is something we don’t really understand,” they wrote, 
noting that the miners had voted in favor of the strike at the last convention. In the minds 
of the Flagler miners, only a mass vote of delegates could countermand the strike call. 
“Thus the Executive Board would have no right to declare the demand off without very 
grave reasons,” the miners reasoned.19  
The problem was that UMW officers had explicitly announced that a May 1 
victory was certain. The miners had not been alerted to any “grave” situations that caused 
the cancellation. Consequently, the abrupt change indicated that either the leaders were 
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too cowardly to fight or were lying about their strength. “I believe there has been too 
darned much blowing and bluff indulged by the delegates to conventions which have 
been held during the past eighteen months,” Indiana miner “M. F.” complained.20 The 
optimism from successfully forming the UMW gave delegates an inflated hope in the 
new union’s abilities. Officers, M.F. and other miners reasoned, should have been more 
straightforward on the limits of the union’s success prior to their eleventh hour strike 
cancellation, but instead the United Mine Workers’ Journal had proclaimed certain 
victory until the strike was canceled. “Are they all imbeciles, or are they all traitors?” 
M.F. asked of the UMW’s national officers.21 For many miners, the answer to this 
question did not matter. The Flagler, Iowa, miners reasoned that the “Executive Board 
certainly should have known, if they did not know, the strength of this order previous to 
the last moment.”22 That the officers refused to acknowledge the true state of affairs, or at 
least hid them from the rank and file, seemed disingenuous and preyed on the hopes of 
miners who paid into a cause that never came to fruition.  
Miners throughout the nation demanded to know why the Journal’s early issues 
trumpeted the eight-hour rallying cry if their defeat was so imminent. For many, the 
answer was that UMW officers used the official organ as a propaganda tool to boost 
worker faith in the movement without building strength. Indiana miner F. J. Llewellyn 
called such efforts “thunder” that, sounded threatening but never generated a true storm. 
Instead, it produced “a Don Quixotic effort” that only hurt the miners. “Truly a glory 
shared in by none except the authors and creators of the great U Mean Wind paper 
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organization. What magnificent victories we have won—on paper! What grand things we 
shall do—in the future! But in the living present, what?”23 
Leader William Scaife acknowledged similar feelings among union miners 
throughout his home state of Illinois, especially the northern field. Even after their 1889 
strike defeat, they believed the UMW would redeem the miners from the years of wage 
decline. Yet, instead of going forward with the national strike, the leaders pulled back, 
leaving the northern Illinois miners in what Scaife called “hopeless confusion,” and 
causing them to wonder if anything the union leaders said was true. The result, Scaife 
claimed, was enough to “disgust the members and make them swear they will never 
belong to a national union.”24 UMW Vice President Phil Penna’s tours of the northern 
Illinois coalfields in July 1891 confirmed Scaife’s assessment. By then, the thirty-four 
year old was no novice to organizing. Born in England, Penna arrived in the United 
States in the early 1880s and settled in Linton, Indiana, where he began mining coal.25 
His fiery speeches and short temper for non-union miners soon made “Little Phil” famous 
in the Indiana miners’ unions and propelled him to national leadership when the UMW 
formed in 1890.26 Penna had given thousands of speeches and organized hundreds of 
locals by the time he combed through the Illinois coalfields in the 1891 summer. Yet as 
he traveled from town to town Little Phil discovered that even he could not fully 
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persuade the miners to return to their union. Rather, he found that “miners have 
disbanded their locals in some instances, while nowhere could I find a place thoroughly 
organized.” Instead of pride in unionism, he found “deep seated discontent,” with the 
UMW’s actions.27 
 
Backsliding 
Leaders like Penna regarded the angry miners with contempt. If it were not for 
such “ilk[,] there would be no need of an organization at all,” the organizer wrote, 
indicating that the miners’ worst enemies were not their employers, but their coworkers 
who claimed to support the union and then turned away. 28 According to Indiana-
Kentucky District President Michael Commesky, these “chronic kickers” no longer 
believed in the principles the UMW advocated. Instead, they opted to “sit like a gnat on a 
log” in union meetings and “preach[ed] their scabism to whoever will listen to them” 
when union victory came slowly. Their hostility toward the order, he argued, had 
hardened their hearts to organized labor’s call. “[W]hen men make up their minds not to 
be converted they will always be sinners,” he wrote, reminding readers that even the 
strongest union men could fall away.29  
The comments touched a common theme among UMW loyalists. Miner wife 
Girsy McNab claimed that such actions were both the source and the effect of the May 
first cancellation. Although she insisted it was not her habit “tae tell a fa’ing man o’ his 
backslidings,” she noted that many of the union miners in her region abandoned the union 
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after the failure. “And noo when the’re in trouble they are wishing they hadna discarded 
their union.”30 Sinthy Snodgrass agreed. Like McNab, Snodgrass was frustrated by union 
miner complaints about the UMW rather than building it up. “Har is de pint dat gages me 
all de time,” she wrote, “why dese bery men dat cus de organazation if dey get in trouble 
wid de bos dey run to de union and get dem ter strike to gane der pint an sum ob dem on 
metin nite wont go to de metin, but gow rund to de pluck-me an talk to de stoer clerks 
and try to git a sof snap jus because dey get der poak and beans fer de skinup stoer.” This 
was no way to build a union, Snodgrass argued, instead, “we nede more good strong 
onions dat will bring the tears ob repentence to de eys ob some ob de rank and file.”31 To 
McNab and Snodgrass, this was an ongoing trend. Miners constantly joined and left the 
union only to join again when the miners grew desperate.  
Such descriptions, which echoed complaints many churchgoers made of 
“backsliders” who fell away from Christian teachings, tapped into a larger discussion of 
honest and moral living in the nineteenth century. Although most often understood within 
religious faith, the term “backslider” was frequently applied to people aside from those 
who stopped attending church. Local newspapers used the term to describe presumably 
upstanding citizens who had acted in ways deemed unethical.32   
A political backslider was someone who turned away from his political 
convictions. Methodist Reverend James Miller stressed to his Decatur, Illinois, 
congregation those practicing politics should uphold honesty above all. “If you have the 
honest spirit you will have the right spirit, and you will go through the campaign with 
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clean hands and come out with a record of which no man need be ashamed.” But if one 
did not, he claimed “you will be certain to backslide and will have to be converted again 
next winter.”33 The Ottawa [Kansas] Daily Republican rejoiced in 1893 when a group of 
local residents “returned to their first love,” by rejoining the Republican Party, declaring 
“that Cleveland and Hoke Smith are frauds” and that “the populists are blind.” 34  Daily 
Inter Ocean correspondent “A. R. H.” made a similar claim of Illinois Ex-Governor John 
Palmer in 1888. Citing the Republican-turned-Democrat’s long career, the writer 
compared Palmer’s speeches from 1868 to his stance in the 1880s. While Palmer had 
once referred to Southern rebels as untrustworthy “sinners,” twenty years later, A. R. H. 
asserted the governor was a “backslider” himself as he moved to reconcile political 
differences and looked at Democrats with sympathy.35  
Whether they were churchgoers, union members, citizens, or politicians, the 
“backslider” simply was not committed to the values he or she once professed. Using the 
term was a way for ministers, politicians, and union leaders to vividly describe their 
efforts as well as those they wished to convert. It reaffirmed that their cause was a 
morally right but challenging endeavor and not only called attention to difficult tasks of 
persuasion where leaders tried to overcome evil, but also implied that their struggles 
continued even when their conversion efforts succeeded. 
 More importantly, the term shamed the people it described. Backsliders had once 
believed in the leaders’ message, but had fallen away. In this sense, the term “backslider” 
became a double insult. It acknowledged that those carrying the term did not behave in 
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moral and respectable ways. This fact was made worse because the backsliders knew 
better. They sinned not out of ignorance, but simply because they did not care to act 
morally. In short, while those who had never been converted were simply immoral, a 
backslider was an immoral traitor.36 
Officers were not the only union affiliates that cried traitor in the months 
following the May cancellation. Thousands of miners, who joined the UMW to create a 
nationwide front against falling wages and poor work conditions, grew frustrated when 
the new union fell short in reaching its goals as well as generating national unity. 
Officers, they believed, had not only become less committed to regulating the national 
market, but even their limited efforts favored some groups of miners over others.  
Miners throughout the southern Midwest saw the first of May as proof of more 
than officer dishonesty, but outright favoritism of some regions and miners over others.  
In looking over the union’s history in his mining region, Indiana miner William Blakley 
claimed that officers habitually neglected Indiana miners’ interests. When the UMW 
neglected to set a price for mine-run coal in Indiana that was comparable to the eastern 
coalfields, he was furious. “Why were the same provisions in regard to the mine run 
price, not made for Indiana as was made for Pennsylvania and Ohio?” The officers 
“ignored” the Indiana miners’ concerns “when every other distrist’s [sic] wishes and 
well-being were looked after.”37 Miner “A Beginner” from southern Illinois asserted that 
no UMW officer bothered to visit his mining region since they organized, causing the 
                                               
36 Thomas Faulds, letter to the editor, “Doesn’t Think a Union Practicable,” NLT, April 9, 1887; T. J. 
Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892. 
37 William Blakley, letter to the editor, “A Linton, Ind., Correspondent,” UMWJ, February 17, 1898; John 
Donnelly, letter to the editor, “An Illinois Criticism,” NLT, May 30, 1891. 
139 
 
miners to wonder if they even had officers any longer.38 It was a valid question for the 
southern Illinois miners to ask. Although they were technically members of the Miners’ 
Federation when it merged into the Progressive Union in 1888, no organizer notified 
them of the merger by telegram, letter, or visit until nearly five months later.39 According 
to William Scaife, such tendencies caused thousands of southern Midwest miners to 
believe “that our organization is an eastern one.”40  
The miners found proof for their suspicions in the Executive Board’s own circular 
that detailed the May 1 decision.41 Although the UMW had over twenty districts, only 
five district presidents attended the first day’s meeting to discuss the strike cancellation, 
and four of those were from the Pennsylvania districts. Indiana and Illinois district 
presidents were summoned for the second day’s meeting, but only the Illinois president 
arrived in time. After two days’ debate, the six district presidents and the Executive 
Board decided to cancel the strike and send the UMW’s May 1 strike fund to aid an 
ongoing strike in the Pennsylvania coke mines.42 The balance of the nation’s miners 
would have to wait until the UMW was strong enough to fight on a larger scale.  
 
Indiana 
Southern Midwest miners were no strangers to weak unions, but by 1891 they 
were tired of their unions backing away from the fight, especially when the union 
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supported strikes in the east. This sentiment was particularly strong in the Indiana field. 
The block coal miners, who suffered through the 1889 strike with little support from the 
Progressive Union or NTA 135, expressed no interest in joining the UMW when it 
formed one month after their 1889 strike failed. Even the bituminous miners who joined 
when the new union formed were less than satisfied long before the 1891 summer. Their 
anger with the national officers began a year earlier when the officers failed to secure 
their desired wage scale with operators in May 1890. Although the Indiana bituminous 
miners were among the most thoroughly organized in the nation and were ready to strike, 
the national officers ordered them to accept the terms, which required miners throughout 
the state to take a reduction. 43  
The miners’ frustration was offset with the promise of the May 1891 strike. 
National officers assured the miners in Indiana and elsewhere that the strike would not 
only initiate the eight-hour workday, but also fair wages. Consequently, when they 
learned the strike was canceled, Indiana miners were furious. But the reason for their 
anger was not only due to the UMW national leaders’ reluctance to fight. The short notice 
of the May 1 strike cancellation prevented Indiana UMW officers from receiving the 
news in time. Unaware of the telegram, thousands of Indiana union and non-union miners 
walked out of the mines believing that their neighboring states had done the same. UMW 
Indiana-Kentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy was as shocked as the miners 
when he heard news of the cancellation “and I may say right here that the officers, as well 
as the organized miners of this state, were in favor of the move for eight hours and I fear 
the change of policy will be a great drawback in perfecting the organization of District 
                                               
43“The Columbus Result,” NLT, April 26, 1890 (quotes); See also, Robert Watchorn, Official UMW 
Report, “Coal Miner Matters,” NLT, April 26, 1890; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 
Report, “Miners of Indiana,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 
141 
 
11.”44  Kennedy’s assessment proved true. A week later, most mines remained at a 
standstill not because miners were striking for the eight-hour day, but because operators 
wished to impose another wage reduction upon the miners’ return.45  
 “The miners of this portion of Indiana were prepared for an honorable defeat, but 
not a dishonorable retreat, and we have been both and not a blow struck!” F. J. Llewellyn 
exclaimed.46 The miners, he insisted, were accustomed to fighting losing battles for a just 
cause, but to be abandoned by the union hours before their strike was nothing short of 
betrayal. The UMW had left the Indiana miners at the operators’ mercy as other states’ 
coal filled their contracts.47  
Despite the miners’ defeat and anger at what they saw as the UMW officers’ 
abandonment of the cause, a close examination of the dues union miners’ paid indicates 
that few Indiana union miners abandoned the UMW in the months after the strike failure. 
Although officers often claimed that dues payments were members’ responsibility for a 
wider cause, miners did not always agree. Rather, they often looked at their dues 
payments as a way to show support or disdain for union decisions. In some cases, failure 
to pay dues indicated that a local union or assembly had dissolved and that miners no 
longer wished to be members. More often, miners remained in the union, but refused to 
give money to an organization that did not act in their interest. Organizer Tim O’Malley 
observed that two Knights of Labor miners’ assemblies refused to pay dues to NTA 135 
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in 1887 but continued to support the Knights’ General Assembly. 48 In instances such as 
this, decisions to not support specific union levels or branches spoke volumes to 
organizations that continually operated on small budgets, making dissatisfaction 
abundantly clear to union officials.49 
Officers experienced this sentiment in the weeks following the first of May as 
they traveled the coalfields to assuage miners’ frustration with the cancellation. “The 
month just gone has been one of disappointment and trouble,” Ohio organizer W. C. 
Pearce reported in June 1891. “In almost every mining locality in Ohio there has been 
more or less kicking and fault-finding regarding the settlement of the 1st of May…. Every 
day letters are received stating men will not pay their dues until some of the [national] 
officers come and explain the present conditions.”50 Ohio organizer and national 
executive board member Richard L. Davis confessed that only two-thirds of his district’s 
union men paid their dues. “The others refuse and some of them say that no matter [what] 
they will not pay another cent to anything. They say they have paid and paid and have 
never reaped any benefit and it is impossible for any one to try to show them any good 
that has been done.…” 51  UMW Vice President Phil Penna found similar conditions 
when he toured the southern Midwest that summer. After a trip through the northern 
Illinois coalfields, local unions and assemblies unabashedly told the national officer that 
                                               
48 T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “The K. of L. and Trades Unions,” NLT, May 28, 1887; Oscar 
Anderson to John Hayes, June 17, 1892, Reel 11, JHP. 
49“E. P.,” letter to the editor, “Rambler Criticized,” NLT, February 4, 1888; Thomas Faulds, letter to the 
editor, “The Value of Organization,” May 19, 1888; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, 
September 7, 1889. 
50 W. C. Pearce, letter to the editor, “Fault-Finders in Ohio,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891.  
51 R.L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Work Very Dull,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891. James H. Eskew made a similar 
statement regarding miners in Ayrshire, Indiana, that winter. James H. Eskew, letter to the editor, “Ayrshire 
Somewhat,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891. 
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they “will oppose sending another cent to the national while the present executive board 
have control”52   
Penna’s statement, combined with other national organizers’ comments pertaining 
to national dues payments, indicates an important trend in union dues payments. Because 
unions sent their dues to the various organization levels separately, miners and locals 
were able to discern when each level received its payment and what amount each level 
would receive, regardless of organizational bylaws. No detailed national dues receipts 
exist from the southern Midwest during the UMW’s early years. However, Indiana-
Kentucky District Secretary Kennedy’s meticulous weekly reports, which included the 
amounts the state received from each local, offer a window into miner dedication to the 
UMW. As officers and organizers reported locals collapsing and union miners 
withholding their national dues, a close examination shows that the state-level finances 
fared somewhat differently than the national.53 
 Prior to the strike, Kennedy’s dues totals often ranged from $20 to $90 each week, 
with the highest amounts collected between March 28 and April 30, corresponding with 
anticipation for the May strike (Appendix Chart 1). This pattern changed in the weeks 
following May 1. The first three weeks following the strike cancellation state dues 
declined slightly compared to weeks prior, hovering at roughly $40 each week, within the 
range typical for his reports prior to the strike. But by June 4, Kennedy reported only 
                                               
52 Historian Andrew Arnold found that hundreds of Pennsylvania union miners similarly refused to pay 
dues to UMW or NTA 135 but continued to pay into the Knights’ General Assembly, causing Arnold to 
conclude that while regional Knights “were slipping back into its old role as a leadership organization,” the 
UMW “was simply slipping away.” Arnold, Fueling, 157; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from 
Linton,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 
53 The analysis of the Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven dues is only possible because Secretary Kennedy 
took pains to report every cent he received each week. No other organizer reported dues as consistently 
during this period.  
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$8.20 for the previous week.  In fact, the secretary’s receipts for the entire month of June 
only totaled $70.50, a far cry from the dues received just weeks earlier.54 
Although the decline in the Indiana-Kentucky district’s dues corresponded with 
officer reports throughout the nation that miners had lost faith in the union, the decrease 
was more likely due to the ongoing strike. Miners seldom paid dues while on strike, but 
resumed when the strike ended. Kennedy’s reports confirm this trend: miners resumed 
paying union dues after their summer strikes ended in failure. In fact, Kennedy’s receipts 
for July 1891 actually showed an increase in union dues that surpassed those collected 
even in the weeks leading up to May 1. If union decline was primarily due to any sort of 
disillusion with union strength or ability, Kennedy’s dues should have plummeted and 
not recovered after most Indiana miners’ strikes had failed. Miners who believed in the 
union continued to pay their state dues even as they cursed their national officers. Their 
belief in unionism was not rattled; their faith in the officers was.55  
 
                                               
54 Kennedy’s receipts show that newly organized locals, small locals, or those that sent sporadic union 
payments were the most likely to dissolve in the 1891 summer. Local Assembly 2998 of Spotsville, 
Kentucky, was only organized for a few months when the May 1 failure occurred. The assembly paid $8.20 
according to Kennedy’s April 4 report, but did not send in anything more until a final payment reported 
August 13, amounting to $7.50.  Similarly, Local Assembly 456 of Carbon, Indiana, was a small order 
located in the heart of the non-union block coal field. Although the local managed to regularly send in its 
meager dues in the 1890 summer months, the union stopped its payments immediately following the May 
1, 1891 strike. These dues comparisons are taken from a compilation of Kennedy’s weekly reports on 
UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven’s status and finances printed in each issue of the UMW’s official 
organ. For 1890 and early 1891, the reports are found on the UMW page of the National Labor Tribune. 
After April 1891, they were printed in the United Mine Workers’ Journal, most frequently under the 
headings “District Eleven” or “Indiana Miners.” 
55 William Bauchop Wilson, letter to the editor, “Wilson in Indiana,” UMWJ, September 24, 1891; John 
Gallagher, letter to the editor, “Clay County Miners,” UMWJ, September 24, 1891. Local Assembly 3688 
in McHenry, Kentucky, continued to give its roughly eight dollars each month even after the May 1 
cancellation. Similarly, Local Union 31 at Linton, Indiana, which sporadically paid eight dollars in dues 
prior to the May 1 cancellation began sending in its dues once a month starting in June 1891. In the months 
that followed, its dues payments increased from eight dollars to twelve by September.  
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Misplaced Faith 
 Few miners captured this sentiment more than those in the Indiana block mines. 
They had no interest in joining the UMW when it formed and were not members during 
the May 1 strike cancellation. But lack of membership did not mean the miners rejected 
union sentiment. Instead, the non-union block men joined the thousands of Indiana 
bituminous miners in what they thought was a nationwide strike. Moreover, when the 
strike failed, the miners did not abandon the UMW. Even though, as block district 
organizer Samuel Anderson explained, they had “not much faith” in the new union, over 
one hundred and fifty miners in Knightsville alone decided to “give it a fair trial” and 
become UMW members for the first time. 56    
The Clay County miners’ willingness to join the UMW after a substantial defeat 
demonstrated that union strength or the miners’ lack of faith in it was not enough to 
dissuade workers from joining a union. But this did not mean that the new members 
trusted the union or its officers. Their skepticism came from their longstanding 
frustrations with larger unions overlooking block district concerns. “Nearly half the 
miners of this state are in this county,” Anderson complained, but their coal was of a 
different quality, mined, and, was priced differently from the coal in the national 
bituminous market. As a result, block miners paid the same dues as bituminous miners 
but often found that block coal concerns were rarely addressed in the state or national 
union agendas.57  
                                               
56 William Houston, letter to the editor, “Clay County’s Hard Lines,” NLT, January 11, 1890; Samuel 
Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891.  
57Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891; “Indiana Miners 
Give In,” NLT, January 2, 1892.  
146 
 
Block miners grew particularly frustrated with the national defense fund. All 
union miners were expected to contribute to the fund to be used as aid for striking or 
locked out miners. Unlike past funds, which were controlled by local and state unions, 
the National Executive Board held sole discretion over how the defense fund was spent. 
The centralization of the funds, much like the centralization of union authority, was 
supposed to increase union efficiency. Yet in 1891, it seemed that the UMW gave little 
aid to the southern Midwest. “[O]ur most intelligent members began to ask, ‘What are 
[the national officers] doing with the defense fund?’” When Anderson and the other 
leaders replied that they did not know, “[a] quiet smile could be seen on some faces and 
that was the last of them.” The miners understood that they would never see the money 
again.58   
  Despite Anderson’s effort to revive faith in the union, the miners wanted nothing 
of it. “[W]e called two delegate meetings and one mass meeting to discuss the propriety 
of thorough organization,” he recalled. “These were failures.” Consequently, as Phil 
Penna and the other national officers decried the union miners’ who “kicked” against the 
UMW and “backslid” away from it, Anderson, like other local organizers, insisted that it 
was not the miners who backslid. Instead, Anderson wanted the nation’s miners to 
understand that the Clay County men were neither “dupes” fooled by their employers nor 
“sinners” who had backslid from the union. “There are as intelligent and good union men 
here as there are anywhere,” he insisted. The union, not the miners had turned away from 
honest principles. “I believe that when we started to organize we made a grand mistake, 
for if, instead of sending away our money for taxes without receiving one particle of 
benefit in return, we had put every cent of money we subscribed into a [home] fund to 
                                               
58 Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891.  
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thoroughly organize Clay county, we then ourselves could have removed the many local 
hardships we have to labor under and could have joined issues with [the bituminous 
miners] on a sound basis.” 59 
Anderson’s anger was echoed throughout the state when the UMW issued its fall 
1891 orders for the Indiana miners to reduce wages. Rather than earning 75 cents per ton 
as expected during winter months, block miner John Mooney and his coworkers—at 
UMW orders—now earned only 45 ½ cents. The officers’ decision, Mooney asserted, “is 
as dishonest and false as the system that it is based on. It is impossible to establish a 
common measure of prices that will do justice to the coal miner.” But there was nothing 
the miners could do. “We cannot fight the men, the operators and the organization.” 60  
Frustration turned to hostility when roughly ten thousand miners in western 
Pennsylvania went on strike for higher wages that fall. The UMW did not order this 
strike, but because the national officers wished to maintain a unified front, they ordered 
all miners to lend their support to the Pennsylvania miners.61 The Indiana miners were 
outraged, Mooney explained, because the same officers “gave their aid and sanction to 
the Pittsburg [Pennsylvania] miners to demand 13 cents per ton above scale rates, and 
they condemn the miners of Indiana when we are justified in forcing the operators of this 
state to pay scale rates.” 62 In short, the national officers had ordered Indiana miners not 
only to work at a reduction, but to send financial aid to miners striking for wages nearly 
twenty-five cents higher than what Indiana miners earned.63  Within days, Indiana miners 
                                               
59Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891.  
60 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Scale for IN,” UMWJ, September 3, 1891.  
61 UMW national officers did not announce that they did not order the Pennsylvania strike until after it was 
defeated. Patrick McBryde, letter to the editor, “Secretary McBryde,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 
62 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 
63 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 report, UMWJ, November 12, 1891; “Ten Thousand 
Miners Quit Work,” NYT, October 2, 1891. 
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and officers planned a strike of their own. Their appeal reached the Executive Board just 
as the Pennsylvania strike ended in defeat. Facing an exhausted national treasury, 
National Secretary Patrick McBryde sent the infamous telegram that stunned the Indiana 
miners. His orders for them to accept the reduced wage were countermanded by Indiana-
Kentucky District Secretary John Kennedy, who commanded all Indiana miners to 
strike.64  
It was not in Kennedy’s character to disregard orders. Born around 1847 in 
Scotland, Kennedy moved with his parents to Indiana and began mining at age nine.65 
When he turned seventeen, he enlisted in the US Army, serving the final months of the 
Civil War. After briefly returning to the mines at war’s end, he reenlisted and served for 
another twelve years, learning how to read and write during his term.  After working for 
several years in the Texas coal mines, he returned to Indiana, settling in Terre Haute. 
Upon his return, Kennedy began organizing under the Knights of Labor in the 1880s, 
becoming Secretary-Treasurer of the Indiana District of NTA 135. When the Progressive 
Union formed in 1888, Kennedy was among the handful of officers that left the Knights 
to join the new order, where he later assumed the Secretary-Treasurer position for the 
Indiana NPU.  
Kennedy did not gain these positions through his personality. Unlike most 
organizers known for their gregarious behavior and charisma, Kennedy was painfully 
                                               
64 “Strike Among Miners,” Indianapolis [Indiana] News, November 5, 1891; Joe Dunkerly and T. F. 
Bolser on behalf of the Clinton, Indiana, miner delegation,“Commesky Exonerated,” UMWJ, November 
12, 1891; John Mooney, letter  to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; J. H. Kennedy, 
UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 report, UMWJ, November 12, 1891; Patrick McBryde, letter to the 
editor, “Response from McBryde,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891; “The Indiana Miners,” JKL, December 17, 
1891. 
65 "United States Census, 1900," Family Search (https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.1.1/M99X-1H3: 
accessed  March 12, 2015), John H Kennedy, Harrison Township Terre Haute city Ward 7, Vigo, Indiana, 
United States; citing sheet 5A, family 124, NARA microfilm publication T623, FHL microfilm 1240409. 
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shy, detested public speaking, and often avoided large union meetings. Described as 
“taciturn” and “morose,” the slight man rarely socialized, even during union conventions 
where he knew the other more boisterous organizers well. Still, none could deny that 
Kennedy was “amongst the most persistent [UMW] organizers that we have ever had.” 
Rather than relying on oratory or grace, Kennedy organized locals by writing letters to 
anyone interested in unionizing, opting to meet with interested parties only when 
absolutely essential. Even then, Indiana organizer John Kane later wrote, “When a visit is 
deemed necessary by him, he makes it, and many a time he has [arrived] and gone before 
anybody knows it.”66  
Despite this, both miners and union officials respected Kennedy. Forceful with a 
tireless work ethic and meticulous attention to detail, he applied his military discipline to 
unionizing. Kennedy faithfully reported district news and receipts of dues to the labor 
papers each week, far more frequently than any other UMW officer in the nation. His 
efforts and dedication earned him the admiration of union miners throughout the state. 
During a period when miners were constantly dissatisfied with union leaders, Kennedy 
held the Indiana District Secretary-Treasurer position for over ten years. 
No miner or UMW officer doubted Kennedy’s loyalty to the union. Yet, in 
November 1891, Kennedy condemned the organization and its national officers and 
ordered the Indiana miners to strike. “We are sorry we have to act in opposition to the 
wishes of our national officers,” he wrote in his weekly report announcing the strike, “but 
we have been sidetracked so often that patience ceased to be a virtue.” Kennedy’s 
                                               
66 “Biographies of the National Executive Board,” UMWJ, March 10, 1898. 
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carefully selected words resonated throughout the state, where miners committed to the 
UMW’s principles believed that the officers no longer did the same.67    
Often, the UMW’s ability to distribute strike aid confirmed these suspicions. 
Although locals had limited aid during the Indiana strike, several mines earned the pay 
increase. As directed by state officers, they forwarded their pay increases to the state 
treasury to be sent to aid the remaining striking miners. However, because the remote 
Indiana mines were so spread out, the miners’ aid took days to reach the state officers and 
days longer to distribute the funds. In the meantime, striking miners wrote letters to the 
United Mine Workers’ Journal complaining that they received no aid. Seven weeks into 
the Indiana strike, for example, “Summit Miner” asked the Journal, “What has become of 
those men that received the advance six weeks ago and were going to donate us 5 cents 
per ton for all coal mined and day men in proportion. If we are defeated and have to 
blackleg are we worse than they?”68  
 For the miners who had dutifully sent their pay advance forward to the officers, 
letters like Summit Miner’s came as a shock. By the time they read the letters, which took 
roughly a week to appear in the Journal columns and equally as long for print versions to 
reach the rural mines, their aid had long been sent. Consequently, although Kennedy 
accounted for the donations, it appeared the funds were entirely mismanaged.69 To the 
                                               
67 J. H. Kennedy, Official Indiana District Eleven report, “Miners of Indiana.” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; 
For additional examples of miners feeling “sidetracked” see “C.C.” letter to the editor, “Words of Advice to 
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69 Kennedy’s receipts appeared alongside Summit Miner’s request for aid and James H. Eskew’s letter from 
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strikers, it seemed that the miners who won the pay advance had abandoned them. To the 
donating miners, it appeared as though the officers misplaced or stole the money.70 “If 
this aid did not reach the men needing aid, what became of it?” miner wife Laurene 
Gardner asked in response to a claim by UMW Vice President Phil Penna that her mining 
town did not pay the aid they were required to send. “[W]e disclaim owing the striking 
miners or anybody else anything more than the assistance due one brother from another. 
In all my knowledge of Ayrshire we have never asked or received either assistance or 
encouragement from anyone,” she argued. “Yet if our striking brothers need more help 
we stand ready to give it.”71 Union miners, in her mind, were bound by the principles 
they shared, not by officer commands. 
 Gardner’s statement indicated disconnect that ran through much of the labor 
movement and nineteenth century society. On one hand, people like Gardner understood 
and appreciated the need for centralized governing authorities over both union and 
governmental affairs. Their national structure was essential in an age where businesses 
and people continually crossed state and national borders. For those affiliated with the 
People’s Party, government regulation of railroads and coal mines was essential to 
establishing regulated rates that, they believed, would benefit both worker and consumer. 
At the same time, this uniformity also cost residents and local unions the autonomy they 
enjoyed. It placed their money and futures in the hands of individuals that often lived 
                                                                                                                                            
paying aid, however, did not see this Journal issue until nearly two weeks after it was published. J. H. 
Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “Kennedy’s Record,” UMWJ, 
December 24, 1891; James H. Eskew, letter to the editor, “Ayrshire Somewhat,” UMWJ, December 24, 
1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene,” UMWJ, January 7, 1892. 
70 “Mike,” letter to the editor, “Mike Responds in a Few Neat Words,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891.  
71 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “The Drink Habit,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891. Both Mike’s and 
Gardner’s responses were to Penna’s accusing letter, which stated the “men of Ayrshire owe to the miners 
on strike the amount per ton which you received in advance,” that appeared under the title “Penna’s Letter,” 
in the Journal’s December 17, 1891 issue. 
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hundreds of miles removed from the mines and fields. Centralized boards’ actions 
seemed especially distant for rural residents who often remained outside the reach of 
timely and reliable communication. In instances like the missing telegram in May 1891 or 
the delayed reports of aid the following fall, the communication gap had a detrimental 
impact on workers’ lives and their faith in governing structures. Even those who climbed 
through union ranks such as Kennedy earned their livings through clerical work and 
politics rather than sweat and muscle like those they represented.72 In many cases, they 
were likened to dishonest businessmen and corrupt politicians, consequently placing 
these leaders in a centralized structure that gave them increased control over union 
finances and affairs prompted miners to mistrust their leadership even more. In the heat 
of Indiana’s missing aid ordeal, Kennedy reported that he encountered miners who 
praised the UMW yet “in the same breath” claimed “that dishonesty has been practiced 
by the state officers in distributing the funds.”73 
Surveying the damage of the 1891 strike cancellation and subsequent failed local 
strikes, Indiana-Kentucky District President Michael Commesky noted that miners 
throughout his district, as well as neighboring districts all viewed the UMW officers with 
contempt. “At this date I cannot say what effect the strike will have on the organization, 
but we hope for the best.” Despite his attempt at optimism, however, Commesky had his 
doubts. Instead of closing his letter with his characteristic call for organization or the 
frequently used “yours for the cause,” the union leader ended with “yours for the 
                                               
72 Postel, Populist Vision, 142. 
73 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “Kennedy’s Report,” UMWJ, 
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present,” hinting that the future of the organization or at least his future in it was 
uncertain.74 
Kennedy’s dues receipts indicate that Commesky had cause for concern. The 
union miners faithfully paid dues through the 1891 fall (Appendix Chart 2). In fact, by 
November 1891, the same month the miners struck against UMW orders, Kennedy’s 
receipts totaled $283.00, a larger amount than had ever been collected prior to the May 
cancellation. The UMW’s condemnation of the Indiana strike, insulting the miners, and 
the Indiana miners’ subsequent failure, however, proved detrimental to the Indiana 
UMW. The number of locals paying dues fell drastically so that most of the $85 in dues 
Kennedy reported in early 1892 came from five locals.75  
The decline, however, was not limited to Indiana. Hostilities and misgivings the 
Indiana miners expressed toward the UMW structure in the labor newspaper pages met 
miners’ unease throughout the country.76 Throughout the nation, miners and organizers 
claimed their experiences with UMW leadership decisions were similar to those of the 
Indiana miners.77 The Bloomington, Illinois, Daily Pantagraph reported that faith in the 
UMW was so low that only fifteen members attended the Illinois District’s 1892 
convention, and that most of the northern Illinois mines had “withdrawn from the 
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union.”78 “Napoleon” of Iowa observed that if Ohio and Indiana, the “great union states” 
of the nation, could not function, there was little hope for other regions to avoid such 
“tomfoolery.”79 The Indiana miners’ winter strike became symptomatic of larger 
problems and misgivings already spreading throughout the UMW rank and file regardless 
of region.  
The officers’ perceived inability to look after the miners’ interest informed many 
mining families’ decisions to reject the UMW or refuse to pay their dues. Even the most 
dedicated unionists charged that the officers failed in this respect. Although Laurene 
Gardner professed she was a faithful UMW supporter, she was among the first to take up 
her pen and question the officers’ decisions. She had “faith in at least their good 
intentions,” she wrote, “but we know how disastrously they turn out sometimes.”80 For 
her hometown of Ayrshire, the turnout was especially disastrous. In the wake of the fall 
1891 defeat, mines like Ayrshire that won the pay advance were forced to either resume 
work at the reduced wages or risk the mine shutting down entirely. Ayrshire shut down.81 
Partially locked out and partially on strike against a reduction even lower than what they 
had originally fought, the Ayrshire miners who had donated all of their pay to the striking 
miners just weeks earlier looked to the UMW for aid. Their strike, however, was not 
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sanctioned by the National Executive Board and therefore was not entitled to a share of 
the UMW strike fund.82  
Furious with the UMW officers for demanding Ayrshire pay to the union in return 
for nothing, Laurene Gardner chastised the UMW’s leadership and practices. “I offer no 
apology for any suggestions or remarks I may make in these lines,” the miner’s wife 
began. With that, she demanded an account of the National Executive Board and Indiana 
state board’s spending. “Commencing with Ayrshire, how much money has been paid 
into the treasury and what has become of it? I mean since the United Mine Workers was 
organized here,” she demanded. To Gardner and many others, it seemed “that part of the 
business is but poorly managed.” The UMW’s rejection of the miners’ need and the 
inability of miners elsewhere to send adequate aid made this abundantly clear. National 
officers simply were not capable of handling the miners’ funds responsibly. As a result, 
Gardner joined the chorus of miners throughout the southern Midwest who adamantly 
opposed the “national defense fund.”  UMW locals should control their own funds, she 
argued, “instead of sending it out like bread upon the water without even the assurance 
that it will return again after many days.”83 
Gardner’s assertions were repeated in mining regions throughout the state in the 
weeks following the strike. Indiana miner John A. Templeton reported that the once solid 
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unions in his region had fractured over the officers’ actions in the late 1891 strike. Like 
Gardner, however, they were reluctant to turn their backs on unionism. The winter strike 
failure had “given the organization a blow from which it will not get over for some time,” 
Templeton acknowledged, but miners were more ambivalent about union structures than 
opposed to them. According to Templeton, “the men are badly split up at Dugger 
[Indiana], some of them wanting to hold on to the U. M. W. of A. and another lot wanting 
a local organization and some want no organization at all.”84 
 Within weeks, Dugger miners’ membership in the “home organization” known by 
locals as the “Nickel Knights” grew. According to miner “Dogtown,” the Nickel Knights 
originally formed as the Independent Order of Home Mine Laborers in Washington, 
Indiana, where miners were upset with the high dues paid to state and national officers 
without receiving any benefit.85 Their nickname, he claimed, came from the five cents the 
members paid in dues each meeting night, which were kept at home for expenses and 
local cases of sickness or strike.86 The miners in the home organization did not seek to 
organize other locals under their name, but mines like Dugger applied the structure to 
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their own mines so that “any organization outside the United Mine Workers has been 
termed nickel knights.”87 
 Dugger UMW leader John E. Griffiths claimed he knew nothing of the order, but 
admitted that many local miners were dissatisfied with the UMW ever since the strike.88 
Ironically, the locals had sided with the national officers in opposing the strike, arguing 
that the state officers’ strike order “was premature and ignore[ed] the fundamental 
principles of our organization.” With their argument dismissed at the state convention, 
Dugger miners honored the state officers’ strike call. Within weeks, however, “a number 
of men got dissatisfied with the amount of aid received from defense fund and openly 
declared they would pay nothing into the organization… and that feeling grew during the 
strike until it looked as if organization was a thing of the past.” Dugger miners “got luke 
warm” and pulled away from the UMW, unwilling to be part of a body whose parts did 
not cooperate. 89 
UMW miners viewed the Nickel Knights with contempt. Phil Penna described 
them as “Nauseating Knaves.” They were not men, he insisted, but “specimens of which 
we have everywhere,” who had no sense to stay in the union and or uphold its 
principles.90 The Nickel Knights were “Judases who have sold their manhood” to the 
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company, T. J. Llewelyn argued.91 According to miner wife Sinthy Snodgrass and many 
others, most were “pumpkin rollers,” or farmers who mined for supplemental incomes 
and cared little about the trouble they caused.92 John Kennedy agreed, stressing that he 
hoped the Nickel Knights would “abandon their evil ways and return to their proper place 
in the United Mine Worker’s [sic] of America.”93 Nickel Knights, they believed, were the 
backsliders at the heart of the UMW’s impotency. 
But not all held the UMW in such high regard. Laurene Gardner first encountered 
the Nickel Knights when her family was forced to abandon their home in Ayrshire and 
search for work in the mines surrounding Dugger and Linton. Her experiences during the 
Ayrshire strike, like those who joined the Nickel Knights, caused her to question the 
UMW leaders’ abilities. Although Gardner remained committed to the UMW and 
vehemently criticized the Nickel Knights, she did not defend the UMW’s actions of the 
past year. She did not claim those who joined the local organization were backsliders 
who abandoned their beliefs or dismiss the Nickel Knights’ grievances against the UMW 
as unjust. Instead, she criticized their methods. “It is a poor way to correct any evil in the 
organization to pull out,” she wrote. In condemning the Nickel Knights this way, Gardner 
indicated that the true evil was not the rebellious miners, but the organization itself. The 
Nickel Knights’ fault, in Gardner’s eyes, then, rested not with any kind of abandonment 
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of principles, but with their unwillingness to run the perceived evil out of the miners’ 
national organization.94   
 Such assertions that evil lurked within the UMW resonated throughout the 
southern Midwest. Indiana block miner and mine operator “Old Timer,” claimed that the 
block miners backslid from their principles not when they decided to leave the UMW, but 
when they first decided to join it. Their decision to reject the UMW and form their own 
local, then, was a return to the principles they once abandoned. “[W]e wandered off to 
follow strange gods; were led into the wilderness and there left to perish; but thank God, 
we are coming to our senses again and I expect soon to see our craft in this district 
organized into a solid block coal union,” he declared.95 
 Miners like Old Timer defended their rights and principles by leaving the UMW 
rather than joining it. Thousands of miners like Old Timer and the Nickel Knights 
believed that local unions had a better chance of favorable work terms than the union that 
struggled to control the national market. “Home organizations” like the Nickel Knights 
settled all disputes with the companies directly rather than waiting for UMW officials to 
mitigate differences. This proved beneficial for several reasons. First, it allowed workers 
to settle disputes and return to work quickly. In addition, operators, seeking to keep a 
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national union out of their mines, often granted local organization miners’ requests more 
than those of the UMW miners.96 
 These factors, combined with the miners’ growing frustration and mistrust of 
UMW leaders, caused state and local organizations that rivaled the UMW to spring up 
across the nation. Northern Illinois organizer Will Hall described a mass meeting in 
Streator where miners resolved that a national union was not reliable. With that, they 
decided “to form a local union, attached to nothing or nobody….”97  Pennsylvania miner 
M. J. O’Neil claimed that miners in his district also no longer trusted the UMW. “I am 
not in any organization at present, neither are the miners of this run,” he confessed, 
adding that the miners, “one and all have become disgusted even at the word 
organization.”98 Within months, miners in O’Neil’s district planned to establish a new 
regional union comprised of the mines along the Monongahela, Ohio, and Kanawha 
rivers.99 UMW miners in Ohio debated seceding from the UMW, leading the movement 
to return to state-based organizations.100 These sentiments reached to the southern 
Midwest where Iowa miners did form a new state organization that fall.101 Within 
months, Missouri and Kansas union miners considered organizing two “national” unions, 
one representing the mines east of the Mississippi River and the other with jurisdiction 
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over the west.102 Although they had pushed for a unified national order for years, by 
1893, its structure and scope no longer seemed ideal.  
Far from being committed to the national and centralized structure, miners looked 
at the UMW’s shortcomings and suspected that, somehow, miners’ organization had gone 
astray. “[I]t is the most trying time I have seen in my life,” western Kentucky miner 
“Blackbird” confessed. Most of the miners in his district had abandoned the UMW while 
those that remained had no money in the union’s treasury and made little effort to 
connect to the national officers. Operators took advantage of the union’s weakness and 
abolished all mine rules that kept miners safe.103 Blackbird, who had always tried to labor 
honestly, was exasperated. “I have done and am doing my best to lead a christian life and 
to stand by our organization and lead others to it, but they will not.” The miners 
recognized they needed to restore their union, but refused to revive their UMW locals, 
much to Blackbird’s dismay. Instead, they organized on their own. “It troubles me to see 
men go astray like this,” Blackbird continued. In his mind, neither UMW miners nor their 
officers had remained faithful to the UMW. “I sometimes feel like exclaiming my God! 
where are we drifting to?”104  
 Blackbird’s question was an old one that touched the heart of many Americans’ 
deepest concerns. From the time the nation began to industrialize, many citizens 
expressed anxieties over the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few and 
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the greed, corruption, and moral decay that seemed to follow in its wake.105 “Whither are 
we drifting?” became as much a warning as it was a question, in reaction to the rapid 
changes in economics, society and culture. In 1882, Freeman Otis Willey took up the 
concerns of Midwestern producers, asking “whither are we drifting as a nation,” the 
Michigan lecturer offered a close analysis of the currency system. The current system, he 
claimed, only intensified the wealth gap. He closed his examination remarking that “if the 
present monetary system is allowed to continue, the child is born who will live to see the 
masses of the American people bankrupt and the principal wealth of the nation in the 
hands of ten per cent of its population.”106 Ten years later, miner wife Margery Jones 
echoed Willey’s claims. Pointing out workers’ patriotism in a country that favored 
wealthy classes over poor, she urged readers to “inquire a little more into the question, 
‘Whither are we drifting, as a nation,’ and not only as a nation, but as a world….” How 
could other nations emulate the United States “if in a land like this, blessed as it is with a 
keen, discreet and enterprising population, the perversity, avarice greed and selfishness of 
man is to succeed in subverting liberty and independence except to those who by the 
most diabolical schemes have possessed themselves of nations wealth and opportunities,” 
she asked.107  
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 Such fears of going astray indicated the concerns and discord that ran through 
nearly all reform movements of the period.108 As the UMW attempted to recover from its 
1891 failure, NTA 135 delegates to the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor 
were shocked to hear General Master Workman Terence Powderly condemn the mine 
workers’ union. The UMW had drifted away from the Knights’ driving principles, 
Powderly insisted. According to him, the UMW favored the AFL at the expense of the 
Knights, that the miners had stopped paying dues to the Knights, and that their 
willingness to set a wage scale rather than abolish the wage system contradicted the 
ideals the Knights professed. With that, Powderly ordered an investigation into the UMW 
with the added suggestion that NTA 135 withdraw from the UMW and restore the 
miners’ union to its original goals.109  
Such expressions of division and corruption indicated that a common vision was 
not enough to create a united movement in labor organizing or beyond. Just as union 
miners divided over whether local, state, or national unions could best protect their 
interests, so Populist proponents split over whether a third party was the best way to 
initiate their desired changes. Like thousands of the nation’s miners and the new union, 
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they remained outside the organization even as they sympathized with its stance.110 
President and Master Workman John Rae described this in his final convention report. 
Noting the numerous local strikes called against national leaders’ orders and the dozens 
of anti-UMW locals, he asserted, “it is plain that while our miners cry for national 
organization, they continue to practice local methods.” For Rae, who tried to uphold the 
union’s national scope while appeasing local interests, this duality cost him supporters on 
both sides of the UMW divide.  
Just as local miners criticized Rae for not fully supporting them, miners who 
supported a strong centralized union condemned Rae for tolerating miners who 
disregarded national union orders. The 1892 UMW convention sided with national 
leaders’ in their decisions to not support the winter strikes in Pittsburgh and Indiana and 
insisted “stricter methods must be adopted” in enforcing national authority over the 
mining districts.111 Rae’s unwillingness to be forceful, Tim O’Malley and others 
believed, created “the criminal blunders of last year.” Rae may have tried his best to keep 
the peace in the UMW, but “in their hearts [the miners] despise him, and admire the man 
who has convictions and the courage to express them, even if it does not suit them at the 
time.”112 Recognizing Rae’s difficult position, Illinois leader William Scaife expressed 
sympathy for the leader that, he noted, simply could not act without the full support of a 
unified rank and file body. “These have been troublesome times,” he wrote as he 
surveyed the events of the past year, “and it has been another case of damn you if you do 
                                               
110 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 245-249. 
111 “United Mine Workers,” NLT, February 20, 1892. 
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and damn you if you don’t. With Brother Rae, no matter what he done, he was certain to 
be damned.”113  
 
As Rae’s predicament demonstrated, defending rights, even for unions, proved a 
difficult task. Establishing a centralized national organization that looked after specific 
regional concerns demanded more manpower and better communication than the young 
UMW could provide. It involved bringing together disparate groups across a vast region, 
and in most cases, it demanded sacrificing the needs of some for the good of the whole. 
For miners who looked to the UMW for salvation from workplace ills, Rae’s damnation 
did not come from the strike cancellation, but from his overstatement of union strength 
and his inability to tend to all miners’ concerns. These actions, combined with those of 
the other officers, tainted miners’ trust for the entire order.  
Far from a solidified force, union miners’ criticisms against leaders over strike 
funds and union dues were part of a rank and file battle with officers and each other over 
how the UMW would look after miner interests. For others, this task required forming 
new unions while still others believed that the surest way a miner could look after his 
interests was to stay out of unions entirely until one was strong enough to uphold its 
principles. Although officers dismissed these varying views as an abandonment of union 
principles, mining families disagreed. Their dedication to unionism never waned, but they 
believed UMW officers’ devotion had. 
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Chapter Five 
Outsiders: Race and the Exclusive Politics of an Inclusive Union, 1892-1894 
 
Less than fifty miles of rugged countryside separated miner “Willing Hands” and 
Laurene Gardner’s Indiana coal towns. In many respects, their backgrounds were very 
similar. Both were deeply connected to the coal industry, originally from the Upper South 
and moved north for better mining jobs. Gardner and Willing Hands were both ardent 
Populists and, although neither quite fit with the UMW, they were two of the union’s 
strongest advocates during a period of widespread rank and file discontent with UMW 
action and policy.  
But in 1892, when both participated in a debate featured in the United Mine 
Workers’ Journal, two very important differences drove a wedge between their otherwise 
common ground. One was a coal miner by trade, one was not. One claimed to be an 
accepted part of the UMW, one did not. The alignment of these sentiments, however, did 
not follow the clean division one would expect. Instead, they reflected how lines in late 
nineteenth century unionism contorted in ways that simultaneously included and 
excluded the same individual in a host of ways. Gardner, a white woman, was neither a 
coal miner nor union member, but she and her “fellow craftsmen” considered her a part 
of the UMW. Willing Hands, a black union miner, wrote repeatedly that he was not a part 
of the UMW’s main body. 
Coming of age in the Southern coal mines, Willing Hands believed that race and 
class issues were deeply entwined. Fears of corporate and political corruption, increasing 
wealth gaps, and poverty were interwoven with lynching, convict labor, and Jim Crow. 
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He watched in horror as racial hostilities intensified throughout the nation, including the 
coal mines. Like thousands of producers, Willing Hands insisted that slavery still existed, 
but the enslavement he witnessed involved more than poor treatment and low wages. It 
involved literal chains, forced labor, segregation in mines and coal cars all fortified by the 
growing power of “the lynching club of the South.”1 Consequently, when miners began 
discussing the best course for the UMW’s reviving its dwindling membership, Willing 
Hands vehemently argued that the UMW had neglected black miners when it needed to 
defend them. “You can never get your union strong as long as you ignore the Afro-
American as a coal producer against you,” he challenged.2 Arguing that the UMW only 
stood to gain by speaking out against convict labor and other Jim Crow-related systems 
practiced in and around the mines, Willing Hands expected the UMW to be an 
organization that would fight for racial equality in addition to economic. When it fell 
short, he and thousands of black miners like him, asserted that the UMW offered them 
little more than membership. 
But not all agreed with his forceful stance. “I notice our friend ‘Willing Hands’ 
seems much troubled about the interests of his race,” Gardner noted in her weekly letter 
to the Journal.3 A white miner’s wife born on the Illinois-Kentucky boarder in 1850, 
Gardner believed that the economic inequality all miners faced should be the UMW’s 
main focus, not questions of racism. Her effort to promote unity over racial equality 
echoed white conversations taking place throughout the nation. As citizens voiced 
concern over the nation’s fragility and expressed fears of another civil war, miners, 
wives, and officers expressed similar alarm with the UMW. In 1892, no national miners’ 
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union had existed effectively for longer than five years. Each one proved a failure due to 
internal divisions that made the union too weak to withstand the pressure brought by a 
competitive market and employers hostile to unionism. Gardner, like many white men in 
the mines, was determined to make sure that the fragile unity formed by the young UMW 
held. “[N]o side issue, race, creed, sectionalism or anything else should divert attention 
from the common doom of slavery that is hanging over us all,” she later declared.4 If the 
miners could pull together and secure better conditions, justice and equality for black 
miners would follow, she and other whites believed, but the key was to stand united on 
their common ground. Consequently, much like the Northern and Southern reconciliation 
that came at the expense of African Americans, the UMW, in a similar quest for unity, 
eclipsed these questions as well.5 “We have seen the results of divided action in the last 
year’s record of troubles,” she wrote. “Not until the order will move as one harmonious 
whole will victory crown our efforts.”6 
The discussion involving a black miner and a white miner’s wife in the pages of 
the United Mine Workers’ Journal highlighted several crucial aspects of the UMW’s 
function in the late nineteenth century. Neither looked like the typical white male coal 
miner, yet miners and officers alike encouraged Willing Hands and Gardner to write their 
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opinions to the Journal.7 During a period when black voices were systematically, legally, 
and violently silenced and when women had limited voice in the public arena, Willing 
Hands and Gardner were welcome to participate in a white male-dominated forum of a 
white male-dominated organization.  
This kind of partial inclusion is seldom reflected in the scholarship of Gilded Age 
organizing or society. Scholars studying the period have carefully observed the politics of 
ethnicity inherent within unions, political organizations, and greater society. They have 
described how unions and political parties included and excluded groups of workers or 
potential constituents based on immediate need. In particular, they have shown that skill-
based hierarchies in workplaces often corresponded with ethnic and gender backgrounds 
that gave preference to English-speaking white men. In most cases, it resulted in outright 
exclusion of black and immigrant workers not only from skilled positions, but also from 
unions that, by the 1890s, focused on recruiting skilled laborers into their ranks.8 
But Willing Hands and Gardner do not fit within these patterns of exclusion any 
better than they fit within the union they defended. Like thousands of other rural 
producers in the Gilded Age, they sat on the fringes of the order and society at large, 
neither fully included nor excluded. Social structures functioned differently in rural 
regions where working class women and men often worked and socialized together, 
creating organizations more receptive to women than those in urban settings. Similarly, 
unlike skilled jobs where employers created stratified hierarchies, the drive to lower costs 
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of coal production made it more advantageous to force all miners regardless of color, 
language, or experience to compete against each other for jobs. Any miner, regardless of 
ethnicity, who accepted a pay reduction automatically forced all other miners in his mine 
to accept the same. Consequently, any union that wished to regulate wage rates needed to 
include all miners without regard to ethnicity as well. Whereas other industries and 
unions could exclude unwanted minorities based on skill, organized workers in semi-
skilled industries often sought to include minorities rather than push them away.  
Yet, as in the case of Willing Hands and Gardner, inclusion often only reached so 
far. When literal skill met the politics of late-nineteenth century society, they became 
both a part of and apart from the whole. Laurene Gardner had never mined coal in her life 
and therefore was banned from full membership and attending union meetings, which 
were limited to members. She lacked experience in mining, but her skill in raising a 
family on a miner’s meager wages and raising children to follow the union were 
commendable qualities to a union facing a dwindling budget and a wayward rank and 
file.9 Although it did not formally include her, she included herself in the UMW when 
she spoke of the miners and the union officers, using phrases such as “we need” and “our 
officers.” More importantly, no one challenged Gardner’s claim. While they at times took 
issue with her opinions on union policy and politics, they argued with her views rather 
than dismissed them even as they forbade her from entering the meeting hall. 
While Gardner’s inclusive wording indicated that she was of the UMW even if 
she was not in it, the language Willing Hands used demonstrated that although he was in 
the order, he was not of it. In 1892, he was a member of the Knights of Labor and UMW 
yet in his letters, which were often directed toward white UMW miners, referred to the 
                                               
9 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, October 22, 1891. 
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UMW as “your union” and used the word “you” to describe the miners. His use of “we” 
never referred to a collective body of miners or organized producers as Gardner used the 
word. Rather, “we” described black miners whose interests and experiences, Willing 
Hands believed, differed from those shared by white miners and their wives. The UMW 
may have accepted any creed or color, but Willing Hands remained ostracized from the 
miners’ organization. He was a member and heavily involved with the UMW, but, in his 
mind, the UMW was a white union. 
In many respects, Willing Hands’s assessment was correct. White English-
speaking union “miners,” including wives like Gardner, included many ethnicities in their 
ranks and expected them to be faithful to the order and its principles. But they stopped 
short of welcoming these minorities in their workplaces or addressing their grievances, 
despite leaders’ efforts to promote racial harmony. Although the UMW put forward 
ethnically inclusive platforms, the labor legislation it actively pursued often favored 
white English-speaking miners’ interests over others. Their decisions to support or reject 
proposed labor legislation such as laws pertaining to convict labor, competency tests for 
mining or mine inspecting, or ending the use of screens to filter the coal often placed the 
rank and file at odds with union leaders who could not understand why miners would 
oppose any legislation that would promote equal and fair treatment in the mines. 
Desperate to protect their jobs, lives, and wages from those they perceived as particularly 
immoral, careless, and unskilled, experienced white English-speaking miners moved to 
regulate who could enter the mines. Despite their claims of wanting to protect the mining 
craft and their lives, the UMW’s efforts ran along ethnic lines rather than those of skill, 
172 
 
tearing through the organization’s already riddled ranks and pushing away its minority 
members.  
 
Separated 
Women like Gardner had a hard time understanding why miners like Willing 
Hands insisted on pushing for racial equality when the union so desperately needed unity 
within its ranks. 10 Because it accepted all miners, white English speaking miners 
believed the union treated all colors and nationalities equally. To them, black miners like 
Willing Hands who complained about race were no better than the miners who grumbled 
that the union did nothing for them. “There are some slobs in it who have only sense 
enough to be always howling about all cost and no profit, who if the mote could only fall 
from their eyes would realize the benefits to be derived from organization,” wife Mary 
Jane Beanblossom wrote. During a period when dissatisfied miners abandoned the UMW 
in droves, the remaining union miners and wives grew more determined that personal 
interests, including those of race, be secondary to the union’s survival, which, they 
believed, was crucial to bringing the changes that all miners needed.11   
Black miners and wives, however, disagreed. Although black and non-English 
speaking miners shared the same problems as all miners regarding wages and working 
conditions, many faced these problems on a level worse than white miners experienced in 
addition to other problems that the UMW often failed to acknowledge or address. Phrases 
white miners commonly used like “white slavery” or urging the union to defend the rights 
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that belonged to them “as free white men,” made it clear to African American members 
that UMW priorities favored white concerns over black.12 In other instances, as white 
Indiana miner “Freedom” proudly wrote that he was “not ashamed our institutions,” and 
applauded a local vigilante association known as the White Caps that “serves to keep the 
niggers in of nights….”13 Such a statement indicated that while white miners joined a 
union that was inclusive to black workers, those who populated its local unions and 
assemblies seldom practiced this inclusion on a daily basis. 
These practices were continued in the workplace. Many operators took advantage 
of already present racist and nativist sentiment in the mines and used black or non-
English speaking workers as a means to lower wages, often refusing to hire them unless 
they worked under scale or as strikebreakers. In addition to the desperation that came 
from often being the last hired and first fired, these groups also found it more difficult to 
confront their bosses regarding wages and working conditions. They not only faced the 
unequal relationship between mine owner and employee that tended to dehumanize all 
workers, but also confronted language barriers and social expectations that made 
challenging one’s white employer especially difficult and dangerous. French miners at 
Frontenac, Kansas, found it difficult to communicate problems with working conditions 
to their employer and often resolved to simply continue working in the poor conditions.14 
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Polish miners in northern Illinois worked for such low wages that when the company 
store burned down, their wives climbed into the smoldering timbers to salvage the 
charred food.15 A black miner who confronted his white employer over hazardous work 
conditions, unfair weights, or lost cars not only upset the workplace hierarchy but also 
challenged contemporary racial norms. Kentucky miner W. J. Smith reported that few 
men dared dispute their working conditions in their Madisonville mine. “The men lost 
cars all the time and one colored man claiming a car talked plain about it and the 
weighmaster shot him.”16  
Events such as this made it clear to African American miners throughout the late 
nineteenth century that they had no real option other than accepting the terms presented. 
Black miners’ decisions to fight wage reductions, push for fair weights, and, as in the 
case of Madisonville, object to operators stealing cars, not only made them especially 
susceptible to losing their jobs, but also increased the risk of losing their lives. “This is 
why they won’t have organization in Hopkins county,” Smith concluded in his report of 
the Madisonville shooting. There was no point in joining a union that did not offer 
protection to its members.17  
Black mine organizer and union officer Richard L. Davis faced a similar situation 
in his Ohio district. There a group of black miners carefully considered accepting an 
operator’s offer to put a majority of black miners in the No. 3 mine. “Some claimed that 
they thought they ought to have a majority in one mine, at least, that the whites had the 
majority in every mine in the valley,” Davis reported. A black majority mine would not 
only offer more jobs to black miners, but also allow black miners to be elected to places 
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16 W. J. Smith to the editor, UMWJ, September 14, 1899. 
17 Ibid. 
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of prestige. Checkweighmen, for example, were usually elected by the workers in a mine 
to make sure the coal was weighed fairly. Black miners seldom received the position in 
mines where whites were in the majority. “I can remember the time when this mine was 
altogether colored, all the other mines for the whites,” Davis wrote. “Now then, for No. 3, 
the colored man’s mine at that time, all the other mines in the valley had the 1 1/8 inch 
screen, the screen at mine No. 3 was 1 ½ inches; at all the other mines the men were paid 
for dead work at mine No. 3 they were not paid for this class of work. Thus you can see 
the difference between the white man’s mine and the colored man’s mines…. Well then, 
as we are now mixed up all through, when one makes a demand we all make it, there is 
no color line; is it not better or do you class yourselves inferior beings?”18  
Despite Davis’s efforts to push for integration to further dissolve the color line in 
the mines, racial divisions remained steadfast. Miner F. H. Jackson responded to Davis 
the following week, explaining the black miners’ frustration. “The white miners of Mine 
No. 3 refused to work some three weeks ago because they thought they had to work 
under a negro boss, which was very wrong to them. It caused my race in this valley to 
feel very angry over this action of my white friends.” Learning of the dissatisfaction, the 
mine boss promised he would “fill Mine No. 3 with negroes and give them eight and nine 
months work, and it would be best for them.” Although Jackson insisted that the tactic 
was a ploy to divide the miners and their union by race, he also acknowledged that the 
offer was a tempting one for black miners who seemed to get no protection from the 
UMW regarding steady work or promotions in the workplace.19 
                                               
18 R.L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Davis,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892. 
19 F. H. Jackson, letter to the editor, “More Good Words,” UMWJ, August 11, 1892. 
176 
 
When offered the opportunity of steady work at high wages at what the agent 
promised was a new mine, Madisonville, Kentucky, miner Wylie Johnson eagerly 
accepted the terms. He was one of thirty western Kentucky black miners, ages fourteen to 
forty-three who answered the call. But instead of being taken to a new mine as promised, 
the miners were sent just north of the Ohio River, to Evansville, Indiana, where the mines 
were on strike. Local residents ambushed the party as they traveled from the train station 
to the mine on the city outskirts, injuring several miners before they made it to the safety 
of the mine. 20  
Terrified, Johnson told his story to the local labor-sympathizing newspaper. “I 
had a good job and left it to come here. We did not know there was a strike and were told 
we would be well cared for,” he claimed. “We want to go back home,” the twenty-six-
year-old miner pleaded. “Won’t you send us back home?” The UMW denied that its 
miners were involved in the ambush, claiming instead that they were men who had 
learned the mining trade as “convicts” in the South, but there was no doubt in Johnson’s 
mind who gunned him down. “The union men ought not to have attacked us,” he insisted. 
But instead of condemning the UMW, Johnson appealed to it, asking for help. “We want 
the union to send us back home.”21  
Johnson and the other miners returned to Madisonville the next day. Their 
experiences were not unique. Hundreds of black miners, both men and women, were 
imported to striking mines each year, both voluntarily and by force. Some knowingly 
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came to break strikes while others, like Johnson, came unaware of the strike but did not 
have the funds to return home. 22  
Situations like this became a root of hostility between white and black miners. 
Many white English-speaking union miners and organizers condemned minority miners, 
charging that these groups were particularly less honest than others in the trade. “The 
colored men often kick because white men do not treat them right, and say we don’t give 
them a chance,” former Illinois union leader Dan McLaughlin wrote from his new home 
in Indian Territory. “Just as long as the colored man allows himself to be shipped around 
the country in gangs for the purpose of driving white men away from their homes and 
lowering wages, just so long will the prejudice and hard feeling exist. Let him be white or 
black, we have no use for the man who insists on going down into the ditch and dragging 
us with him.”23  
McLaughlin’s statement revealed a disjunction that ran throughout workers’ 
ranks.24  The old union leader spoke of strikebreaking in general, condemning all who 
broke strikes and worked below scale rates. In his mind, the problem plaguing black 
miners and the UMW was not one of race, but of ethics. White miners’ anger against 
black miners, he insisted, was not due to their skin, but to black miners’ willingness to 
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drive down wages.25 Yet, McLaughlin’s claim also revealed the racist sentiment rampant 
in union ranks. Not all black miners broke strikes, and many of the black union miners 
that complained to McLaughlin about fair treatment in the UMW were likely as willing to 
break strikes as their white coworkers. Still, McLaughlin’s unapologetic words indicated 
that he and other white UMW members would discriminate against all black miners as 
long as some black miners broke strikes. Even though white union and non-union miners 
frequently broke strikes and compromised their labor principles to provide for their 
families, the strikebreaker, in many white miners’ minds, was black.26 
To black miners, such treatment was far from equitable. All miners were accepted 
in the union, and, by 1891, the UMW had added a provision to the constitution that “no 
person be hindered from securing work on account of race, color or nationality.”27 Still, 
thousands of unionized white English-speaking miners refused to work with black men in 
the mines. Progressive Union organizer John Young reported that although black and 
Italian miners in Braidwood, Illinois, were interested in the union, they still refused to 
join. “They say that they would be in the union if they get the same show as other men, 
and there is a great deal of truth in it,” he wrote, acknowledging that black and non-
English speaking miners’ interests were frequently neglected even when they joined the 
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order.28 Recognizing a similar situation, Kentucky miner and organizer W. H. Foster 
reported that the union was “going down,” in his region because “the white man is doing 
all he can to down the Negro and the Negro is doing all he can to down the white 
man….”29 Willing Hands insisted white miners should not be surprised at the black 
miners willingness to tear at the miners’ union. His own assembly in Bevier, Kentucky, 
dissolved over the very issues Foster described, yet he offered no apology for the black 
miners’ unwillingness to work with the white miners. “[W]hen everything is smooth you 
object to our color, which is unconstitutional and contrary to the will of our National, 
state and general officials.” Given this inconsistency, Willing Hands argued that white 
miners should not be surprised that when white miners went on strike “out of revenge we, 
the bulk of the Afro-Americans go to work for spite,” he wrote.30  
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the midst of the widespread frustration with UMW 
authority when locals throughout the nation broke away from the UMW and formed 
“home organizations,” thousands of black union miners did the same. Fed up with UMW 
officers who did little to end the racial discrimination in the mines that hired white miners 
over black and learning that the region’s five hundred white miners in Leavenworth, 
Kansas, were planning to strike, black miners of Leavenworth broke from their white 
brethren and formed an “anti-strike organization.” In doing so, the miners curried special 
favor with their employers, securing the fair treatment and steady work that the UMW 
did not provide.31  
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The African American miners of Leavenworth demonstrated a crucial component 
encouraging anti-UMW organizing. To UMW Missouri-Kansas District President F. B. 
McGregor, the black miners were “led by the nose,” away from proper organization and 
morality.32 They turned their back on honest labor principles out of selfishness and greed. 
But to the miners who joined the anti-strike order, it was a way to secure what the 
national union neglected. In organizing, the miners demonstrated their understanding that 
collective action brought desired results. Their faith in unionization never wavered, but 
their trust in the UMW did. As such, their anti-UMW order became a means to not only 
secure higher wages in their workplace, but to also strike at the order that had betrayed 
them.33 
Illinois miner Pro Bono Publico recognized this problem in his own district and 
bamed the problem on both races. Black union miners were upset with white members 
because they were not treated equally in the order. Meanwhile, white miners resisted 
opening their locals to black miners based on their presumed dishonesty either through 
working for lower wages, breaking strikes, or laboring as convicts. Like many organizers, 
he pushed miners to put aside racial differences.  Urging his readers to “treat every man 
as white,” he ordered them to cooperate with each other regardless of whether a coworker 
may have broken a strike or might have once been a convict. “[I]t is a business matter,” 
not one of racial sentiment or morality.  “Christianity or morality don’t dig coal,” he 
argued, reminding miners that “the coal produced by the immoral man is just worth as 
much money in the market as that produced by the moral man or church member.” For 
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that reason, he continued, “it won’t do for us to hold aloof from another man because his 
life has not been all that could be desired previously.” Rather, “the only way to make 
those men better and at the same time make yourselves better is to get into the union with 
them” and urge upon them to do better in the future than they have in the past.”34 
But, as Willing Hands and other black organizers found, even when they were 
willing to work in the same local, white miners seldom wished to follow black leaders. 
Richard Davis endured countless threats from both white and black miners for his firm 
stance for white and black miners to unionize and cooperate across the color line.35  
Miner T. H. Rollins demanded to know why black miners “are never elected to any 
position that there is any honor or pay in?” To Rollins, the practice of accepting black 
miners but denying them leadership smacked of hypocrisy. “I feel that we have as much 
at stake as our white brothers,” he wrote, echoing white union miners’ claims that all 
miners had an interest in improving the mining trade. But while white miners used this as 
an argument for black miners to cast aside concerns for racial equality within the union, 
Rollins used it as a way to push for black rights within the order. “I know that I speak the 
sentiments of my colored brothers at large,” he wrote. Black union miners were as willing 
and competent as whites to help guide the union, but were seldom given the chance.36 
To black miners, exclusion from the UMW did not come from any concerted 
effort to push them out of the organization, but from rank and file resistance to UMW 
laws. “Now what is needed most is principle and discipline,” Willing Hands wrote of 
white miners ignoring the inclusion laws of the UMW and Knights of Labor, “brothers, 
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buy and read a few Afro-American papers, to see just what the negro has to fight….” His 
words referenced the trouble “that not only the Afro-American gets in the South, but all 
over the land, both North and South.” 37 In the following weeks, he called readers’ 
attention to a lynching in Ohio, a race riot in Nashville, and reminded them that such 
happenings were connected to the events at Coal Creek, Tennessee, a year earlier when 
black convict laborers were forced to take the place of striking miners. “I appeal to you to 
do something against such outrages,” he wrote, arguing like T. H. Rollins that such 
actions affected white miners as well as black.38 Using “supposed Afro-American 
criminals” as laborers, lynching, and other forms of violence, the “lynching club of the 
South” kept African Americans pressed down while forcing all miners to “work for a 
song.” It was in the white miners’ best interest to join the anti-lynching cause, he argued. 
“Laborers you will suffer the same fate that we Afro-Americans are if you don’t become 
more solid, for it is you next that the despots will mob.”39 Like T. H. Rollins and 
thousands of other black farmers and laborers throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, Willing Hands firmly believed that their labor organizations were ideal 
vehicles to lobby for racial change.40 
But support was not always easy to cultivate. White miners readily supported 
laws forbidding convict labor, but seldom for the reasons black miners listed. Rather, it 
was because, as miner wife Girsy McNab wrote, it was another means for the mine 
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operators and government to work together “that guid American citizens may starve.”41 
Laws that dealt with broader aspects of racism that had indirect implications on mines, 
however, received substantially less support. Segregation, black miners’ inability to 
safely express workplace grievances, and lynching all affected black miners and 
organization, but few could convince white miners or the UMW to push for new laws. 
White miner “Mike,” for example, replied to Willing Hands’s plea for UMW action 
regarding the Nashville riot with a joke. Known for his sarcasm, Mike quipped that the 
black prisoners’ deaths were “too bad.” Instead, “they should have been taken to the 
World’s Fair and exhibited to Sunday school scholars as models of innocence.”42 Mike’s 
response, however, appeared in the same Journal issue that contained black mine 
organizer Richard Davis’s report of a trip through West Virginia. Traveling with two 
white men to organize the region, Davis faced hostility at nearly every coal town they 
visited. Denied access to the boarding house, he was expected to sleep in a run-down 
cabin far from town. He was forbidden from eating indoors, from eating with his fellow 
travelers. In each case, his companions spoke to their hosts and usually secured Davis 
better accommodations, or at least access to a bed and dining room table. Still, Davis 
could not help but wonder what would have happened if he had made the trip alone. He 
presumed he probably would have been arrested, “for I felt like cursing and I would have 
used cuss words had I been by myself.”43 
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Outraged at the irony, Willing Hands once again urged readers to pay attention to 
the violence blacks faced, “for it will not be long until a Virginia mob will have an Afro-
American labor organizer hung…” With that, he condemned Mike’s words, asserting that 
the violence African Americans endured was no joking matter. “Further,” he continued, 
“it is not possible for you to wish the organization success as long as Afro-Americans are 
left at the mercy of others, as I fear that you would have done R. L. Davis should you 
have been in company with him.” 44  Davis cautioned that this ongoing racism against 
black miners would only hurt the UMW. Black miners would continue to reject the order 
and worsen white miners’ conditions in the process, he argued, “for take the negro out of 
the organization and you have a vast army against you, one that is strong enough to be 
felt and feared.”45 UMW membership was simply not enough to be included in the order. 
Even within union ranks, as many black miners understood it, the line between white and 
black, “you” and “us” remained. 
 
Unskilled 
 Distinctions between “them” and “us” extended to miners who did not fully 
assimilate into American culture. In most cases, these were newly-arrived immigrants 
who spoke very little English. Like miners from the British Isles, these immigrants often 
arrived with prior experience in the mines and traveled to mines in regions where they 
already had friends or family waiting. While stereotypes of strikebreaking and immorality 
applied to these groups, most miners placed more emphasis on non-assimilated 
immigrants’ lack of knowledge, both of American customs as well as of the mining 
industry. In her account of the economic downturn, for example, Laurene Gardner 
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described a “flood” of “imported laborers” that were different from the immigrants that 
came before. Like black miners and convict laborers “imported” into mining camps to 
lower wages and break strikes, new immigrant miners were “imported” into the nation for 
the same reason. “Our fast growing millionaires cast about for cheaper labor more 
amenable to their wishes and found it in the hordes of vagrants and paupers the old 
countries were glad to be rid of.”46 
 The desperate population of beggars Gardner described became a menace in many 
miners’ minds for several reasons. First, they feared that their communities would 
become overrun with men and women who did not adhere to local customs and 
disregarded local law.47 In addition, the new arrivals’ presumed willingness to work for 
low wages would only worsen the condition of miners throughout the nation. Indiana-
Kentucky District Secretary John Kennedy described a new group of immigrant miners 
arriving at a small Indiana mine whose operator deemed the miners qualified to mine coal 
because “they could live and work on a piece of bread half the size of his hand and a 
glass of water for twenty-four hours.”48 Though hyperbolic, such a claim was horrific to 
miners who understood that such a denial of basic necessities resulted in a wage 
reduction that would cascade into their own homes. These notions were made worse by 
the belief that the “pauper laborers” arriving were “unintelligent” and “unskilled.”49 Not 
only did these new miners not speak English or understand American customs, but, 
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according to most assimilated miners, they did not know how to mine coal. 
Consequently, many assimilated miners maintained that the new miners would degrade 
the mining trade by lowering wages, making a mockery of the skill required to perform 
the job safely, and placing all miners in grave danger underground. 
 For thousands of miners and other citizens, trouble began with the new arrivals’ 
inability to speak English. “It is quite a common thing to lay the blame on a number of 
those who work in the mines who do not understand the English language,” one 
Braidwood, Illinois, miner explained of the declining wages and failed unions. Although 
many non-English speaking immigrants honored strikes while English-speaking miners 
broke them, he acknowledged, the stereotype remained. 50 John Kennedy agreed with the 
Braidwood miner’s assertion and conceded that “those non-English-speaking people were 
not all to blame” in the recent strikes. Still, “it was through them and on account of them 
that the strife and bloodshed was brought about.” Even if they did not break strikes, they 
were responsible for lowering wages, he insisted. All the “ignorant Poles,” were good for, 
Kennedy asserted, was driving down wages and pushing honest laborers out of work. 
Kennedy was not alone in such beliefs. Southern Illinois miner and organizer J. C. 
Heenan noted that operators used the non-English speakers’ “ignorance” as a way to keep 
the union out of the mines. By shuffling non-English speakers from one local mine to 
another, operators kept non-English speakers “constantly among strangers,” never 
assimilating, never getting to know English-speaking coworkers. Such a tactic not only 
added to the desperation of non-assimilated miners who never knew where they would 
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work next, but also “destroy[ed] all confidence that might otherwise be established 
between them and the English-speaking miners.”51 
These claims, which often associated lack of English skills with ignorance and 
indifference to unionism had a bigger impact on miners than lowering wages and 
crippling unions. In many cases, English-speaking miners and society at large carried 
these assumptions of ignorance into how they understood skill. Charles Fisher, for 
example, learned how to mine coal in France but was working in the No. 2 mine in 
Frontenac, Kansas, when it exploded in 1888. He was in the mine when he heard the blast 
and nearly died trying to navigate the toxic tunnels to fresh air. With over seventeen 
years’ experience mining coal, the thirty-three-year-old knew proper mining practices, 
how to ventilate a mine, and on the day of the explosion could tell simply by the sound 
that a “blown out shot” was the source of the mayhem that followed.52  
But when Fisher was called as an expert witness in a trial to determine who was at 
fault for the 1888 explosion, he did not know how to explain this. He sat on the witness 
stand confused at the court proceedings—each time the plaintiff asked him a question, the 
defense objected before Fisher could answer. By the time the plaintiff asked him to tell 
the jury whether or not the company supplied “brattices” to direct the mine’s airflow and 
after the defense’s objection was overruled, Fisher neither knew whether he was allowed 
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to answer the question nor what the plaintiff meant by his question. As the jury awaited 
his answer, Fisher voiced his exasperation to the Court. “You must explain this to me,” 
the miner demanded. “I can’t understand very well the English language; I want you to 
explain so I understand.”53 
The problem was not that Fisher could not speak English. He could. Prior to the 
explosion, French miners not fluent in English went to him for assistance when dealing 
with mine management. Fisher spoke on their behalf, requesting new rooms for some 
men or, on the morning of the 1888 explosion, demanding better ventilation in the rooms. 
More likely his fluency in English and knowledge of the common complaints in the mine 
explain his inclusion as an expert witness for the plaintiff in the trial.  
Fisher’s confusion came from the words the lawyers used to describe the mining 
practices that were seldom used in the mines. Most miners familiar with the term 
“brattice” knew it as a wooden frame placed in a mine doorway that, by itself, had little 
to do with controlling air flow in the mines. The heavy canvas cloth coated with tar 
which hung from the brattice controlled the flow. Only miners of British descent called to 
testify during the trial voluntarily called the curtain and frame together “bratticing.” The 
other miners, including Fisher, simply knew it as a “curtain” or “canvas” and never used 
the word “brattice.” This was especially important, since the Cherokee and Pittsburg 
Company often provided the wood for the frame, but did not provide sufficient curtains 
to hang from them. The plaintiff’s question, as Fisher understood it, made no sense.54  
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The misunderstanding, which came from the attorney’s unfamiliarity with mining 
terms and practices, however, reflected poorly on Fisher and drastically altered his 
treatment during his testimony. The miner’s outburst where he admitted not 
understanding the question caused the plaintiff to rephrase the original question and ask 
whether the company provided “curtains,” but it also had a second outcome. Although 
defense attorneys had frequently objected to the questions asked of Fisher and the other 
witnesses as a tactic to muddle testimonies, the grounds for objections to Fisher changed 
after his outburst. In the other testimonies and before Fisher’s outburst, the defense’s 
objections were that questions were “too suggestive” to the witness or “irrelevant” to the 
case. The objections, like those for other witnesses, were quickly overruled and the trial 
continued. But after the outburst, the objections grew more frequent and often charged 
that, “the witness has not shown himself competent to express an opinion with reference 
there to.” 55 Much to Fisher’s frustration as he tried to recount his experience during the 
explosion, the defense argued he was incompetent to do so. “I can tell it if you let me,” 
the miner insisted as he grew more restless on the witness stand, but it was no use.56 
Unlike the objections to other witness testimonies, several objections against Fisher 
attacking his competency were sustained.57 Nearly two decades of working in the mines 
was not enough to be recognized as a mining expert by the Kansas courts. Credibility 
hinged on more than one’s ability to mine coal; it also demanded impeccable proficiency 
in the English language.   
Despite his actual skill, Fisher’s lack of English fluency placed him on the fringes 
of the workplace and society. Throughout the coalfields, immigrants like Fisher were cast 
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as “ignorant,” and “unskilled” despite their experience in the coal industry. To be sure, 
European mines and mining methods were not drastically different from procedures in 
the United States. As in the southern Midwest, European mining techniques often varied 
from mine to mine based on coal quality and surrounding rock composition. However, 
English-speaking American miners frequently assumed that non-English speakers, 
particularly those from eastern European countries were unskilled in the more “modern” 
mining techniques, namely blasting the coal with explosives. In reality, mines in Eastern 
Europe were as likely to use explosives to blast the coal as mines in Britain, and any 
immigrant miners had more experience in mining coal than a local farmer, but the 
stereotype of the unskilled “Hun” remained steadfast.58 Miners who wished to keep the 
new immigrants out of the mines therefore not only did so because they believed non-
English speakers lowered wages and took jobs, but because they believed that the new 
arrivals were unskilled at mining and endangered the lives of all who worked in the mine 
with them.  
In a report circulated throughout southern Midwest mining districts as well as 
labor newspapers, Ohio Chief Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine claimed that “Slavonic 
and Latin races,” possessed “intense greed” that “create a constant menace to the lives 
and health of themselves and their fellow workmen. These people are entirely ignorant of 
the science of mining and as a result are continually working in peril.” Not only did they 
not know how to mine, he continued, but they could not be taught. “Their lack of 
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knowledge of our language precludes their being warned in time of danger or of being 
instructed as to the mode of applying the remedy, until many times it is too late.”59      
English-speaking miners did not have to look far for evidence. Haseltine found 
that although the total number of immigrants laboring in Ohio mines was less than 9 
percent, 111/3 percent of Ohio mine fatalities for 1891 were “among this class of 
people.”60 The mines that hired the majority of non-English speaking immigrants to drive 
down their prices also tended to cut more expenses in keeping mines safe. Mines that 
hired an overwhelming number of non-English speaking miners were also the most 
unsafe and the most likely to experience an accident. Just seventeen months before the 
infamous 1892 Homestead strike, Andrew Carnegie’s business partner and Homestead 
manager Henry Clay Frick faced a different kind of labor crisis when one of his coal 
mines exploded. The Mammoth mine disaster, which killed nearly one hundred and 
twenty men and boys, became one of the largest ever recorded. Miners and wives 
throughout the nation expressed alarm at the explosion, offering their sympathy to those 
affected in the disaster. Miners knew that the same disregard for safety took place in their 
own mines and looked at the disaster as a rallying cry to change procedures in extraction, 
not only by making sure that explosives were handled with greater care, but to also make 
sure that inexperienced miners did not handle them and that mine inspectors knew 
enough about explosives to check the mines properly. In the midst of this debate was a 
careful mention of who died. Over one hundred of the dead were immigrants from 
eastern Europe, adding to the evidence that new immigrant arrivals had no business 
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working in the coal mines. Consequently, even as they offered sympathy and even 
monetary assistance to the non-English speaking miners’ families injured or killed in the 
Mammoth explosion, English-speaking miners also moved to take them from the mines 
entirely.61  
Dozens of miners cited the Mammoth mine disaster as evidence for tighter 
regulations against unskilled miners and mine inspectors. “[I]t only seems to be a matter 
of time when more of our craft will share the same fate,” organizer W. H. Turner of Iowa 
asserted, insisting that more precautions against mine gasses needed to be implemented. 
“It is not likely to be detected until too late, unless some competent person is keeping a 
vigilant watch for its presence,” he insisted.62 Turner did not speak alone. In the wake of 
the disaster, miners clamored for tighter laws such the Gallagher Bill that restricted who 
could work in the Pennsylvania anthracite mines.63 “If other states will follow this 
example,” the National Labor Tribune wrote, “the miners will be similarly protected; if 
not they will be subjected to the competition of not only the Huns and Italians who have 
drifted there under ordinary circumstances, but will have also those that Pennsylvania 
will refuse to take.”64 But the bill did not work as planned. Although the legislation was 
designed to keep inexperienced miners out of the mine and mine inspector’s office, 
anthracite miner “A Delving Serf” insisted that it was ineffective because it “has not 
stopped one Polander or Hungarian from filling the place of a miner.” Irate, the miner 
continued to say that he witnessed miners receive mining certification “who could not tell 
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in English where they were born, what their names were, or how old they were.” Worse, 
Delving Serf insisted, one local operator had three of his Polish employees go before the 
board in hopes they would be appointed to the mining board, “and lo and behold, Mr. 
Polander was appointed, when to my certain knowledge miners of at least twenty-one 
years’ experience who were passed by.”65  
Delving Serf’s statement, which contrasted “Mr. Polander” with experienced 
“miners” indicated that, in his mind, one could not be Polish and an experienced miner. 
Such a belief came out of more than simple expectations of white, English-speaking 
entitlement, but a fundamental understanding that those who could not speak English 
were incapable of being honest skilled workers. Rather, many saw them as tools that 
furthered company’s power over the mines. The Gallagher Bill, Delving Serf argued, not 
only failed to keep immigrants out of the mines, but also gave operators a valuable 
loophole in the event of a mine disaster. “[I]f any anthracite miner gets killed the 
employers can say ‘Well, he had a certificate of competency; surely he knew what he was 
doing. What had he a certificate for but as a practical miner? We are not liable.’” 66  
 Such a fear prompted thousands of English-speaking miners and wives to stop 
pushing for legislation to keep new immigrants out of the mines and instead favor laws 
that would prohibit immigration entirely. The “intelligent foreign born miner” should not 
be offended at UMW efforts to stop immigration, Laurene Gardner observed. If “he is 
ready and willing to avail himself” to assimilate, unionize, and mine with care, he was 
welcome to stay. But those who did not were “one evil that organization was meant to 
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check,” she insisted. 67 Citizens in Hymera, Indiana agreed. A mass meeting at the 
Hymera Baptist Church demanded on behalf of the miners that all immigration be 
immediately prohibited, “except for persons who can read and write the English language 
and who bring with them the means to make a home in this country.”68 Although 
thousands of farmers and laborers in the United States were already impoverished to the 
point of desperation and had no “means to make a home” without living on a tenant farm 
or a company house, non-English speaking immigrants seemed far more dangerous than 
any other group.69 
English speakers may have accepted non-English speakers into their ranks, but 
such actions left no doubt where their true sentiments lay. For thousands of non-native 
English speakers, such hostility gave them little reason to support an organization 
devoted primarily to native-born and English-speaking interests. Swedish miners in 
Oswalt, Iowa, for example, took pride in the fact that they kept their entirely Swedish-
speaking Knights of Labor assembly strong when the English-speaking miners’ assembly 
faded. Such enthusiasm was in part due to Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes’s 
attention to the local, promising them assistance in whatever way he could.70 Still, by 
summer 1892, miner Oscar Anderson voiced uncertainties about NTA 135 and the UMW 
to Hayes. As one of the two organizations that comprised the UMW, NTA 135 was 
supposed to have a say in UMW affairs, but it held little influence. “[I]n fact,” he wrote 
to Hayes, “135 is dead as far as Iowa is concerned.” To the Swedish miners of Oswalt, 
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this was a problem. “[T]he Mine Workers organization is so much mixed up in the 
Federation of Labor that our members positively refuse to pay them any Tax.”71 Like 
thousands of English-speaking miners who refused to pay dues to organizations that did 
not respect their wishes, Anderson and the Swedish union miners of Oswalt wanted 
nothing to do with a labor organization voicing increasing hostility to immigrant labor.72  
The Knights General Assembly, Anderson believed, was far more accommodating to 
their interests. With that, he requested that Hayes transfer the Swedish local’s charter 
from NTA 135 to the General Assembly, and to send all Knight material to the local in 
the Swedish language. Anderson’s request, which would pull the assembly out of the 
UMW, revealed that, what many English-speaking organizers would have described as 
ignorant and anti-union actions were actually an effort to unionize according to the 
organization that best addressed their interests. Irate at being called an “ignoramous” for 
opposing officer decisions, French miner Louis Goaziou sarcastically played into this 
stereotype. “What little English I can speak and understand I have learned in or around 
the mines, and the little I can read and write I have learned at home in the evening, so you 
can easily see that having such an ignoramus as myself for teacher it’s no wonder that my 
education is very imperfect.” Perhaps he was incapable of understanding how the union 
functioned, he continued, but many miners “not as ignorant as myself” nonetheless 
agreed with his assessment. Several miners rushed to Goaziou’s defense, but the miner’s 
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statement made it plain that his words against the union were dismissed because he was 
an immigrant incapable of understanding the union, making his grievances against the 
officers less legitimate than those of native-English-speaking whites.73 In his Ohio mine, 
“Union” claimed that immigrant miners like Goaziou who complained against the 
officers or refused to pay dues until the union acknowledged their grievances were 
behaving unreasonably. Although miners of all backgrounds and ethnicities withheld 
dues or abandoned the union when it did not suit their interests, non-native-English 
speaking miners who did so were seen as particularly hostile to the union. throughout the 
nation. “Some of the foreign-speaking people have told us that they are in the majority 
and they do not intend to be ruled by the American of English-speaking people,” Union 
explained, implying that such demands were illegitimate. When their requests for equal 
treatment in the union were denied, immigrant miners abandoned the union. “I feel sorry 
that our foreign-speaking brothers are responsible for such a state of affairs. Let us have 
unity and we shall prosper; without this we will get farther apart.” The claim blamed the 
union’s failure on non-English speaking miners who were refused a full voice in the 
miners’ organization. For Union and thousands of other English speaking miners, “unity” 
came only when these miners accepted the leadership of white, English-speaking miners 
and dutifully paid their dues to the organization that begrudged them. 74 
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“Coal Butchers” 
Despite its proclamations of inclusion, the UMW’s actions unapologetically 
favored white, English-speaking miners. Even when these groups were officially included 
in the order, they were still in many ways ostracized. Yet, as firm as their sentiments 
were toward black and immigrant workers in the name of keeping wages fair and mines 
safe, white English-speaking miners were far more ambivalent when addressing these 
same issues among local farmers who also entered the mines. Like black and non-English 
speaking miners, companies used farmers, most of whom were white and English 
speaking, as a means to lower wages and decrease production costs. In addition, although 
they could join the miners’ unions because they worked in the mines, few farmers did. 
Still, unlike black and non-English speaking groups imported into the mines, farmers 
were often well-rooted in the local community. As a result, farmer-miners became a kind 
of quiet threat compared to the hysteria that followed other minority mining groups. 
White English-speaking miners recognized farmer-miner presence in the mines as a 
danger, but one secondary to black and non-English speaking miners. Despite constant 
complaints from mining regions throughout the nation, miners never implemented any 
major initiative or policy to keep the farmers out of the mines.  
But the skilled miners did not treat the farmer-miners with the same hostility as 
they did black or non-English speakers, even though farmer-miners’ presence in the 
mines intensified in mid-1893 when the Panic and depression shattered the already 
crippled economy around the southern Midwest mines. As Mary Lease urged Kansas 
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farmers to “raise less corn and more hell,” hundreds followed the first part of her advice 
and made up for the difference in the mines. They “crowded out” the practical miners 
during the winter months when wages were highest. Their presence in the already full 
mines slowed the turn and lowered earnings for everyone. It was unfair, the National 
Labor Tribune wrote, the farmer-miners “take from the soil during the season of farming, 
and when the winter demand set in for fuel they cut a fat streak out of what the regular 
miners should have.”75 Miner John Neal complained that his mine continued to take on 
farmer-miners until the mine was so crowded the miners could not earn a living wage 
despite the regular winter pay increase.76 “It will take two of those farmers to put out as 
much marketable coal as one practical miner would do, but then it would not do to refuse 
those men good places in the mines, because they are useful in time of strikes.”77 Yet as 
pressing as the matter had become, miners were ambivalent about how to address the 
problem. Even though white English-speaking miners at times walked out when black 
men were hired in their mines and often rallied around anti-immigration legislation, they 
staged no demonstrations against farmer-miners and agreed upon no policy to rid them 
from the mines. Instead, their presence on the fringes of mines and miners’ organizations 
created confusion that, in several different ways, served as formidable stumbling blocks 
to organizational unity.  
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Indiana miner and operator “Old Timer” considered farmer-miners a liability on 
multiple fronts. Noting that Elijah Bridgewater, an inexperienced local farmer-miner, 
injured himself in the mine, he reminded his readers not only of the dangers that ran 
rampant for any miner, but also that the danger increased when working with less skilled 
men. But Bridgewater’s injury, caused by a slate fall, was likely at least partly the 
company’s fault. The company seldom supplied enough timbers to prop up the mine and 
Bridgewater had good evidence to prove that the company’s neglect caused his injury. 
But when the farmer-miner moved to sue the company, his inexperience worked in the 
company’s favor. Bridgewater “knew but little about mining, and on the trial the lawyers 
could make him say just what they wanted.” As such, the jury sided against Bridgewater 
ten to two, ruling that his negligence, not the company’s caused his injury. Not only did 
Bridgewater’s presence in the mines place miners in direct danger, but as a witness, he 
aided the company in escaping responsibility for the fruits of its neglect, allowing unsafe 
workplace practices to continue.78 
In this sense, white assimilated miners’ fears of unskilled miners being used by 
the company proved true. But the real danger of the inexperienced miner came not from 
the non-English speakers, but from local farmers. Working six months a year in the 
mines, farmer-miners simply did not have the skills of “reading” mine faces, cracks, and 
other danger signs that might prompt a practical miner to use a different technique to 
blast or otherwise loosen his coal.79  Instead, farmer-miners knew just enough to claim to 
know how to mine, but were often far more likely than other minority groups to become 
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mine foremen or mine inspectors. With little experience, they often followed company 
orders without understanding the consequences in coal mines and as inspectors, seldom 
recognized company violations. “A Miner” wrote that his Missouri mine should have 
been shut down because there was no escape shaft. But the mine inspector disregarded 
the violation. Even though nearly two dozen miners were killed in a mine fire just a few 
months earlier, he still failed to note the safety violations in the mines. “He is a farmer 
and does not know anything about a coal mine,” Miner wrote. “He should be removed or 
thrown in the mine and roasted with the twenty-three men that were burned to death… 
either would suit the miners so they get rid of him and get a competent inspector to do his 
duty.”80  
 Still, as dangerous as it was for the miners, companies saw merit in pushing for 
inexperienced miners into authority positions. Not only were they more likely to miss 
safety violations simply through inexperience, but in the event of a mine accident, the 
company was often absolved of guilt since the mine inspector found no violations. “The 
operators have the advantage every time,” Old Timer observed, “and unless we become 
awake to the fact we might as well quit suing coal companies first as last.”  The surest 
way, he believed, was to stop training the farmers. “I have never taught one yet and never 
will,” he insisted, reminding his readers that “miners must dig the coal and the hay John 
must grow the corn and raise the pork and beef. Then, and not till then, will we better our 
condition.” 81 
 Although hundreds of miners agreed with Old Timer’s sentiment, most 
recognized that the farmer-miners would not leave the mines. At the same time, miners 
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also understood that few farmer-miners were willing to join a trade union for an 
occupation they performed six months each year. Even when forced to join in strongly 
unionized areas, they stayed in only for the period that they mined, seldom paid dues, and 
rarely honored the principles they were supposed to uphold. But if they could not force 
the farmer-miner to labor honestly, many miners believed that they could force them to 
pay additional fees. “If we were organized here and charge these winter coal diggers 
about $20 for the privilege of taking our living from us, we would not be bothered with 
many of them,” John Neal suggested.82 Although few suggested a fee so high, Neal’s 
plan was an old one. One of the first resolutions the UMW passed when it formed was an 
“anti-‘corn-husker’ resolution” proposed by an Illinois miner which stated that “men who 
only work part of the year in the mines must pay all dues and abide by all conditions of 
our organization and should they fall in arrears during the time they are out of the mines 
they must pay all arrears before they can be allowed to work.”83  
But these precautions did not work to the miners’ advantage. “During the strike of 
1889 in the block field our chances of success looked favorable up till the time the 
farmers had their crops put away, and then they swarmed down on us and we must either 
divide our small resources with them or they would go to work in the mines,” John 
Kennedy observed noting that the same conditions applied four years later. “And every 
week when the amount was a little smaller than usual they would come to the 
commissary, draw their rations and the same day or the next morning go to the boss and 
tell him they were ready to go to work although they had worked on their farms and had 
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[a] year’s provisions stowed away in their homes.”84As dues paying union members who 
worked in the mines, they were entitled to the aid the union provided. Yet, Kennedy and 
hundreds of other miners who saw the mines as the farmers’ secondary source of income, 
believed that the farmers should allow the aid to be reserved for those truly in need that 
had no other income. Not only did the “cornfield-mechanics” take jobs at lower rates, 
then T. J. Llewellyn observed, but these “Benedict Arnolds” tore apart the miners’ union, 
even if they could be forced to join and pay dues. “[T]hese ‘coal butchers’” would be the 
first to sign iron-clad agreements to keep unions out of the mine. “Were it not for the 
good men who will suffer through the action of the ‘things’ who are supposed to have 
been created upright, but who haven’t backbone enough to make men, I would cheerfully 
say that 50c a day is enough for these poor, miserable traitors, who are busily engaged in 
tearing down the bulwark between themselves and slavery,” he wrote.85  
Statements like Llewellyn’s left little doubt that farmer-miners who worked 
against the union were seen as deplorable co-workers, yet his statement indicated that 
they were also viewed very differently from the black and non-English speaking miners 
who were accredited with the same behavior. Whereas black and non-English speaking 
miners were viewed as naturally inclined to dishonest labor and therefore ostracized from 
within their organization and not entitled to fair treatment, farmer-miners, like white, 
English-speaking practical miners, were expected to know better. They were “Benedict 
Arnolds,” traitors to their own people. In identifying them as such, Llewellyn included 
farmer-miners with the interests of the UMW, even as the farmer-miners acted against the 
order.  
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Such a stance resonated with thousands of white English-speaking miners who, 
though seldom understood black or immigrant struggles in the mines, fully understood 
farm life. “I have been one of them [a farmer] in times past and was a farm laborer for a 
good many years, and I am sure they would be much easier organized than any other 
class I know of,” Indiana miner “Salamander” argued.86 “Tow Row” of Ohio agreed, 
claiming that the farmer-miners were not only good men, but that their actions should be 
emulated. “I think it would be better still for all of us to own farms, and work on them, 
too, when the scale of wages did not suit us.”87 In her reply to Tow Row, Laurene 
Gardner expressed her own sympathy for the farmer-miners. “I wish every coal digger 
owned… a little patch [of farmland], for that would give me one, two or three, in fact,” 
she began, she merely opposed to their willingness to rob miners’ work. Farmer-miners 
were not wholly bad, they were industrious and hard-working, “in fact a little too 
enterprising,” as one National Labor Tribune editorial professed. Though their actions 
were as damaging as other non-union miners, practical miners still counted them as one 
of their own, like miners who became operators or foremen, their faults lay in selfishness, 
not a predisposition to dishonesty that many associated with black and non-English 
speaking miners.88 
Willingness to exclude some miners based on presumed skill while tolerate other 
miners with decidedly less mining skill came to a head in 1893. For decades, miners had 
complained about the unfair advantage coal screens gave to the company. Although many 
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states had passed laws standardizing the size of the screens that sorted the coal, they were 
seldom specific enough to be enforced effectively. The screens not only needed to be 
specific on the length and width, but also in the spacing between the bars that allowed the 
coal to pass. The shape of the bar, typically either “flat” or “diamond” also affected how 
much coal fell between the bars. Finally, these factors meant little if the screen was not 
kept in good repair. The thousands of tons of coal that crossed the screens regularly 
corroded them, shrinking bars or breaking them entirely. As a result, more coal fell 
between the bars before it could be weighed, making it coal the company could sell 
without paying miners for mining it.  
Miners and labor organizers alike had long favored the idea of instituting a “run 
of mine,”  “gross weight,” or “anti-screen” law that would force coal companies to pay 
miners before the coal was run over the screen. Such a law made it easier to regulate 
scale rates and compensate miners for all coal they mined. By 1893, several states, 
including Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, all secured anti-screen legislation in some 
capacity and, the UMW expected Ohio to follow that January.89  Quoting Ohio Chief 
Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine’s warning of increased dangers created by 
inexperienced immigrant miners and citing the latest mine explosion in Colorado that 
killed twenty-five miners, the United Mine Workers’ Journal presented the anti-screen 
legislation as a viable means to protect the mines from the “Sicilian or the Bohemian” 
who “don’t know of the skill, the care, and the intelligence necessary to be a safe and 
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complete coal miner.” 90 If mines weighed the coal before it was screened, the UMW and 
many miners reasoned, companies would pay all miners equally for the full weight of the 
material they mined, including dirt and slack. Skilled miners who produced large 
amounts of coal therefore produced a more valuable gross weight than the inexperienced 
miners who produced more slack than coal. As a result, companies would seek out the 
best and most experienced miners to extract the coal, giving skilled miners the ability to 
set their own wages and work with the most careful miners.91 
As desirable as the anti-screen bills were to many miners and organizers, 
however, hundreds of miners demurred. The number of Ohio union and non-union miners 
who rejected them caught organizer Richard Davis by surprise.  “I can not for the life of 
me see how and where they base their argument,” he wrote. “I believe the miners want it 
or they would not have mentioned it.” It simply did not make sense why the miners 
would oppose a law that would pay them for all the material they mined rather than the 
largest chunks of coal.92 
“Willing Hands” readily answered Davis’s question, noting that Indiana had 
already passed the law, but could not enforce it unless “it is in the employers [sic] interest 
to do so.”93 His words reflected the skepticism that hundreds of miners shared regarding 
workplace legislation. “It makes a miner laugh to hear paid lawyers explain what is right 
between operators and miners,” miner “Old Timer” wrote of legislation. “Doctors, 
lawyers and preachers whenever they make a law to benefit miners always have a 
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loophole through which an operator can, by greazing himself good, squeeze out of paying 
a poor coal digger one cent damages.”94 Legislation to aid miners like abolishing 
company stores and establishing weekly pay laws, if they were not ruled unconstitutional, 
were seldom enforced in any state, many observed. When they were enforced, companies 
used the legislation to protect themselves, such as when mine inspectors’ superficial 
inspection and approval of mines’ absolved companies of guilt in mining accidents. 
 These trends extended into the national forum. Union leaders like Phil Penna 
encouraged the miners to support “protection” in 1888, yet by 1892, miners dealing with 
wage reductions questioned whether they received any benefit from legislation like the 
McKinley Tariff. “I don’t know whether to attribute the above results to the operations of 
the McKinley tariff law or not, but it is certainly a protection which we miners of Indiana 
could have done without,” miner “Uncle Abe” wrote bitterly.  “The Democratic 
politicians are just laughing in their sleeves… not that they are glad to see us reduced, but 
because it proves as they say the sophistry of those coal operators and with this insure the 
State of Indiana on their (the Democratic) side in next November.”95 As the economy 
crumbled, hundreds of other miners looked at the McKinley Tariff and the newly 
repealed Sherman Silver Purchase Act and agreed, asking how any legislation aided 
producers.  Demonetizing silver “played sad havoc with the business of India,” miner 
Ecce Homo observed after the United Sates repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. “I 
would like to ask Mr. McKinley what caused the panic of ’73, and all the panics since 
then,” he demanded, insisting that legislation was little more than a “tool” for bankers. 
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Politicians “claim to be in favor of protecting home industry,” miner “Sorehead” wrote, 
“But what are the facts of the case? A few Eastern capitalists seem to get all the 
protection.” Meanwhile, silver and coal mines shut down and farmers continued to flood 
the mines that remained open, all to the benefit of the “gold gamblers” throughout the 
world.96  
If state legislators repealed the laws that aided miners and only enforced the ones 
that could benefit companies, and if the national government did the same by repealing 
laws like the Sherman Silver Purchase Act that producers wanted while “financial 
pirates” exploited the tariff to their advantage, miners saw little reason for the anti-screen 
bill to have a different fate.97 “It is a good law for the miners if they only would believe 
it,” Willing Hands wrote to Davis, “but, brother R. L. D., you are wrong, there is a large 
percent of the men here that don’t want it lived up to….”98   
Many miners opposed it because companies would use it to further injure the 
miners. Anti-screen bill supporters were correct that the operators would only want 
practical miners, “Union Miner” conceded, but this would not benefit the miners. Even 
when wage scales were set according to screen size, mines paying wages for mine run 
coal deducted as much as fifty percent of the weight for slack.99 No doubt this practice 
would continue in some form under the anti-screen law, Union Miner asserted, which 
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would mean that all miners would be deducted the same flat rate, regardless of their skill. 
“[W]hat are you going to do with the ‘pumpkin rollers’ and the ‘woodchoppers’ that are 
already in the organization? They cannot be discharged, because we will not allow it,” he 
reasoned. Unlike the UMW’s willingness to overlook mistreatment of black or immigrant 
miners, they would not tolerate a unionized farmer-miner to be discharged from the mine. 
But farmer-miner coal production was substantially lower than that of practical men, 
“and while making the yearly [pay] scale, should it be taken on the anti-screen basis the 
average would certainly be taken.”100  
In short, the anti-screen bill would pay practical miners as though they were as 
unskilled as the farmer-miners. “By that the unskilled miner would be benefitted at the 
expense of the skilled miner,” Union Miner concluded. Kansas miner John M’Laughlin 
agreed. “I am satisfied that if we insist upon a straight mine run price we will be whipped 
into accepting a price far below what the practical miner should have for his labor,” he 
wrote. Accepting the bill would not only do little to help miners in securing fair wages, 
but it would also make the mines more accessible to less skilled men, degrading the 
mining craft.101 
The anti-screen bill opponents were not far off in their predictions. While most 
states simply did not enforce the law, miners gained little in those that did. Farmers 
continued to work in the mines while companies paid depreciated wages for run of mine 
coal. “Developments have shown that [the anti-screen law] is inductive to poor mining,” 
Missouri Labor Commissioner Oscar Kochtitzky observed in 1888. Far from cultivating 
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careful and skillful miners, he found that miners had little incentive to produce quality 
coal. Rather, “in order to increase their ‘output,’” miners “resort to the excessive use of 
powder and heavy blasting, shooting from the solid, without ‘under,’ or ‘side’ cutting.” 
These tactics were the precise actions accredited to immigrant miners and outraged 
practical miners when performed by farmers because of the increased likelihood of mine 
explosions. But run of mine miners were not paid to be skilled. Whereas experienced 
miners once used concentrated blasts to loosen only coal, under gross weight pay, they 
overloaded their shots and extended their blasting range to bring down more slack to 
increase their weight.102  Rather than protecting the skilled miner, the legislation only 
made him less skilled.  
 
Gilded Age efforts to protect the mines and miners manifested in contradictory 
ways. Who unions accepted and what legislation they desired did not always align, but 
did reflect how late nineteenth century society and skill divisions in a semi-skilled 
industry inhibited unity along ethnic and occupational lines. Although the UMW 
professed to be an inclusive organization that embraced all miners regardless of ethnicity, 
it pushed aside black and non-English speaking miners, dismissing their concerns and 
berating their abilities. Instead, groups that did not fit with the white, English speaking, 
experienced miner mold were accepted into the union more out of a desire to make them 
obey union doctrine rather than genuine interest for their well-being.  
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While these various groups could work together for common interests, as when 
white and black miners fought against convict labor, minority groups were ostracized 
when their interests did not align with the white, English speaking rank and file. 
Questions of racial discrimination in the workplace and community, lynching, or unfair 
laws were seldom addressed and never given serious consideration by miners’ delegates 
at national conventions. Such practices alienated black and immigrant workers who 
looked on the UMW with hostility.  
Such a stance allowed the organization to be more accepting of those who were 
not male or not miners than these minority miners. Whereas skilled black and immigrant 
miners were pushed away from the order, women like Laurene Gardner and farmer-
miners blended in with it. Consequently, official inclusion in union ranks meant little. 
While white and English speaking union miners did not want minority groups in the 
mines, they expected minorities to join and remain faithful to the union. Even as they 
extended this invitation however, white English speakers neglected legislation that would 
help black miners and embraced legislation that would keep immigrant miners out of the 
mines and nation. These positions stood in contrast to the miners’ stances on farmer-
miners, who though they were not welcome in the mines, did not suffer from any sort of 
hostile action from the practical miners. Instead, miners looked on the farmers with 
sympathy, judging that their placement in the mines was due to the same hardships all 
white English speakers faced in the midst of an economic depression. The best means to 
remove the farmer from the mines, many reasoned, was to improve the economy. 
Ultimately, these various groups that did not completely fit with the UMW frayed 
the already unraveling union. Unable to unite for common interests, union legislation to 
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regulate the mines failed, causing many to put their hopes more in national politics than 
the union strength.  This is what gave Willing Hands and Laurene Gardner the common 
ground they shared. Despite their disagreement on who belonged to the UMW and what 
the organization’s priorities should be, both remained confident that it was the best labor 
organization to achieve their goals. Yet, as the depression continued, even the most 
steadfast believers began to question the union’s strength. As officers abandoned the 
organization and the Knights of Labor disintegrated, it seemed that the UMW and what 
remained of the miners’ unity was not far behind. 
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Chapter Six 
Waiting for “Moses”: Renegade Leaders and Absent Victories, 1894-1896 
 
From district to district, miners’ reports of their strike success rolled in. “[W]e are 
right in line to call for the general suspension” Missouri miner “Sunshine” wrote just a 
few days after the 1894 strike began, “every man stopped at noon.”1 From Illinois, 
“Calamity” boasted “All solid in this county; men all out, will stand by the national 
officers win or lose; organized to a man—300 to 500 at every meeting.”2 Such a solid 
standing caught union miners and officials everywhere by surprise. For the first time in 
their memory, the miners had a widespread and united national movement. Indiana had 
nearly shut down its entire coal production. Non-union Iowa miners who reluctantly 
joined the strike were not only still strong six weeks in, but decided to reorganize UMW 
Iowa District Thirteen.3 Miners in Ohio were firm and stronger unionized than ever 
before, “waiting patiently for the final suspension to come to a close at 70 cents, and 
nothing less,” W. S. Moke reported.4 In nearly every state miners echoed his claim. 
“There must be no receding, no backsliding, if it takes all summer and next fall to fight it 
out,” declared one Pennsylvania miner.5 Wages had fallen too low not to fight; on this 
point nearly 150,000 bituminous mine workers agreed. 
The seven-week bituminous coal strike that began in April 1894 shut down coal 
production more successfully than most miners thought possible. Years of strike defeats, 
constant wage reductions, and with the only previous nationwide coal strike canceled 
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before it began, miners had little hope that 1894 would bring any real change. UMW 
membership and coal prices steadily declined as the depression worsened and the warm 
summer months approached, causing many miners to believe it was unwise to strike. But 
these same factors also convinced them that they had nothing left to lose. The desperation 
that came from a prolonged economic depression stirred up unrest from producers in 
nearly every corner of the country. Coinciding with the growing Populist movement and 
railroad worker unrest, the union and non-union miners also made a national push on the 
national stage.  
There were only 13,000 miners in the UMW when the miners walked out, yet 
with the overwhelming support of the non-union miners, the strikers earned a roughly ten 
cent per ton wage increase despite the ongoing depression. The gain was enough for 
UMW officers to call the 1894 strike a victory, not only because they increased miner 
wages, but because they mobilized the miners as a unified national force. But many 
miners disagreed. To them, the strike did not mark their first national victory over the 
competitive coal market, but a defeat that came from within their own organization. The 
officers’ tactical decision to negotiate with operators while the strike force was at its 
strongest looked like betrayal to miners who believed that union leaders had “sold out” 
their best chance to earn a fair wage. Consequently, this defeat that leaders presented as a 
victory became the latest betrayal in a long history of union deceit. As charges of officer 
corruption circulated, the effects of such a non-victory cast a shadow over the UMW and 
its officers that lasted for years.6  
                                               
6“Vice President Penna Talks,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894.  
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Previous scholars have been correct to observe the power of failed strikes and 
employer strength as critical factors in workers’ decisions to abandon their unions.7 In the 
case of 1894, the settlement crushed the enthusiasm the strike had inspired. Many of 
those who joined union ranks quickly left as mine operators initiated new wage 
reductions shortly after the new wage scale was established. Others threw away their 
union cards to avoid being blacklisted. As both capital and government became more 
hostile to workers, repression snuffed out any remaining hope for raising wages. 
But these blows struck a movement that was already weakened and fragmented. 
Many rural producers would have agreed with “Old Miner” of Kansas who insisted that a 
“wolf in sheep’s clothing” lurked among them.8 By the time he wrote those words in 
1894 no miner was entirely sure who the “wolf” was, but distrusted across the board 
government officials, mine operators, and union leaders who claimed to act on behalf of 
the miners’ interests. As rural producers across the country moved to clean out 
government offices of leaders unsympathetic to the average worker’s plight, so workers 
and officials set out to “purify” their own ranks from within. Locals overthrew state 
officials and demanded UMW national officials’ resignations. State leaders accused 
national UMW leaders for accepting bribes to end the coal and railroad strikes. But such 
actions were not restricted to the UMW. In the Knights of Labor General Assembly in 
November 1893, Knights overthrew longtime General Master Workman Terence 
Powderly.  A little over a year later, UMW President John McBride unseated Samuel 
Gompers as President of the American Federation of Labor, the UMW miners split from 
the Knights of Labor and helped form the Independent Order of the Knights of Labor, 
                                               
7 Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation; Voss, The Making of American Exceptionalism; Phelan, 
Grand Master Workman; Weir, Beyond Labor’s Veil. 
8 “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “The Storm Is Over,” NLT, May 10, 1894. 
215 
 
and the following June, the Knights of Labor established a new miners’ union that, 
drawing on the residual anger from the 1894 settlement, siphoned the UMW’s already 
dwindling ranks.9  
Recrimination among the rival organizations mattered little to the rank and file 
and divisions between the Knights and AFL meant more to organizational leadership than 
its grassroots. Instead, mine workers asserted that their leaders’ wars came at the 
detriment of worker interests, reinforcing miners’ beliefs that officers cared little for their 
interests; and they wondered who, in fact, still labored for honest labor principles and 
who had “sold out” and used the organization for personal gain.  
 The 1894 settlement then, proved to be far from the victory UMW leaders 
claimed. Workers saw it as part of an extensive web of treachery both within the labor 
movement and in Gilded Age society. It tapped into rural producers’ existing suspicion of 
leadership and became another symbol for why they doubted anyone who claimed to help 
the common man. Such confusion and frustration split an already divided rank and file, 
indicating that the battle workers fought was as much against ‘labor’ as it was against the 
‘capital’ that oppressed them.   
 
The Suspension 
Wages fell drastically between the time of the canceled 1891 strike and the first 
nationwide strike in 1894. In 1891, southern Midwest bituminous miners in competitive 
regions earned an average 70 cents per ton for screened coal. By 1894, they earned 50 
                                               
9 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June, 27, 1895; Report 
of the General Executive Board, Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1895, p. 29; 
Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 257; Sanders, Roots of Reform,  83-5; Weir, Knights Unhorsed, 177. 
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cents per ton for the same labor.10 Nearly every miner understood that the declining price 
came not only from miners’ willingness to work for low wages, but too much coal. For 
years, many union leaders and miners called attention to the surplus and insisted that the 
only way to raise coal prices was to decrease the supply. Some proposed lessening the 
supply through a process known as “restriction” where miners limited coal production 
either by producing a predetermined tonnage or shortening work hours.11 Still, given 
miners’ actions like accepting free clicks, and other means of making extra money, it was 
unlikely all miners would honor restriction.12 Worse, the overcrowded mines and slow 
turn meant that even if all miners restricted their output or hours, operators could 
maintain production rates by adding more men to the mine, further slowing the turn to the 
point that it forced miners to work more in order to feed their families. 
Others, however, believed that coal exportation was now a viable option. The low 
coal prices reached a level for some qualities of US coal to be cheaper than that mined in 
the British Isles. To government officials, operators, and miners alike, exporting the US 
coal surplus became a viable alternative.13 Some operators considered expanding US coal 
exports to British dominions and other regions with poorer coal qualities.  At the time, 
the total amount of US bituminous coal exported never exceeded 2,400,000 long tons, 
worth roughly $6,000,000 in 1893 and $4,900,000 in 1894, indicating over a thirty cent 
                                               
10 In other places, such as in Bevier, Kentucky, wages remained the same, but the screen size increased. 
“Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Bevier (Ky.) Men,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894; “Proposition,” UMWJ, 
November 19, 1891; William T. Morris, letter to the editor, “The Old, Old, Story,” UMWJ, August 16, 
1894; D. H. Sullivan, letter to the editor, “Denny Sullivan,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895. 
11John Rowe, letter to the editor, “From John Rowe,” NLT, July 13, 1889; “Shorter Hours,” letter to the 
editor, “Shorter Hours the Cure,” NLT, August 10, 1889; “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “A Statement of the 
Case,” NLT, August 24, 1889; “Bob,” letter to the editor, “‘Bob’s’ Plan of Restriction,” NLT, August 24, 
1889. 
12 Because miners were paid by the ton rather than by the amount of time spent in the mines, the restriction 
skilled workers exercised in other industries seldom applied to coal producers. For details on restriction 
success, see Montgomery, “Workers’ Control of Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century,” in 
Workers’ Control in America, 9-31. 
13 Parker, The Production of Coal in 1894, 27. 
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decline in coal prices, felt in coal mining regions throughout the world. When English 
miners struck to raise their own wages in early 1894, a handful of US operators took 
advantage of the scarcity and increased their exports to fill demands formerly supplied by 
Britain. The expansion of trade indicated that if US operators could price their coal far 
enough below Europe, they could claim their own piece of the global coal market.14 Still, 
as countries negotiated tariffs to protect their own coal industries, the cost to ship and 
competition with Britain and Germany largely restricted US exports to the Americas 
where industrial development lagged in comparison to the European and Asian countries 
where Britain exported its coal surplus.15 
 For thousands of miners, then, the only way to decrease the US coal surplus was 
to stop mining entirely.16 This was the course the UMW decided to take in summer1894. 
This was not the first time the miners’ union proposed a national strike. Miners vividly 
remembered the aborted 1891 strike for the eight-hour day. Delegates at the 1893 
convention likewise voted to demand and strike for a five cent per ton wage increase on 
                                               
14US exports only increased by a small percentage, largely because Germany and other European coal 
producers were better positioned to benefit from the strike. “Her Waning Glory,” The Hutchison [Kansas] 
News, February 6, 1894; “Will There Be Another Strike in England?” CTJ, February 14, 1894. 
15 Russia, for example, began issuing a duty on all foreign coal in 1884 and gradually raised it as coal prices 
fell. Its need for coking coal, largely unavailable in its own region, however, made it essential to increase 
its imports from Britain, Germany, and Austria regardless of the tariff. While the tariff did not stop imports, 
it was high enough to make it impossible for US operators to compete with Britain for the Russian coal 
market. Similarly, the coal industry in the Pacific, largely from New South Wales, supplied California’s 
coal demand more economically than eastern coal operators could. “Why Not Export Coal?” NLT, April 
26, 1894; Parker, The Production of Coal in 1894,15, 26-29. Keppen, The Industries of Russia, 58-59; 
Saward, Compendium of Valuable Information Relative to Coal Production, Prices, Transportation, Etc., 
at Home and Abroad… 1894 (s.l.: s.n, 1894), 8-10; Richard Rothwell, The Mineral Industry, Its Statistics, 
Technology and Trade in the United States and Other Countries to the end of 1896, Volume 5 (New York: 
Scientific Publishing Company, 1897),762-764; “The Coal Trade,” San Francisco [California] Call, 
January 1, 1891; “Imports and Exports of Coal,” CTJ, January 10, 1894; “Coal is King,” CTJ, January 10, 
1894; “The State of Trade,” CTJ, January 24, 1894; “The Tower Bridge,” The [London] Times, January 24, 
1894; “Free Coal and Iron Ore,” NYT, January 26, 1894; “Her Waning Glory,” The Hutchison [Kansas] 
News, February 6, 1894; “Some Figures in the Foreign Trade,” CTJ, February 21, 1894; “Buy American 
Coal,” CTJ, April 11, 1894; “Buy American Coal—II,” CTJ, April 18, 1894 “Review of the Trade during 
1894,” CTJ, December 26, 1894. 
16 George A. Denison, “Suspension of Work in the Coal Mines,” in Work and Wages, reprinted in NLT, 
January 1, 1887.  
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both screened and run of mine coal, an amount that UMW President John McBride 
claimed was too low. But low union membership, particularly in West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, combined with the onset of the 1893 Panic, ended miners’ demands before 
the UMW could initiate an official campaign. “Had the delegates at our last annual 
convention been able to read the future, and thus learn what was ahead of us, there would 
have been less disappointment over the failure to advance prices,” McBride said as he 
advocated the 1894 strike. 17 
Yet, conditions in 1894 had not improved much over 1893. A strike at any time 
was a gamble, but a coal strike in a vastly non-union trade during the summer months of 
a depression was especially risky. Great Britain’s success with its own coal suspension 
left little doubt that coal prices would increase in a coal shortage, but there was no 
guarantee operators would be willing to pass this increase on to the miners, especially 
since the surplus coal meant operators would make high profits on coal long before their 
supply ran low.18 Illinois miner “Irish American” was one of thousands of miners who 
acknowledged the ongoing reductions that seemed to happen monthly in the mines. In 
some districts it drove weekly wages lower than the cost of a single ton of coal. Still, he 
remained opposed to the suspension altogether, noting that the miners were too 
unorganized and too desperate to feed their families to honor the strike long enough to 
win. “I wish to say to those who favor national suspension that such a move would only 
work injuriously toward your organization,” he wrote, “and I think if such a move was 
                                               
17E. S. C., UMW Convention Summary, “The Coal Miners,” NLT, April 13, 1893; John McBride, Address 
to the Fifth Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “McBride’s Address,” UMWJ, 
April 12, 1894. 
18 Patrick McBryde, “A Parallel of the Present Proposed Movement of American Miners in the Great 
British Strike,” UMWJ, April 19, 1894; “Shorter Hours,” letter to the editor, “Shorter Hours the Cure,” 
NLT, August 10, 1889. 
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inaugurated it would only bring on defeat, and defeat means demoralization, as all those 
know who have witnessed failures even in sectional strikes.”19 Thousands of miners 
agreed with Irish American’s reservations. “Let me inform you there are miners out in 
this Western country not by the hundreds, but by the thousands who have been living on 
half rations for months and only half clothed,” one Missouri miner wrote.20 A suspension 
at this time, “W. L.” of Foster, Iowa, observed, meant that the miners in his region would 
not pay the rent for their company homes.21  A suspension, then, might make conditions 
worse for the miners rather than improve them.  
Still, as more mines announced immediate reductions ranging from ten to twenty-
five percent, suspending work in all mines throughout the nation seemed the only means 
of increasing wages.22 “Mr. Editor, how much longer is these hard times going to last in 
this country?” the Missouri miner asked in his letter. His questioning reflected the 
desperation many miners faced in light of the depression and the indecision they had 
toward the suspension. The Missouri miner never claimed to be in favor of the strike, 
never insisted that it was the best move for the miners to make. He did not write excitedly 
about certain victory. Instead, he wrote that he thought there was nothing else left for the 
miners to do. “I sincerely hope that this general suspension all over the country will prove 
beneficial to us miners,” he wrote, “for if it doesn’t, I don’t know what is to become of 
us.”23 
                                               
19 “Irish American,” letter to the editor, UMWJ, March 15, 1894; “A Miner’s Widow,” letter to the editor, 
“Funny Reading in their Pay Envelopes,” JKL, March 8, 1894. 
20 “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “A few Plain Truths,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 
21 W. L., letter to the editor, “A Delegate,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 
22 Walter S. Scott, letter to the editor, “Iowa News,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894; T. B. McGregor, letter to the 
editor, “McGregor’s News,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894. 
23 “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “A few Plain Truths,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 
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Such ambivalence stretched throughout the miners’ ranks. In many places, a small 
majority favored the decision to join the strike, so that although most miners honored the 
strike, not all agreed with it. Delegates to the Iowa state convention voted to join the 
strike by a vote of 66 to 58.24  For others, the timing of the strike seemed wrong. Miner 
“Blind Robin” suggested that the strike commence a week earlier to prevent operator 
stockpiling while others pushed for the miners to quit work on May 1 when their yearly 
wage contract expired. Traditionally, striking on May 1 was a way to negotiate a new 
wage contract with the company for the upcoming year. If the miners did not agree to the 
terms the company offered under the new contract, they would not work until the contract 
was resolved. But in 1894, most miners accepted that the low wages came more from the 
overstocked coal market than operators’ unwillingness to pay higher wages. The 
suspension, therefore, was an effort to deplete the nation’s coal supply and elevate coal 
prices high enough to restore miners’ wages to the 1893 scale of 70 cents per ton, not a 
negotiating tactic against their employers as a strike was typically used.25 Consequently, 
even if an operator was willing to pay the 1893 scale, the miners were forbidden to accept 
the offer. The suspension would only end when the UMW Executive Board declared it 
over. No local settlements or loading coal for any reason would be tolerated, regardless of 
the wage amount. All miners would work for the same price or not at all.26  
                                               
24 When this vote carried, the delegates re-voted to make the strike decision unanimous. W. L., letter to the 
editor, “A Delegate,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 
2525 The bituminous coal scale was set according to Pennsylvania prices and adjusted accordingly by region, 
the 1893 scale for southern Midwest states in the Indiana and Illinois competitive regions, would have been 
around 75 cents per ton. In regions like Lewis Station, Missouri, it would have been around 85 cents per 
ton. John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Clinton, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; F. W. Koehler, letter to the 
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26 Proceedings of the 1894 Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “Official Report,” UMWJ, 
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But not all miners agreed. Indiana delegates to the 1894 UMW Convention 
initially voted against the suspension with the intention of finishing out the 1893 
contract.27 For the delegates and many of the miners they represented, striking before 
May 1 meant breaking their contract and going back on their word. For others, it meant 
they would sacrifice extra weeks of pay when the mines were running full time for the 
first time in months. Although they remained overwhelmingly non-union, miners in the 
Indiana block district favored the suspension but voted 726 to 1349 in favor of not 
joining until May 1. Even local union leadership was divided over when to walk out. 
Most in favor of carrying out the contract, Indiana Secretary John Kennedy observed, 
“favored restricting themselves to two days per week—that being as much or more than 
they have worked for the last four months.” Miners in LaSalle, Illinois, likewise decided 
to continue working until the contract expired until nearby Spring Valley miners marched 
to the LaSalle mines to convince them to stop.28 
To many miners’ surprise, the strike began as a success. Although the UMW only 
had roughly 13,000 miners in its ranks, mostly concentrated in Ohio, the non-union 
miners’ own frustrations allowed them to join the strike, even if they would not join the 
union.29 By May 1, roughly 125,000 miners were idle and more followed in the following 
days.30 Miners throughout the nation reported marches to neighboring towns to convince 
                                               
27 When their motion to wait until the contract expired lost, an Indiana delegate suggested the Convention 
vote again on the suspension issue, on this vote all Indiana delegates voted in favor of the suspension, 
making the decision unanimous. Proceedings of the 1894 Convention of the United Mine Workers of 
America, “Official Report,” UMWJ, April 19, 1894. 
28 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, April 26, 1894; Old 
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more miners to join the strike. Missouri and Iowa almost entirely shut down their 
industries, Indiana and Illinois shut down by three-fourths, with more expected. Ohio, 
Alabama, Indian Territory, and New Mexico slowed their production to a crawl. Such 
overwhelming support, “Makeshift” of Bevier, Missouri, noted, was “something unusual 
for Bevier to do.”31 Upon traveling through the partially-unionized Kentucky mines, J. 
Carter, like dozens of other union organizers, found the miners’ faith in the UMW 
revived as the strike continued. “Even the women here are helping us,” he wrote 
excitedly, “they say they will desert their men if they go back to the old wages.”32 By 
May 10, John McBride proudly announced that within five days “there will not be 5,000 
bituminous coal miners at work in the whole country.”33After years of defeat, the 
overwhelming success of the national suspension inspired new hope among the miners, 
causing thousands to believe for the first time that national solidarity was not only 
possible, but within reach. 
Yet, not all mines were at a standstill. Mines in Earlington, Kentucky ran full 
time, mostly with black miners who had no interest in aiding the UMW-led suspension 
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and instead filled southern Indiana contracts.34 “If there is any possible way to have those 
miners lay down their tools, I would like for some one to suggest the plan, for we have 
done all we can do,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote of the working mines.35 In other 
regions, farmers abandoned their fields for the mines, unwilling to turn away high-paying 
work, even during the normally busy summer farming months. “[The miners] done 
everything they could to persuade them to quit work a couple of weeks, and put in their 
time cultivating their farms,” John Kennedy wrote, “but as there was nothing human to 
them except their shape of course they could not be persuaded to quit work.”36  
Such problems were not isolated to Indiana and Kentucky. Virginia, Maryland, 
and substantial portions of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Colorado all refused 
to join the suspension.37  Missouri miner Philip Veal claimed that most of Kansas ignored 
the suspension because the state’s organizers, like M. L. Walters, ordered them to remain 
at work. “The miners in Kansas in most places have seceded from the union under Mr. 
Walters, their leader (which Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot must envy),” Veal 
wrote.38 According to him, Walters told the miners that “Kansas was not invited to join 
the national movement,” and that the suspension would only benefit the eastern mines.39 
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Even when Missouri miners marched across the state line to encourage the miners to quit, 
they were met by a crowd of angry miners, wives, and strikebreaker-sympathizers who 
chased the strikers out of the state.40   
Though the number of men who refused to work was higher than expected, they 
were not enough to shut down national coal production.  Pennsylvania and Kansas fields 
shipped coal to railroad depots across the country while Kentucky and other non-
suspended mine regions began sending their coal to fill the Chicago market demand. 
Dozens of striking miners and wives in coal towns throughout Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana 
stopped trains and uncoupled coal cars to sidetrack them, but railroad workers, 
unsympathetic to the coal suspension, quickly rehooked the cars and continued their trip 
to Chicago. Nothing, it seemed, would prevent coal from going back into the market, 
especially as several state governors ordered troops to keep the trains running.41  
Meanwhile, dozens of operators throughout the nation, eager to turn a high profit 
while the majority of the mines remained out, appealed to their employees to return to 
work, offering the scale price and, at times, even more than the miners asked. By May 5, 
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hundreds of miners, having suffered for months, accepted the offer and returned to work 
while others remained torn between honoring the strike and accepting the 70 cents per ton 
that the miners had already declared as their goal. “I must say that it is useless for Bevier 
miners to stay out any longer,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote, asking the UMW 
Executive Board what they should do. “[T]he men are getting restless now seeing all 
other mines working and we idle. I do not know what they are going to do, they want to 
work and are afraid to work, for they don’t want to do anything wrong if they can help 
it.”42 
Concerns like Blackbird’s prompted UMW leaders to reconsider their position. 
Between the growing number of miners abandoning the strike and the increasingly 
violent hostilities between the miners and strikebreakers, it seemed wise to settle quickly 
rather than hold out any longer.43 UMW leaders called for a special convention, but 
warned all miners that the UMW would not be able to reimburse travel expenses. If 
miners wished to send a delegate, they had to pay for his travel. The expense garnered 
from the May Special Convention and the difficulty of getting all delegates to Columbus 
in time made it clear that the miners would not be able to hold another special 
convention. Consequently, when the delegates failed to settle on a scale, they passed a 
resolution allowing the Executive Board to settle on the delegates’ behalf. Within a 
month, McBride and the Board settled with the operators, but not for the 70 cents the 
miners and delegates expected. Instead, McBride and the national officers ordered the 
miners back to work for 60 cents per ton.44 
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43 “Secretary McBryde,” UMWJ, June 21, 1891. 
44The UMW officers’ actions fit with what Bruce Laurie called “prudential unionism,” or increasing 
caution in labor goals and agendas in an effort to make gains without risking union strength. In this case, 
226 
 
UMW officers claimed to share in the disappointment of not securing the 70 cent 
scale, but nonetheless insisted on calling the settlement a victory.  “Under all the 
circumstances I think you have done remarkably well,” Terence Powderly wrote to 
UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde. He, like other officials wanted the miners to 
“have the good sense to accept the terms you have won.” 45 But many miners saw little to 
celebrate. To those who remained faithful during the suspension, the settlement was no 
victory, but, as miner “Incog” wrote, a “great fizzle.”46 Miners who returned to work 
early on the 70 cent scale faced reductions to the new settlement rate whereas those who 
stood by the strike and refused to work despite the high wage offers were furious that 
they sat idle when they could have been earning much more had they abandoned the 
strike. “[W]e are beaten, and that badly, by ourselves, after having been idle only two 
months, when the country was about paralyzed for the want of coal, trains laid off, 
factories closing, mills shutting down, everybody in this great country brought to realize 
that they cannot do without the coal miner,” Alfred Broad of Illinois wrote, “Will we ever 
be so near victory again?”47  
The frustration Broad expressed was but one part of the rank and file outcry that 
came from the settlement. Thousands of miners believed the national officers overstepped 
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their authority in settling the strike on terms not approved by the miners. “To simply say 
that we don’t like the settlement signed by our officials would not give the readers to 
understand just how bitter the dose is for us to swallow,” Indiana miner W. J. 
Winterbottom wrote. Although the miners in his region returned to work as ordered, 
many Indiana miners believed that the officers “abused the power delegated to them at 
the Cleveland convention.” As it stood, Winterbottom noted that in his region at least, 
“Feeling against our officers who signed the compromise runs high, with no sign of 
abatement; nothing short of their resignation and its acceptance will satisfy us.”48 His 
assessment reflected the sentiments of thousands of Indiana miners. Within four days of 
the settlement announcement, miners in Sullivan County, one of the state’s densest 
mining districts, immediately called for a special state convention to discuss the UMW 
leaders’ actions.49 Dunkerly “had no right whatever to sign that scale without first 
consulting his constituents,” the miners declared in their resolutions. Moreover, they 
insisted, all national officers and district presidents “have violated the trust reposed in 
them by the miners of the bituminous districts of America” and “crippled our greatest 
chances of success in the greatest and only true fight of our lives….” With that, the 
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miners asked for the resignations of Dunkerly and the national officers who signed the 
scale and announced that they would “continue this fight until we get last year’s price.”50   
 The Indiana miners succeeded in removing Dunkerly from office, even though the 
convention was called so quickly that many miners outside of Sullivan County had not 
yet even learned of the settlement, let alone the convention called in response to it.51 Yet, 
as they learned of the special convention, more locals endorsed its outcome. “The 
removal of President Dunkerly has met with general approval throughout this district,” 
W. J. Winterbottom reported, insisting that anyone who condemned the coup was a traitor 
to the UMW.52 Winterbottom’s sentiments were confirmed throughout the state in a 
second special convention called to allow miners throughout the state participate in the 
decisions. Although the miners accepted the new scale under protest, they refused to 
reinstate Dunkerly and continued to request the national officers’ resignations. Their 
actions demonstrated that while they would tolerate low pay, an untrustworthy officer 
was unacceptable.53 
 The only significant exception to the Indiana miners’ favor of overthrowing 
Dunkerly was the Indiana block district where miners endorsed the national officers’ 
settlement decision and condemned Dunkerly’s removal. By then, the block miners had a 
tenuous history with state officers, frequently arguing that the state officers looked after 
bituminous interests at the expense of the block. Lamenting that “it was an evil day for 
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the miners of Clay Co. when we allowed our charter to be absorbed by [NTA] 135,” the 
block district seceded from Indiana District Eleven. With the national officers’ blessing, 
formed its own UMW district, District Eight. “[I]n the name of common sense, why 
should we be taxed to pay men that we would not recognize, believing that they [the 
Indiana District Eleven officers] not only violated our constitution, but violated every 
sense of honor, equity, and justice?” block district President Samuel Adams asked in his 
defense of the new district formation.54 
 The fracture that caused state and local districts’ rebellions indicated the 
hostilities that ran throughout the nation’s coalfields after the suspension. Illinois miners, 
like those in other locations, resolved that even though they believed the officers acted 
within their authority to make the settlement, they would disregard the officers’ 
settlement and continue the fight for the 1893 scale.55 “John McBride is the greatest 
scoundrel on earth, and Penna and Fahy have been consigned to hades long ago,” one 
southern Illinois miner wrote on behalf of the non-union men who were UMW members 
before the strike.56 They were not alone. Soon after the settlement, miners felt doubly 
betrayed by charges that McBride and other officers had “sold out” the miners by 
accepting bribes to end the strike. Not only had the officers overstepped their defined 
roles, but if the rumors were true, they accepted money from operators while doing so. “If 
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that be true it is a scathing comment on the miners who put him in office,” miner wife 
Laurene Gardner wrote of McBride, noting that this was not the first time he was charged 
with dishonesty toward the miners. “As for Phil,” she continued, “I haven’t the slightest 
doubt of his sale.” Her claim that Penna did not care for the miners was shared by an 
“army of detractors” throughout the coal districts.57 Her assertion was not wrong. A mass 
meeting of over 1,000 outraged miners in Ohio resolved to continue the fight for the scale 
and requested the resignations of the entire UMW Executive Board that signed the 
compromise.58 In other Ohio regions, miners simply praised their state president, A. A. 
Adams for refusing to sign the compromise and continued their fight.59 Missouri miner 
“Justice” voiced the complaint of many Missouri miners when he condemned McBride 
for the settlement that benefited no miner, least of all those in Missouri. “East of the 
Mississippi river are all that were considered when it came to a settlement,” he wrote. 
Delegates to the Missouri-Kansas Special Convention echoed his complaint. During the 
strike, the UMW did nothing about the Kansas strikers who proved detrimental to the 
Missouri suspension effort. The delegates’ frustration at such disregard was enough for 
them to declare that no national officers had authority in Missouri-Kansas District 
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Fourteen any longer. Rather, they ordered “that the legislative power be placed in the 
hands of the local unions.”60  
The UMW’s 1894 claimed victory over the coal industry, then, did little more 
than divide the organization’s ranks not only against the national officers, but also along 
state lines as locals rejected national authority. But local rule did not work in a 
decentralized national market. With the national officers unable to establish the scale the 
miners wanted and the miners unwilling to accept the scale set, the state conventions’ 
resolutions to fight for a better price seemed logical, but not practical. Those who 
resumed work at the 60 cent scale stood at odds against those who remained out for the 
70 cent scale.61 Worse, miners hopeful for a better settlement soon found employers 
unwilling to negotiate or hire anyone associated with such an organization. Although the 
practice of blacklisting union men had long been implemented in the coalfields, it grew 
more widespread as miners looked to return to the mines after the suspension, causing 
local unions and assemblies throughout the southern Midwest to shrink as they 
surrendered their union cards to return to the shafts.62 Their strike effort was not 
successful at securing the miners’ desires or ensuring their dedication to the UMW, 
despite officers’ claims of victory. It did, however, powerfully demonstrate the UMW’s 
potential strength, which lay not in its membership, but in the organization’s ability to 
                                               
60 Although the convention was for the entire Missouri-Kansas District, nearly all delegates were from 
Missouri since most of Kansas had left the UMW. In the course of the convention, delegates also decided 
they would have no further interaction with the Kansas miners. T. B. McGregor and George H. Chapman, 
UMW Missouri-Kansas District Fourteen Special Convention Official Report, “Official Report,” UMWJ, 
June 28, 1894. 
61 M. J. O’Neil, letter to the editor, “As to the Pittsburg Scale,” NLT, June 28, 1894; Jensen, Winning of the 
Midwest, 247, 249. 
62  W. J. Reynolds, letter to the editor, “An Iowa Man,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894; “Peace,” letter to the editor, 
“Lucas, Ia.,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894; T. Howells, letter to the editor, “Braceville, Il.,” UMWJ, August 9, 
1894; W. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “The Blacklist,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895 1895 (date listed 
incorrectly as January 10 on the first page of this issue); “Big Foot,” letter to the editor, “Maynard, O.,” 
UMWJ, January 17, 1895.  
232 
 
mobilize those outside the order.63 Such ability increased operators’ concern for the 
UMW even as miners’ faith in it waned. 
 
Unrest 
The UMW’s ability to attract non-union miners to the cause tapped into a larger 
movement taking place among producers. By 1894 the alliance between farmers and 
laborers to challenge the systems that oppressed them had gathered steam throughout the 
South and Midwest.64 The ongoing depression and elected officials’ seeming indifference 
to solving the problem added to the unrest in the nation’s coal and grain fields. For some, 
the People’s Party seemed the best option to confront questions regarding railroad power, 
banking, and finance. Most producers, however, stopped short of fully joining the 
People’s Party movement. Like the thousands of miners who joined the UMW strike 
without joining the union, producers subscribed to the general frustrations voiced by the 
People’s Party without committing to the third party. Indeed, as bituminous miners 
prepared for their first nationwide coal strike, Ohio businessman and currency reformer 
Jacob Coxey set out for Washington D.C. voicing the frustrations of hundreds of 
thousands of farmers and workers who simply could no longer make ends meet. His 
demands for government assistance in securing higher farm profits and fair paying jobs 
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resonated with both agriculture and industry.65 Surveying the low number of union 
membership in the weeks leading up to the 1894 suspension, one northern Illinois miner 
pointed to Coxey as inspiration. “Let us… be like Mr. Coxey,” he wrote, “start out with 
the intention to get there, and we will find the people of the whole country will be with 
us.”66 
The miner’s claim not only described the UMW’s initial success with the 1894 
suspension, but also the broader legacy of resistance during the 1894 summer. Just weeks 
after the miners’ suspension began and days after Coxey reached Washington, the 
American Railway Union (ARU) launched a strike against the Pullman Car Company. 
Led by Eugene V. Debs, an already well-known organizer who hailed from the Indiana 
coalfields, the ARU enjoyed the support from coal miners in nearly every district of the 
southern Midwest. Coxey and other reformers may have wanted to classify these events 
as a collective push from the “Army of the Commonweal,” but as the UMW’s 
overwhelming body of non-union strikers demonstrated, such a push was far from united. 
Still, even though the efforts did not represent a formal collective push under a common 
head, they did reveal a broader sense of unrest that came up from the grass roots during 
particularly difficult economic hardship.67  
This trend became more apparent in the 1894 election when neither farmers nor 
laborers united behind the People’s Party campaign. In addition to longstanding party 
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loyalties and beliefs that the ballot box was not the ideal means to change the ongoing 
circumstances, even those who supported Populist ideals questioned whether the People’s 
Party’s goals were attainable.68 “We will never again see the day when wheat will be 
worth $1 a bushel,” Democrat Hermann Lieb stated to the German residents of Decatur, 
Illinois. “The reason is that the Argentine republic is now unloading in Liverpool sixty 
millions of bushels of wheat against the five millions they used to send.” Nothing the 
Populists could do would change how supply and demand functioned in either the wheat 
or coal industries, he insisted. Illinois Germans, then, would do better “to vote straight 
democratic this time at least.”69 Such claims held sway among thousands of producers 
throughout the southern Midwest who were uncertain whether the People’s Party, much 
like their unions, was strong enough to bring about the changes it desired.70 Such 
divisions among producers remained steadfast in the 1894 election, with Populists 
making small gains in pockets throughout the southern Midwest, but falling short of 
forging any sort of farmer-labor coalition strong enough to sweep political offices.71 
Farmers and laborers shared common angst and employed common forms of resistance 
against the forces that oppressed them, but their efforts in the southern Midwest were too 
decentralized to unite effectively.72 
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  These divisions, dissatisfaction, and unrest reached into other producer 
organizations. Dozens of locals abandoned the Knights of Labor as leadership seemed 
unable or unwilling to address rank and file concerns.73 Although the UMW’s dual 
relationship with the AFL and Knights of Labor had always been difficult to balance, the 
relationship between the UMW and the Knights’ general leadership continued to decline 
in the months after the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor.74 An official 
Knight investigation uncovered that Knights General Secretary-Treasurer John Hayes had 
misrepresented NTA 135 numbers and dues payments in his books in an effort to thwart 
the UMW and bring all UMW miners, including those of the National Progressive Union, 
under the Knights’ exclusive control.75 
Although McBride and Powderly both vehemently insisted that the UMW was 
innocent of the charges presented at the 1892 General Assembly and that UMW officers 
were loyal to the Order, doubts remained. 76  Hayes, McBride declared, “is now and 
always was an implacable and unscrupulous enemy of the United Mine Workers and their 
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interests.”77 Powderly reinforced this claim at the 1893 Knights of Labor’s General 
Assembly, noting that he “felt mortified to learn that while acting under information 
which I had every reason to believe to be genuine I had written that part of my address, 
and I regret having done so very much.”78 However, even as he issued his declaration 
that there was no doubt of the UMW’s loyalty to the Knights, the Knights made it clear 
they were no longer loyal to him. Internal dissention riddled the Knights’ ranks long 
before 1893 and when charges of impropriety surfaced indicating that Powderly had used 
the Order for personal gain, Powderly’s enemies, including a faction led by Hayes, 
unseated Powderly as General Master Workman at the November 1893 General 
Assembly, replacing him with James Sovereign of Iowa.79  
 Such a coup set the tone for 1894, fitting with the national upheaval that caused 
Coxey to march, Populists to form a third party, and the miners and railroad workers to 
shut down the nation through strikes. It made claims of union leader corruption even 
more credible and provided a pathway for the UMW miners to push for resignations from 
their own leadership the following summer. That fall, Powderly and his sympathizers 
attempted to launch their own coup within the Knights in the name of “purifying the 
Order.” NTA 135 and other Powderly supporters would overthrow the Sovereign-Hayes 
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faction at the 1894 Knights of Labor General Assembly. For very different reasons, union 
leadership was as frustrated and restless as their rank and file.80  
 
Cast Out 
 The tumult that cast out Powderly and caused miners to call for their officers’ 
resignations in late 1893 and the summer of 1894, was only the beginning of the upheaval 
that ran throughout the mid-1890s. As miners demanded the UMW officers’ resignations 
and the UMW officers conspired with Powderly to reinstate his faction in the Knights of 
Labor, Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes made his own plans in the name of 
cleaning house.  NTA 135, known to the miners as the “secret branch” of the UMW, was 
the Knights of Labor’s arm in the UMW for nearly five years by the time of the Knights 
of Labor’s November 1894 General Assembly in New Orleans. By then, however, the 
Knights membership, like many other unions, including the UMW’s in the mid-1890s, 
was in a steep decline and the UMW’s increasingly close relationship with the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) made many Knights leaders uneasy. In addition, it was no 
secret that the miners’ delegates were part of the group planning to reinstate the Powderly 
faction at New Orleans. Powderly claimed he would refuse the General Master Workman 
position if it was offered, but remained closely apprised of the Knights’ affairs.81 By 
October, the former General Master Workman informed his sympathizers of Hayes’s plan 
for the Sovereign-Hayes faction to retain control of the Knights. “Every District and State 
Assembly supposed to be friendly to me, or opposed to them, that has elected a 
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representative to the New Orleans session is to be disfranchised,” Powderly warned.82   
Still, he wanted as many supporters as possible to attend in order to make a unified stand 
against Hayes, even if they no longer represented their home orders. “John McBryde [sic] 
should be at New Orleans if he has to walk, even if they [the miners] have thrown him 
out,” Powderly stressed to UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde.83  
 No one was surprised, then, when John Hayes renewed his 1892 charges against 
NTA 135. In fact, Powderly traveled to New Orleans in anticipation, ready to stop the 
proceedings with a court order at the first sign of illegal action. But Hayes denied the 
miners’ delegates as well as those in LA 300 a seat, convincing the other delegates, with 
the help of Daniel DeLeon and the Knights’ socialist faction, to forbid them from 
entering the Assembly with a vote of 25 to 37. The decision to bar the miners divided the 
Assembly. Knowing this, the expelled delegates hoped that the 25 who claimed the act 
was unwarranted would convince other delegates to turn against Hayes and reinstate the 
miners in time to vote for the executive officers. But Hayes had enough support to hold 
the officer election before the Assembly could move against him. 84  “Come to think of 
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it,” Powderly later reflected on New Orleans and the election, “hayes [sic], was not the 
only rascal, he was simply preeminent in the role that was all.”85  
Such a line between honest officials and rascals was not as clearly defined to rank 
and file miners. In the weeks following the New Orleans Assembly, local assemblies 
received a barrage of circulars from the Knights and UMW. On behalf of the Knights, 
Hayes published the charges against the UMW officers and ordered that NTA 135 be 
reorganized solely under the Knights. UMW officers refuted the charges and insisted that 
reorganizing NTA 135 outside the UMW would dissolve the UMW and return to the days 
of the divided and fighting miners’ unions.86 “Judging from the letters I am receiving 
from the local assemblies of the United Mine Workers of this state the men are at a loss 
to know what to do,” Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy wrote in his weekly report. 
“They claim they are receiving circulars from the general assembly and circulars from the 
national office and that they do not understand them,” he continued, noting that he was 
equally confused. “I am not furnished with copies of all those circulars, and even if I 
were, I do not know that I would be able to advise.”87  
Rank and file confusion came from the ongoing debate over which leaders were 
worthy of the miners’ trust. Already uneasy by the 1894 settlement, Hayes’s claims of 
impropriety within organized labor beginning with his 1893 overthrow of Powderly and 
subsequent attack on UMW officers intensified an already ongoing debate regarding 
which of labors’ leaders were honest. As UMW delegates voiced their outrage over the 
New Orleans Assembly, the AFL faced its own upset. Nominated by Phil Penna, UMW 
President John McBride ran against Samuel Gompers for the AFL presidency, defeating 
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him with the help of the AFL’s growing socialist faction. In the AFL, the coup signaled a 
push toward political action not possible under Gompers’s direction and was another 
indicator of the growing divisions and unrest within organized labor as a whole. To the 
miners, however, it furthered the already present claim that McBride’s actions always 
benefited his own interests more than those of his rank and file. Hayes’s cries that the 
UMW was aligned more closely to the AFL than the Knights found new ground as 
McBride handed the UMW Presidency over to Phil Penna in January 1895.88 
These misgivings came to a head as the UMW prepared for its own national 
convention. In addition to holding the annual UMW elections, Knights delegates to the 
February 1895 convention would also decide whether to side with the UMW or the 
Knights of Labor. Residual anger over the 1894 settlement loomed large as miners 
prepared for the convention, knowing that the officers who signed the settlement were the 
same officers embroiled in the ongoing UMW-Knights conflict and the same officers 
seeking reelection at the 1895 convention. The fact that these same men were involved in 
so many controversies caused many miners to question if it would not “be best us to have 
a new set of officers entirely composed of men that have not held any office in the 
national before?”89 Noting that resentment over the 1894 settlement remained strong in 
                                               
88 Ironically, Hayes’s partnership with Daniel DeLeon and socialists within the Knights helped bar UMW 
from the New Orleans General Assembly. Gompers’s rejection of using the AFL to pursue political aims, 
however, caused AFL members of the Socialist Labor Party to support McBride despite misgivings many 
had toward Populist supporters. “Gompers Goes Out,”  Topeka Daily Capital, December 18, 1894; 
“President John McBride,” NLT, December 27, 1894; Postel, Populist Vision, 208-9; Pierce, Striking with 
the Ballot, 147, 178; Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 257; Sanders, Roots of Reform,  83-5; Weir, 
Knights Unhorsed, 177.  
89 Sim Cooper, letter to the editor, “Good of the Order,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895 (quote); “Young 
American,” letter to the editor, “DuQuoin, Perry Co., Ill.,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; David Mason, letter 
to the editor, “Brother Mason,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; A. A. Adams to Phil Penna, open letter reprinted 
in “Adams’s Answer,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Phil Penna to A. A. Adams, open letter printed in “Penna 
to Adams,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; “A Looker On,” letter to the editor, “Discipline,” UMWJ, February 
7, 1895; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “What R. L. Thinks,” UMWJ, March 14, 1895; “Incog,” letter to 
the editor, “Courage Brothers,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895. 
241 
 
his district, Indiana miner Sim Cooper suggested that Phil Penna decline the nomination 
for president. “Now, Mr. Editor, Phil is not the only man by a great deal,” Cooper 
continued. “Secretary McBryde is in the same box, and all that signed the compromise 
last June, and I think that Pat [McBryde] ought to decline, too, and let us see if the order 
can run one year with a new set of officers.”90 
 Cooper and the other union miners’ demands for new officers did not come from 
frustration with the 1894 settlement alone, but officers’ seeming preoccupation with 
affairs that had little to do with the average miner. Many miners believed the “trouble 
between our delegates to the General Assembly and the general officers of the K. of. L,” 
had no bearing on local affairs. In fact, few state officials and local correspondents even 
commented on the events in New Orleans or the fight between UMW and Knight 
leadership that followed. Instead their debates centered on whether their union dues were 
too high, if they should establish a defense fund for strikes, what to do about the constant 
reductions, and how to reach the eastern European miners alienated from the union.91 
These were the issues the miners wanted addressed, but found that the officers’ 
“jealousies,” desires for control, and personal grudges came at the expense of these 
concerns, just as they had in years past. “It seems to me that when labor officials devote 
their time fighting each other for supremacy, that the interests of their constituents are 
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sadly neglected,” miner “T. T.” wrote. Such a revival of the old ‘rule or ruin’ policy, they 
believed, would only cause further injury to the already hurting rank and file.92 
“The sooner we are rid of such officers the better it will be for the laboring men of 
this and every other country,” T. T. declared speaking for miners throughout the nation.93  
These concerns came not only from the fighting or seeming dishonesty, but from the 
neglect that many miners felt while the officials waged their war against each other. 
“Think of it!” T. T. exclaimed. “Ten thousand miners in Ohio on the verge of starvation. 
Fifteen thousand in Pennsylvania attempting to avert a reduction in the present rate of 
mining. And yet we have some labor leaders who appear anxious to precipitate a war of 
extermination between the K. of L. and Federation miners. Shame on such men.”94 
T.T.’s claim highlighted how far removed officers were from their rank and file, 
but he was not the only miner that noticed. Rather, many miners pointed to the officers’ 
salaries to demonstrate officers’ disconnect from rank and file concerns, placing the 
salary question as another of the items to be discussed at the 1895 UMW convention. 
Although wages continually declined and UMW numbers shrank, officers’ salaries, 
which came from UMW funds, never decreased.95 Indeed, even the 1894 settlement 
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made by the officers on behalf of the miners did not affect officer salaries, causing one 
Illinois miner to quip that union miners were “paying officers a salary to neglect their 
duties.”96 When union leader Tim O’Malley defended the officers, claiming that they did 
not accept their pay during the strike and instead donated “several hundred dollars” to the 
strike effort, miner Louis Goaziou quickly responded that this was only further damning 
evidence that the officers earned too much. “What about the miner who don’t earn $1000 
in three years and suffered the pangs of hunger to uphold a principle? I know some who 
fed themselves on boiled bark and leaves sooner than to give up the fight,” the miner 
continued, adding sarcastically, “But the well fed officer who goes a little into his own 
pocket, knowing very well that he will get it back, that’s the real hero, and I suppose the 
hungry miner who foots up all the bills, he is a darn fool.”97 Goaziou was not the only 
miner to observe the wealth gap between union officers and their rank and file. By early 
1895, one group of Ohio miners found that officers already made five times more than 
the average miner in their district and another reduction for the miners was pending. They 
believed paying the officers flat salaries would not only bankrupt the miners and their 
union, but also make the leaders complacent. “We believe that the nearer the officers can 
be kept on an equal footing with those they represent the better it will be for us,” the Ohio 
miners declared.98 To them, union affiliation meant little if the unions could not aid the 
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miners, but time and again officers seemed unconcerned with the instability of the union 
as though they did not realize how close the UMW was to dissolution. 
“This neglect or overconfidence in our solidarity of unionism has led us into a 
snare,” Ohio official William H. Crawford cautioned while surveying the UMW’s 
precarious condition. The union may have successfully called out all the nation’s miners, 
but only to its own detriment, especially as officers continued to engage in petty fights. 
“Men have lost confidence in their officials and can not trust one another,” he continued, 
“This is the gigantic evil in our midst.”99 If the union’s leadership did not heed the 
miners’ concerns, he and others believed, there would be little need for them or their 
orders, regardless of whether they won their fights.  
This dysfunction coincided with the already growing tension between UMW 
national officers and miners west of the Mississippi River after the 1894 suspension. Like 
most other regions, western states faced wage reductions upon resuming work, but their 
trouble came from two distinct causes. First, the depressed coal prices caused mines to 
increase production in hopes of selling greater volumes to make up for profit loss. For the 
first time, Iowa mines mined enough coal to compete with Illinois and Missouri mines for 
the Chicago and railroad markets at the same time that southern Illinois looked to take a 
bigger portion of the Chicago market as well.100 Western Pennsylvania miners also 
moved to capitalize on the Chicago market and the overwhelmingly non-union region 
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caused wage reductions to cascade through competing mines in Ohio, Illinois, and 
Indiana, regardless of union affiliation.101   
The competition-fueled reductions were compounded with old problems that 
intensified with the economic and agricultural crises. Desperate farmers suffering from 
lowering grain prices and western silver miners hurt by the silver legislation all sought 
relief in the coal mines. While some simply entered the larger shafts as diggers, others 
used their land to open their own mines. “Every farmer in Bellville who wishes to, can 
have his own coal mine, and it is not uncommon there to see the ‘old man’ and his boys 
digging, and the old woman and girls hoisting the coal with an old gin horse, and thus 
producing very cheap coal indeed,” Illinois union leader James Flynn observed. Such 
enterprises, or cooperatives where miners leased farmland from local farmers to open 
their own mines, dug their coal with no overhead and little debt, selling their coal far 
below the scale. Although their production was less, there were enough farmers, 
cooperatives, and small coal companies to force larger mines to push their wages down to 
compete. But by early 1895, the larger corporations operated with higher overhead costs 
and larger debts, making it difficult to sustain their corporations on the meager profit 
margins that fed cooperative miners’ families.102 Consequently, operators in Iowa 
appealed to the UMW to force the smaller and cooperative mines to adhere to the scale 
rate.103  
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But the UMW did little to address the miners’ concerns. Indeed, Missouri mine 
worker “Cornfield Sailor” observed that although his state remained loyal to the UMW 
throughout the 1894 strike, the organization did little to save them from the constant 
injuries sustained from union and non-union miners in neighboring states.  Kansas miners 
abandoned the UMW and returned to work, injuring the Missouri miners’ strike while the 
Oskaloosa settlement that Penna described ultimately caused Missouri miners to accept a 
reduction. “The reduction that those places [in Iowa] are getting now is only the 
consequence of former reductions at Bevier [Missouri],” Cornfield Sailor explained. In 
his mind, the trouble came from the UMW’s inability to regulate the mines west of the 
Mississippi. Preoccupied with the larger producers competing in the eastern markets, the 
UMW rarely bothered to address the problems in western mines competing for railroad 
markets.104  
As the February 1895 UMW national convention neared, however, UMW 
President Phil Penna looked to Iowa with newfound interest. With rank and file miners 
pushing for a formal investigation into his role in the 1894 settlement and the growing 
threat that the Knights miners would vote to break from the UMW, Penna seized the 
opportunity to cast the UMW in a positive light. Although he attended the Iowa state 
convention where miners discussed the problem at length, Penna sent an open letter to 
Master Workman James Sovereign blaming him and the Knights of Labor for the wage 
decline. According to Penna, miners in Des Moines, who had recently abandoned the 
UMW by transferring their NTA 135 charter to the Knights of Labor’s Iowa State 
Assembly, were working below UMW scale rates, forcing all miners to accept the same 
                                               
104 “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor “Cornfield Sailor,” UMWJ, May 16, 1895. 
247 
 
reductions.105 Noting that this assembly was under Sovereign’s jurisdiction rather than 
the UMW, Penna challenged Sovereign to “exemplify the ability of the Knights of Labor 
to care for the miners’ interests” by commanding the Des Moines non-UMW Knight 
miners to honor the scale “or admit your inability to do so….”106 Such claims, designed 
to highlight the Knights’ weakness also made light of the problems miners faced and the 
UMW failed to address, particularly in western states. Consequently, by the time Penna 
charged Sovereign with being unable and unfit to care for the Iowa miners, the remaining 
UMW miners west of the Mississippi considered seceding from the UMW to form a 
western miners’ union.107 
 Despite Penna and the national officers’ claims that the Knights ultimatum would 
split a unified order, many miners understood that what remained of the UMW was 
already splintered but those who remained in its ranks desperately willed it to survive. 
The 1895 convention at Columbus, Ohio, then, served as a means to patch wounds, even 
if it could not heal them entirely. Even miner wife Laurene Gardner, who blatantly 
accused Penna of accepting bribes to end the 1894 strike not only encouraged miners to 
put aside differences, but endorsed Penna for president.108 The salary question was 
quietly laid to rest by reducing the president’s salary by three hundred dollars. Penna won 
the presidency, but his reputation remained injured. Although the miners’ committee 
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exonerated Penna and the other officers of the “selling out” charges, even the committee 
unanimously agreed that the officers had “exceeded their authority” and acknowledged 
that McBride did have a suspicious amount of money credited to him at the strike 
settlement.109  At a second meeting, Knight miners voted in favor of seceding from the 
Knights to remain loyal to the UMW. Within weeks, the former Knight miners, along 
with several other trades assemblies, formed the Independent Order of the Knights of 
Labor.110 Led by General Master Workman William Beauchop Wilson, a former UMW 
organizer and delegate at the New Orleans General Assembly, the Independent Order 
would allow Knight miners to retain their dual membership in NTA 135 and the 
UMW.111 
 The outcome of the 1895 convention, though a testament to many miners’ loyalty 
to the UMW, did little to assuage the fractures already present within the order. Furious 
that the officers remained unscathed, Local Union 296 of Ohio submitted resolutions to 
local presses declaring that they were leaving the UMW and encouraging others to follow 
suit. The plan reverberated throughout the state, enough for Ohio UMW leader R. L. 
Davis to express alarm that the UMW was at a breaking point.112 This sentiment was so 
strong in Indiana District Eleven that the delegates at the state convention considered a 
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resolution to leave the UMW and use the ten cents paid in national dues to build a local 
defense fund.113  
Davis and the other officers had good reason to worry about their ranks breaking 
apart. As Wilson and the Independent Order moved to incorporate former Knights into its 
ranks, their actions were matched by Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes, who 
“reorganized” the Knights’ own NTA 135 and called for the former Knight miners’ 
assemblies to return to the order. Eleven delegates representing ten assemblies from Ohio 
and Indiana attended founding meeting, held in Evansville, Indiana, in June 1895.114  
Although it was dismissed by UMW officers, the split was not taken as lightly as 
they implied. Officers insisted the new NTA 135 of the Knights of Labor would be short-
lived, but the frequency of their comments indicates that the number of assemblies 
leaving the weakened UMW was cause for concern. The three assemblies that originally 
seceded from Indiana to form the NTA 135, Knights of Labor, for example, were nearly 
one-quarter of the total locals still paying dues in District Eleven.115 
 The Knights’ reach soon stretched into other states, but their decision to leave the 
UMW for the Knights did not necessarily reflect a preference for Knights procedure over 
the UMW. In fact, the fights between Knight and UMW leadership and even the 
organizational splits were met with little comment or fanfare from the miners. By 1895, 
neither Knights nor the UMW had proven able to adhere to their principles and in most 
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regions, the local assemblies, like local unions, were more concerned with reviving their 
dying locals and finding trustworthy leadership than they were with the ongoing fight 
between organizations.116 The vast number of non-union miners, constant district 
competition, and lack of faith in officers had a greater impact on miners than their union 
affiliation. Indeed, one Pennsylvania assembly under the Independent Order declared that 
the infighting among the officers in the newspapers was tiresome and declared that 
instead of attacking each other, they should organize the miners in whatever organization 
they wished.117   
But if the rank and file miners were unconcerned with the Knight-UMW split, 
their decisions regarding which organization to remain affiliated with after the split 
revealed that hostilities from the 1894 suspension remained strong. NTA 135, Knights of 
Labor’s selection for master workman, former Ohio state president A. A. Adams, left 
little doubt that those who left the UMW to rejoin the Knights did so out of an 
unwillingness to sit under the UMW’s present leadership. By the summer of 1895, 
Adams was a symbol for organizational purity. He became a hero in 1894 by refusing to 
sign the 1894 settlement and openly charged UMW national officers of misconduct. In 
subsequent months, he became the driving force behind the allegations that the officers 
had “sold out” and was the reason the charges were investigated at the 1895 UMW 
convention.118 Adams, then, was the ideal leader for miners unhappy with UMW officers 
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or their exoneration and the Knights of Labor was the most promising organization to 
avoid corruption.119 
 Local assemblies’ decisions to abandon the UMW and Independent Order for the 
revived NTA 135 Knights of Labor were part of a larger rebellion against the UMW 
officers. When miners faced a new wage reduction in spring 1895, UMW miners in Ohio 
and Indiana charged that officers had once again “sold out” the miners and demanded 
state officers’ resignations.120  Summit, Indiana, miners called for the resignation of the 
national officers in addition to their state leaders, prompting UMW President Penna to 
immediately issue a response rejecting their request, claiming the local was three months 
behind in dues.121 If Penna’s claim was true, the Summit local that lodged the charges, 
which faithfully paid its state dues, purposefully withheld dues to the national from the 
time national officers instructed them to accept a reduction. Summit had allies. When 
Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy informed local mine leader W. J. Winterbottom 
that some of the locals in his region of southern Indiana were no longer paying their state 
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dues, Winterbottom did not deny it; instead he remarked that “in all probability they have 
not paid their national tax either.”122 Other regions experienced similar declines, with 
officers everywhere giving listings of locals suspended for not paying dues.123 “When the 
strike ended the union expired,” Illinois District Secretary W. J. Guymon summarized of 
the Illinois districts.124 Miner “Next Week,” agreed, noting that “[t]here are some 32,000 
miners in Illinois and not one in ten is organized,” a far cry from how energetic the union 
had been just a few months earlier. There was no doubt in his mind to the cause as he 
encouraged the miners to revive their locals. If an officer was guilty “of evil doing” they 
should “kick him so far that he cannot get back anymore. But stick to the order yourself,” 
he insisted.125 
Next Week’s assertions indicated that the atrophy labor organizations experienced 
in the mid-1890s did not indicate a lack of faith in unionization as much as it did mistrust 
for union leadership. “[H]ad we a Debs,” one miner posited, “we might claim nine-tenths 
of the miners of our country as members….”126 Miners’ cries for “a Moses” who would 
“lead us out of this wilderness in which we find ourselves” gave way to new 
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253 
 
organizations comprised of miners frustrated with the UMW.127 Miners in Ohio formed 
the Massillon Independent Movement, Indiana became a base for the American Industrial 
Union in Indiana, which planned to make Eugene Debs their president, while Iowa 
formed the Iowa Miners’ Protective Association that former Missouri UMW mine worker 
“Cornfield Sailor” hoped Missouri would emulate.128  
The anger and desperation that drove the miners to refuse to pay dues, reject 
union leadership, or form opposing orders did more than create unrest within 
organizational ranks. The most overwhelming and pressing impact that came out of the 
1894 suspension, settlement, and seeming officer dishonesty was the dramatic decline in 
UMW membership and efficiency. “At our annual convention in 1891 Secretary 
Watchorn reported a membership of a fraction over 34,000. Since that time our 
membership has been on the decline,” Indiana District Eleven Secretary John Kennedy 
wrote angrily. “We have tried for six years to perfect our organization and we are farther 
from the goal than we were five years ago.”129 The fracture and decay of the miners’ 
movement meant that the UMW no longer had any power to influence scale rates or call 
strikes. Although remaining UMW members continued to push for “restriction” or 
limiting the amount of coal produced by only working five and a half days a week, 
leadership cautioned against it, claiming it would only hurt the union more. Only five 
percent of Illinois miners were organized, Indiana barely had one-quarter in the union, 
                                               
127 Editorial, “For several weeks,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895 (quote); “Incog,” letter to the editor, 
“Linton Letter,” UMWJ, November 14, 1895; 
128Cornfield Sailor’s non-union status did not necessarily come from a rejection of the UMW, Instead, he 
became non-union because there was no longer any organization in his region for him to join. D. H. 
Sullivan, letter to the editor, “Denny Sullivan,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895; Michael Ratchford, letter to the 
editor, “President Ratchford,” UMWJ, March 13, 1896; G. W. Purcell, letter to the editor, “President 
Purcell,” UMWJ, August 29, 1895; D. C. [name illegible], letter to the editor, “Opposed to a New 
Organization,” NLT, August 29, 1895; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, 
November 28, 1895; D. E. Jones, “Abuse of the Officers,” UMWJ, July 18, 1895. 
129 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, UMWJ, December 5, 1895. 
254 
 
United Mine Workers’ Journal editor John Kane declared. “Take Pennsylvania and the 
same condition of affairs exists, even to a worse degree. Take West Virginia, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Virginia and Missouri, yes, even Ohio, and every other state whose relations 
to each other are such that what affects one influences the other, and they are all in a 
condition in which the crudest methods of warfare are almost impracticable, not to say 
anything about such a nice instrument as restriction,” he continued, claiming it would be 
better if the miners waited for the union to become strong again. 130 But Kennedy, as well 
as hundreds of the remaining UMW miners, disagreed. “True, if an effort was made in 
the direction of restriction and if we failed we would lose some members,” Kennedy 
observed. “It is equally true if we remain inactive and do nothing we will lose 
members.”131 Miners in Streator, Illinois, agreed, observing that instead of uniting across 
district and state lines miners were “making a fight by themselves, the same as in olden 
days before we were brought in such close competition with one another by improved 
methods of transportation.” Such efforts would only end in failure, they acknowledged, 
but they saw no easy fix. While surveying the UMW’s failures since its formation, the 
Streator miners claimed that “lack confidence in one another and also our officers,” only 
intensified UMW weaknesses, because, they wrote, “instead of building it keeps us 
rebuilding.”132 
In the meantime, there was little the union could do to aid the miners, but sit in 
what Linton, Indiana, miner and former union leader “Incog” called “masterly inactivity,” 
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doing little more than “hoping for better times.” What was the point of being in the union, 
he wondered. “Why just think of it, we are all in the habit of speaking of Earlington 
district (Kentucky) as a blackleg hole and yet those men have not come below 62 ½ cents 
a ton and are now getting 76 cents, and a man can put out as many tons of coal there as he 
can at any mine around Linton.”133 If the miners were going to be masters at inactivity, it 
seemed it would be better if they did so outside the union rather than in it. 
 
If the unions were not active, the miners still were. Under the cover of darkness in 
the late summer of 1896, several masked men burned down the Old Pittsburg Coal 
Company’s mine in Hymera, Indiana.134 Prior to the flames, the Hymera miners were 
locked in a dispute not with the company, but with the neighboring mines over the size of 
the screen used to filter the coal.135 “The lawful screen for this state, or at least the law 
recognized, is 1¼ inch diamond bar,” Kennedy explained. “The screen at Hymera was 1
56
17 inches between diamond bars, and they were nearly always in trouble for the last 
couple of years with these men because of their unfair screen.”136 The difference between 
the two, which was 563  of an inch, drove down coal prices in the Sullivan, Indiana, region 
enough to help trigger a five cent per ton wage reduction in mines throughout the area. 
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But even the formerly thoroughly unionized District Eleven no longer had the power to 
enforce its regulations. 
The other miners in the region walked out on strike when asked to accept the new 
reduction that summer, but Hymera accepted the terms. Most who worked there were 
also farmers and saw no reason to fight a reduction in their supplemental income. They 
continued mining at the newly reduced rate until the fire destroyed everything from the 
tipple to the shaft. “So far, nobody seems to have any idea who done it,” Kennedy 
asserted, insisting that the “deplorable” arson would do more harm to an already 
depressed region. Yet even as he condemned the vigilantes’ actions, Kennedy wanted 
some good to come from the event. Namely, he hoped the company would use its 
insurance money to purchase a new screen compliant with Indiana regulations.137  
The Old Pittsburg Coal Company, however, did not share Kennedy’s vision. The 
company already experienced financial difficulties before the fire and after surveying the 
nearly $50,000 in damages, company executives claimed the mine was not worth 
rebuilding and made plans to leave the region altogether. In the following weeks, the 
Hymera farmer-miners pleaded with the company not only to remain in Hymera, but to 
rebuild the mine as soon as possible. In exchange, some offered money to help cover the 
initial building costs while other farmer-miners promised the company six days of work 
without wages. To everyone’s surprise, the company complied, rebuilt the mine, and 
announced that anyone seeking a spot in the new shaft would first have to give the 
company six days of free labor. “[And] that is not the worst of it,” Kennedy railed, “this 
is to be the rule for a year. Fellow miners, any of you that have six days’ labor to pay for 
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a job at a mine where they are paying less than scale rates… and will promise not to 
claim any of the rights of citizenship, you might be able to get work at Hymera, Ind.” 
Over one hundred men agreed to the company terms.138 
The desperation that ran throughout the southern Midwest corn and coalfields by 
the mid-1890s made situations like that in Hymera far too common. Miners in Spring 
Valley, Illinois, were irate when the city inspector found that the company’s scales 
cheated the miners out of five hundred pounds to each ton. The justice of the peace threw 
out the case because the city inspector had no jurisdiction over the rural mines. The 
situation turned into a race riot later that week when a group of black men shot an Italian 
man while robbing him. In addition to placing a bomb near the mine manager’s home, 
two separate miner mobs charged to the company houses reserved for African American 
miners. The black miners had not only accepted the cheated weight, but worked under the 
scale rate, prompting a mob of “white” miners and a second mob of non-native English 
speaking “foreigners” led by the region’s Italians to ransack the black miners’ living 
quarters, shooting and beating men, women, and children. For nearly two days, black 
miners and their families hid in the woods as the mobs scoured the land with their 
shotguns, “hunting for negroes.”139   
                                               
138By April, the mine had resumed full force, yet miners had not been paid for three weeks. Although the 
company owed them $1,300, it only offered to split $500 between its employees. Within months the 
company declared bankruptcy, demonstrating how hard-pressed even coal companies were to turn a small 
profit. “Notes of the Week,” CTJ, August 12, 1896; “Hymera Mines Change Owners,” Indianapolis News, 
October 14, 1896; J.H. Kennedy, UMWA District Eleven Report, UMWJ, February 18, 1897; “Striking for 
Arrearages in Pay,” Indianapolis News, April 16, 1897; “Mining Outlook in Sullivan County,” Indianapolis 
News, May 17, 1897; “Indiana Miners,” Elwood [Indiana] Daily Record, July 7, 1897; “Indiana Labor 
Commission Report of the Settlement of the Coal Miners’ Strike at Star City and Hymera, Sullivan, 
Indiana, November 30, 1897,” JMP, Box 37,  Folder 4, INSA.  
139 “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Lasalle,” NLT, August 8, 1895; “Mobs at the Mines,” 
NLT, August 8, 1895 (“hunting for negroes”); “Two Mobs in a Riot,” CDT, August 5, 1895; “Rioters to be 
Tried,” DIO, August 17, 1895. 
258 
 
The conditions that caused the Hymera miners to burn down the shaft were the 
same that caused Spring Valley miners to divide along racial lines. Such actions exposed 
the forces that caused rural workers to attack each other as much as their employers. By 
then, the southern Midwest was almost solidly non-union because miners did not believe 
that union affiliation could help them.140  Bituminous miners’ annual income had 
declined from $292 in 1894 to $282 just two years later, making their earnings sixty-eight 
percent of what factory workers earned in 1896.141 Faced with a crippled economy, 
increasing debt and defunct producer organizations, thousands of producers pinned their 
hopes for change on the ballot box, but their efforts there were equally frayed. Just as 
they remained divided over which organization or leader to follow, neither farmers nor 
miners in the South, Midwest, or anywhere could agree on the party or platform that 
would improve their conditions while ethnic divisions further prevented rural producers 
from voting together. Even with a fusion ticket in 1896, they failed to unite on a national 
stage. Instead, miners, like farmers and other rural laborers split their votes between the 
parties.142 Their actions in refusing to vote together, embracing vigilantism, accepting 
depreciated terms like six days of free labor or five hundred pounds of cheated weight 
exemplified the ongoing thought among producers everywhere. They believed they were 
better off looking after their own interests than following an organization or party, even 
when they accepted worse terms than they desired. 
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Chapter 7: Epilogue 
Common Legacies 
 
 
There was never much reason to visit the tiny coal mining town just outside 
“Egypt” until December 7, 1930.  On that day, the number of people in Mt. Olive, 
Illinois, swelled by 4,000 as visitors came to pay respects to one of the miners’ greatest 
champions before she was laid to rest. Mary “Mother” Jones had dedicated sixty years to 
the miners’ unions, first as a volunteer in the late-nineteenth century, and then as a paid 
UMW organizer in 1901. Over the next decades, “the miner’s angel” became famous for 
her involvement in Colorado and West Virginia strikes, but her heart remained with the 
Illinois miners.  Consequently, at her request, her body was forever interred with the 
miners and wives buried at the Union Miners’ Cemetery in Mt. Olive.1 
The union cemetery was first created to hold the bodies of three Mt. Olive miners 
killed during a UMW strike in Virden, Illinois, in 1898 when strikers and their wives 
waged a gunfight against mine guards. Six miners and five guards were killed and their 
bodies were shipped to their hometowns for burial.2 Seen as “murderers” by community 
leaders, the three miners from Mt. Olive were forbidden from being buried in the regular 
cemetery. Unlike the miners of Frontenac, Kansas, just ten years earlier, however, the 
Virden miners were given a proper burial when the UMW purchased a one-acre tract of 
land to place their bodies. By the time Jones made her burial request in 1923, the 
cemetery had become a resting place for dozens of union miners and wives, including 
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“General” Alexander Bradley who marched with Jacob Coxey in 1894 and led the 
“soldier-miners” in the1898 march on Virden.3 Jones wished to be part of this legacy. “I 
hope it will be my consolation when I pass away to feel I sleep under the clay with those 
brave boys,” she wrote, for in her mind, “[t]hey are responsible for Illinois being the best 
organized labor state in America.”4 
Jones’s claim was not wrong. By 1930, the UMW claimed over 160,000 
members.5 Although crippled in 1896, changes in both union and the national economy 
in the months following greatly improved union strength. Phil Penna stepped down from 
the presidency at the end of his 1896 term, becoming superintendent for the coal 
company he partially owned.6 With the last of the leadership who signed the 1894 
agreement out of the UMW executive offices, hundreds of miners who had demanded 
officers’ resignations in 1894 and 1895 considered returning to the union again. 
Meanwhile, the improving economic conditions made it possible for miners to demand 
higher wages for their work. Working as a volunteer UMW organizer, Mother Jones 
joined leaders like Eugene Debs and Samuel Gompers in an aggressive 1897 push to 
revive the union and organize the non-union coalfields. During those months, young 
northern Illinois miner John Mitchell gained fame for brokering peaceful negotiations 
between Illinois miners and operators and bringing “discipline” to a rank and file 
accustomed to local strikes. The union’s organizing momentum intensified as Mitchell 
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unofficially assumed the UMW presidency in 1898, with the UMW making strides in 
negotiating wage agreements with operators, most notably in the 1902 anthracite coal 
strike.7 These successes continued into the twentieth century and dramatically increased 
under the leadership of former southern Iowa grain dealer and miner, John L. Lewis.8 
By the time Jones died, the UMW was one of the strongest labor organizations in 
the United States. Less than six years after the miners laid Jones to rest, 50,000 miners 
returned to her grave to once again pay tribute to Jones by erecting a monument in her 
honor.9 Despite the UMW’s strength in Illinois and in the nation, Illinois miners were far 
from content with their organization.  Rather, the organized miners were divided between 
two vying unions. The miners who built and dedicated the Jones Monument were 
members of the newly-formed Progressive Miners of America (PMA) and its women’s 
auxiliary, a rebel union founded in 1932 by southern Illinois union miners dissatisfied 
with UMW leadership. They claimed that UMW President Lewis “sold out” their 
interests by entering into an agreement with coal operators, including Phil Penna, that 
unfairly reduced Midwestern miners’ wages. The PMA and UMW spent the next several 
years engaged in violent battles throughout the southern Illinois mine fields, breaking 
each other’s strikes and attacking each other through legal battles, in newspapers, and in 
sporadic gun battles resulting in casualties.10 By the time the PMA erected the Jones 
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monument, twenty new names were listed on the monument with Jones and the 1898 
Virden miners who had given their lives for organized labor. According to the 
monument’s inscription, these nineteen miners and one miner’s wife gave their lives in 
the 1930s PMA mine wars, fighting against both the government and the UMW, for “the 
cause of clean unionism in America.”11 
Like Jones herself, the inscription on her grave testified to the complexities of 
labor organizing and how divided loyalties, internal divisions, and conflicts are typically 
understood and remembered. Jones’s career as a labor organizer began long before she 
joined the UMW’s payroll. Like many women involved in the labor movement, she held 
no membership in these early years and because of this, her efforts prior to working as an 
official organizer are easily overlooked. Likewise, the monument constructed in her 
honor was funded and built by union workers who opposed a rival labor organization so 
bitterly that they were willing to die fighting against it. In memorializing those killed 
fighting the UMW, Jones’s monument was anti-UMW propaganda designed to remind all 
who viewed it that organized labor, even in the 1930s, was divided against itself. Even 
the strongest unions at the height of their strength alienated workers who believed the 
organization did not have their interests at heart.  
But inconvenient truths illustrated by Mother Jones and her grave do not find a 
place in many narratives of “the labor movement.” By categorizing labor into a neatly 
separated division of “union” and “non-union,” those with unofficial connections to the 
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labor movement, like women, farmers, or workers in hosts of other occupations that 
pulled them in and around the mines, are excluded from historical accounts. In the late-
nineteenth century, these groups played crucial roles in organizing and strike success or 
failure. Without holding a union card, women like Mother Jones or miner wife Laurene 
Gardner contributed to leadership and organizing decisions that directly shaped the 
course of the UMW. Lacking union membership or even the official title of “miner” did 
not stop farmers from entering the mines and working for lower wages than the UMW 
scale allowed. The tens of thousands of non-union miners who made the 1894 strike an 
initial success, their reasons for honoring a strike while not joining a union, or their 
attitudes toward unionism in general are left unconsidered. 
In addition, excluding these non-union outliers makes those within union ranks 
appear much more solidified than they actually were and, at times draws lines that group 
workers in ways more arbitrary than real. It groups together all union members, whether 
they were white, black, or a non-English-speaking immigrant as a unified body when 
they did not always see themselves as a part of the whole. Strikebreaking and working 
below the union scale may be classified as non-union behavior, but in 1888, union miners 
broke a non-union strike on union officers’ orders and regularly undermined their own 
pay scales. Such instances indicate that unionism could exist outside union ranks just as 
easily as non-unionism resided within. 
This simplification of labor organizing’s turbulent past makes it more difficult for 
modern-day scholars and activists to make sense of the fracture among workers or their 
unwillingness to organize. If organizations like the UMW are presented as the only 
alternative for workers to improve their lives and the thousands who stood outside its 
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ranks are overlooked, it makes the modern day divisions among workers and their non-
unionism appear more novel than it actually is. Those who stood outside Gilded Age 
unions or acted against them from within, those who refused to unite for a common 
“labor ticket” or support mine legislation like anti-screen laws were not acting ‘against 
their own interests.’ Rather, workers and their interests were far more diverse than their 
critics acknowledged.  
Worker lives cannot be simplified and sorted into neat categories of “union,” 
“non-union,” “Republican,” “Populist,” or “Democrat.” The ideological battles they 
waged extended far beyond the divisions between the Knights and the AFL. Instead, they 
were complicated people, with rich lives and hopes that pulled and pushed them in 
different directions as they did what they thought was best for their lives and families. It 
allowed them to work multiple occupations as farmers, wage earners, and businesspeople. 
It pitted them against labor organizers even while they still professed to uphold “honest 
principles.” It caused some union miners to strikebreak and others to break away from the 
main order and form new unions that rivaled larger ones. 
Such findings apply as easily to the 1930s coalfields and present day workers as 
they do the workers of the Gilded Age. They share a common legacy of being “run of the 
mine” workers, whose interests are mixed and conflicting, but never without reason. It is 
only when actions are considered in this full, messy, and unfiltered context that worker 
non-unionism begins to make sense. 
 
 
Copyright © Dana M. Caldemeyer 2016 
265 
 
Appendices 
 
Lexicon of Mining Terms 
 
Anthracite coal: hard coal typically of high quality and mined primarily in the eastern 
Pennsylvania coal fields 
 
Bars: part of the screens used to sort slack from coal. Bars varied in shape and spacing, 
both factors determining how much coal fell between the bar gaps and away from 
the coal that would be weighed to the miner’s credit. Bar shape and spacing was 
therefore citical to any cents per ton wage agreement. 
 
Bituminous coal: most common type of coal mined in the United States. It is softer and 
less pure than anthracite 
 
Block coal: coal that broke into large lumps of a higher quality than  typical bituminous 
coal. In the southern Midwest, it was mined almost exclusively in Clay County, 
Indiana. 
 
“Blown shot”/ “rickety shot”/ “windy shot”: an explosion backfire that came from  a 
miner improperly loading his shot blast out the coal. Instead of firing into the 
face, it shot into the room, usually with an enormous boom and an intense flame. 
In most cases, blown shots were harmless, but in poor working conditions, they 
could cause the entire mine to explode, causing miners to be wary of less 
experienced men in the mines. 
 
Car: large wheeled cart miners used to transport coal out of the mine. 
 
Checkweighman: Worker appointed to oversee the weighing process to make sure 
miners were correctly credited for the amount of coal they mined.  In some mines, 
the company appointed and paid the checkweighman but in others, including most 
union mines, the checkweighman was appointed by the miners and receied his 
salary out of the miners’ wages. 
 
Dead work: Any labor a miner performed in the mine that did not add to the ton of coal 
he produced. Placing support beams, laying track, clearing out excess rock, and 
bailing out water were all kinds of dead work. Because these tasks did not add to 
his tonnage, the miner was usually not paid for them. 
 
Entry: Long corridors that branched throughout most mines from the mine shaft to the 
“face” with rooms situated along their sides.  Miners who “drove entry” dug the 
coal from the face of the entry, extending the corridor deeper.  
 
Face: newer portion of the mine where the coal was extracted and entries and rooms were 
dug deeper. 
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“Free click” / “free turn”: mining system that allowed miners who drove entry access to 
as many cars as they needed to clear away the coal from the entry face without 
having to wait for a turn. This allowed the mine to continually expand  and 
increase production, but slowed the turn for room miners who waited for access to 
a car. Miners who drove entry, then, had the best spots in the mine and often 
produced more coal than room men. 
 
Lump coal:large chunks of coal miners were paid to extract 
 
Nut coal: smaller pieces of coal that fell through the bars in the screening process that 
miners seldom received pay for. 
 
“Cents per ton”: the most common method of miners’ payment, referring to the amount 
of cents the miner received for each ton he mined. This meant that the miner’s 
wages depended on the weight of his load rather than the effort or the time it took 
to extract it. 
 
“Pluck-me” store: name for the company-owned store that employers frequentlly 
compelled their employees to shop at, either through scrip payments or the 
prospect of losing one’s job if his family did not shop there. Miners frequently 
complained that the stores unfairly “plucked” the wages from the miners.  
 
Practical Miner: an experienced miner who depended on the mines as his primary 
income. 
 
Room: section of a mine created by walls and supports designed to keep the roof intact. 
Rooms were connected by entries and one to four miners were assigned to each 
room.  
 
“Run of the Mine” coal/”Mine Run” coal: coal weighed before it was screened to filter 
out the slack. This made the miner’s loads weigh more and decreased the value 
per ton. 
 
Screen: large mine equipment, usually composed of metal bars and mesh, used to filter 
mined coal. Coal was dumped over the screens, allowing nut coal and slack to fall 
away from the lump coal before the coal was weighed. 
 
Screened coal: coal that was screened before it was weighed to filter out the slack. This 
made the miner’s loads weigh less, but with a higher concentration of coal and 
increased its value per ton. 
 
Scrip: form of payment rural companies like coal mines, timber camps, and textile mills 
used in place of cash. It was often only redeemable at the company-owned store, 
forcing employees to shop there. Scrip was closely tied to wroker debt and 
exploitation (see Chapter 1). 
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“Slack”: non-coal elements like slate and clay extracted with the coal during the mining 
process. Slack decreased coal value and most miners received no pay for 
extracting it. 
 
“Turn”: the wait or the line for an available “car” to load the coal. If the mine had more 
workers than available cars, the turn ran slow, meaning the miner had longer to 
wait for his coal to be hoisted and therefore produced less coal. 
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Abbreviations 
Organizations 
 
AMA   American Miners’ Association 
ATSF   Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Company 
BLS   Bureau of Labor Statistics 
FAMI   Federated Association of Miners and Mine Laborers of Indiana 
FLUA   Farmers and Laborers Union of America 
HCA   House Committee on Agriculture 
IFI   Illinois Farmers’ Institute 
IMPA   Illinois Miners’ Protective Association 
IOKL   Independent Order of the Knights of Labor 
NFM   National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers 
NPU   National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers 
NTA 135  Knights of Labor National Trade Assembly No. 135 
SBA   State Board of Agriculture 
SMI   State Mine Inspector 
UMW   United Mine Workers of America 
USDA   United States Department of Agriculture 
 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
BD   Black Diamond 
BP   Bloomington [Illinois] Pantagraph 
CT or CDT  Chicago [Daily] Tribune  
CTJ   Coal Trade Journal 
DISJ   Daily Illinois State Journal 
DIO   Daily Inter Ocean [Chicago, Illinois] 
DP   Daily Picayune [New Orleans, Louisiana] 
EMJ   Engineering and Mining Journal 
EC   Evansville [Indiana] Courier 
FSDM or FSM Fort Scott [Kansas] (Daily) Monitor 
IF   Indiana Farmer 
JKL   Journal of the Knights of Labor 
JUL   Journal of United Labor 
KF   Kansas Farmer 
NE   National Economist 
NLT   National Labor Tribune 
NYT   New York Times 
OCFP   Osage City [Kansas] Free Press 
TSJ   Topeka [Kansas] State Journal 
UMWJ   United Mine Workers’ Journal 
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Collections and Locations 
 
ATSF Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company New York 
Executive Department Files, KSHS 
ALPL   Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois 
CMP   Claude Matthews Papers, INSL 
ILHS   Illinois Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois 
ILSL   Illinois State Library, Springfield, Illinois 
IRAD   Illinois Regional Archives Depository 
INHS   Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana 
INSA   Indiana State Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana 
INSL   Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana 
JAMP   James Atwell Mount Papers 
JHP   John William Hayes Papers 
JMP   John Mitchell Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. 
KSHS   Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas 
KBLI   Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industry [Industrial Statistics] 
LC   Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
MHJP   Mary Harris Jones Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. 
SHSM   State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 
TVPP   Terence Vincent Powderly Papers 
UILSP   University of Illinois Special Collections, Champaign, Illinois 
UKSP   University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, Kentucky 
UMKC  University of Missouri Special Collections, Kansas City, Missouri 
WERP   William E. Rider Papers, UMKC 
WJBC   William Jennings Bryan Collection, Library of Congress, 
Washington,  
D.C. 
WKU   Western Kentucky University Special Collections, Bowling Green,  
Kentucky  
LDLP   Lorenzo D. Lewelling Papers, KSHS
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